Early West Indian 
Government 



Showing the Progress of Government 

in Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, 

1660-1783 



by 
FREDERICK G. SPURDLE, M.A., Ph.D. 



Published by the Author at his address, 
44 Russell St., Palmcrston North, New Zealand. 



LIMITED EDITION 

This edition of this book is limited to 
1000 numbered copies, of which this is No. 




PRINTED BY 

WHITCOMBE AND TOMBS LIMITED 

CHRISTCHUBCH AUCKLAND HAMILTON HASTINGS LOWB HVTT 
WELLINGTON T1MAKU 

LONDON 



PREFACE 

% 

Some years ago I wished to write the story of the decline of West 
Indian constitutions in the nineteenth century. In order to do this 
I had to start with a clear and reliable picture of what they had 
declined /rom, i.e. what they had been in their prime in the late 
eighteenth century. I sought information widely from both people 
and books, but, incredible as it may seem, could find no source of 
full and exact information. American investigators had worked out 
the story so far as the ex-mainland colonies were concerned, but so 
far as the West Indies were concerned published material was 
extremely patchy. It was generally understood that constitutional 
practices within all the older West Indian colonies had by the end of 
the eighteenth century become widely divorced from the spirit and 
letter of the original Restoration pattern as enshrined in the royal 
Commissions and Instructions issued to each governor. But to what 
extent, and in what detail? And too, by what steps? Practically no 
clear information was available. 

Accordingly, I have had to look the facts out for myself, and this 
book is the result. The investigation has proved surprisingly long 
and involved for I have had to go back to the origins of our colonial 
system, examine the constitutional position enjoyed by governors 
and their councils in the seventeenth century, and trace the ways by 
which these powers came to be reduced and even eclipsed by the 
popular Assemblies as the years rolled by. The greatest changes 
occurred in the field of executive government, and I have deliberately 
devoted the bulk of my attention to this sphere. I disregard the 
Bahamas and Bermuda not only because space does not permit 
their inclusion, but because their story is already better known than 
that of their sister islands. Even as it is, to cover so wide a field 
within the compass of a single book has compelled a drastic selection 
of material. The study has been terminated in 1783 because by then 
the movement towards formalisation and reduction of the governors' 
powers had become as complete as it was ever going to be. 

This story of early colonial development is of more than just 
historical importance. As a study of colonial government it is of 
present-day significance and many a student of representative in- 
stitutions as they are still to be met with today throughout many 
parts of the British Commonwealth will find it of interest. 



Preface 

Perhaps in the fullness of time somebody else will take up the 
story where the present writer leaves it off in 1783, and will describe 
in detail the great constitutional decline of the West Indian islands 
in the nineteenth century; and so complete the background against 
which the present-day constitutional renaissance within these islands 
needs to be set in order to be fully understood. May the present 
study be found of use when the time comes to begin such a task. 

Before closing I should like to express my indebtedness to many 
who have helped to make the research possible: to the encourage- 
ment given me by the late Professor A. P. Newton, of King's College, 
London; to the Librarian and assistants of the Institute of Historical 
Research of the University of London; to the Directors and staffs 
of the British Museum and the Public Record Office; the Librarian 
and staff of the Royal Empire Society; and last, but not least, to my 
wife, whose patience I have often sorely tried, but who has en- 
couraged and helped me to the end. 

F. G. SPURDLE. 



CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

I. THE GROWTH OF ORGANISED GOVERNMENT . . 7 

Rise of Assemblies in Barbados and the Leeward Islands, 7; 
Representative Government in Barbados, 1640-60, 12; Rep- 
resentative Government in the Leeward Is. before the Re- 
storation, 21 ; The English in Jamaica, 1655-64, 24. 

II. THE ISLAND LEGISLATURES . . . . . . 28 

Exercised only subordinate jurisdiction, 28; The Council and 
Assembly, 29; The law-making process, 30. 

III. ISLAND EXECUTIVES SURVEYED . . . . . . 33 

The Governor, 33; Governor and Council, 34; Dependence or 
otherwise of Councillors, 35; Their selection, 36; The Quorum, 
37; Precedence at the Board, 40; Devolution of Government in 
Barbados and Jamaica, 40; Lieutenant Governors in the Lee- 
ward Is., 41 ; Lieutenant General of the Leeward Is., 46; Devo- 
lution of Government in the Leeward Is., 47. 

IV. BRIDLING THE PREROGATIVE . . . . . . 50 

Court regulation, 51; The Militia, 57; Quitrents, 63; Fee 
Taking, 64; Assembly organisation, 68. 

V. FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN BARBADOS . . 76 

Procedure in tax legislation, 76; Appropriation, audit and issue 
to 1685, 79; The same after 1685, 85. 

VI. PUBLIC WORKS IN BARBADOS . . . . . . 94 

Position of the Executive, 94; Fortifications, 96; Defensive 
expeditions, 100; Harbour Works, 105; Public Buildings, 108. 

VII. JAMAICAN FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION .. .. ,111 

Procedure in tax legislation, 111; Appropriation and issue, 1 14; 
Control of the Public Accounts, 120; The Receiver-General, 
122; The Surplusage Question, 125. 

VIII. PUBLIC WORKS AND KINDRED SERVICES IN JAMAICA 127 

Guard Ships, 127; Fortifications, 129; Parties against the 
Maroons, 135; Barrack Building, 137; Public Buildings, 138; 
Highways and Harbours, 140; Assisted Immigration, 143. 

IX. FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE LEEWARD ISLANDS 147 
Preparing for supply, 149; Procedure in tax legislation, 150; 
Inspection of Accounts and issue of public money, down to 
171 1,1 53; The same after 1711 (a) Antigua, 155; (b) St. Christo- 
pher, 157; (c) Nevis, 161; (d) Montserrat, 163. 

X. PUBLIC WORKS IN THE LEEWARD ISLANDS . . 166 

General features, 166; Fortifications, etc., 1 68 ; Public Buildings, 
174; Waterworks, 176. 



Contents 

XL APPOINTMENT IN BARBADOS AND THE LEEWARD 

ISLANDS . . . . . . . . 180 

External appointment to major offices, 180; External appoint- 
ment to minor posts, 183; Assembly encroachments in regard 
to (a) its own servants, 186;(b) Agents, 189; (c) Treasurers, 191 ; 
(d) Excise officers, 194; (e) Powder officers and lesser posts, 
195; The position in 1783, 197. 

XII. APPOINTMENT IN JAMAICA . . . . . . 200 

External appointment by letters patent, 200; External appoint- 
ment by government departments, 203 ; Encroachments by the 
Assembly in regard to (a) its own servants, 203 ; (b) the Agents, 
204; and (c) Tax receivers, 207; The position in 1783, 208. 

XIII. CONCLUSION: THE ISLAND CONSTITUTIONS IN 1783 . . 210 

APPENDIX. TABLE OF WEST INDIAN GOVERNORS TO THE 

YEAR 1783 .. .217 

CHAPTER REFERENCES . . . . 220 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . 265 

INDEX 272 



Chapter I 

THE GROWTH OF ORGANISED GOVERNMENT, 

1625-1664 

1. The Rise of Assemblies in Barbados and the Leeward Islands 

The first permanent English settlement in the West Indies was 
made early in the year 1624, when a small band of adventurers under 
the leadership of Thomas Warner, a Suffolk gentleman, landed upon 
the little island of St. Christopher, with the intention of making it 
their home. They had been sent out by a small syndicate of London 
merchants, of whom Warner and another, Ralph Merrifield, were 
the chief promoters. They had been in possession of the island 
scarcely above twelve months, when a crew of privateering French- 
men under Pierre d'Esnambuc put in to refit. These newcomers 
became so attracted by the possibilities of settlement that they too, 
with Warner's permission, established themselves. Both sections of 
the island community so increased in numbers that in 1627 by 
common consent a partition was effected, the English retaining the 
central portion of the island, while the French agreed to confine 
themselves to its northern and southern extremities. l 

Having made his settlement without any authority from the 
English Crown, Warner was no sooner confident of success than he 
took steps to regularise his position. This necessitated his return to 
England in the summer of 1625. On account of his humble birth he 
could not hope himself to secure the proprietorship of the islands, 
though he did secure quite early from Charles I a commission 
appointing him Lieutenant or as we should say, Governor over the 
islands of St. Christopher, Nevis, Barbados, and Montserrat, as well 
as all others of the Caribee Islands not claimed by any foreign 
power. 1 The question of the proprietorship required considerably 
longer negotiation. Warner managed to interest Lord Treasurer 
Marlborough in his claims, and the latter afterwards transferred his 
whole interest to James, first Earl of Carlisle, who in July, 1627, was 
finally granted letters patent over the whole of the Caribee Islands, 
from 10 to 20 north latitude; a wide range which made express 
mention of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Barbados, Dominica, 



8 Early West Indian Government 

Guadaloupe, Montserrat, Antigua, Nevis, and St. Christopher, as 
well as smaller islands. 8 

The inclusion of Barbados within this grant wrought a great 
injustice to Sir William Courteen, who only a few months earlier 
(17 Feb., 1627) had planted a settlement there. He at once contested 
the grant, and brought forward evidence to prove his own prior 
right to the island. Despite this, however, the influence of the more 
powerful courtier prevailed, and by a decision given by Lord Keeper 
Coventry in April, 1629, Carlisle was confirmed in his possession. 4 
Meanwhile the dispute had seriously discouraged emigration to the 
colony, prospective settlers being unwilling to risk the purchase of 
land while the proprietary claims remained in such confusion. But 
Coventry's judgment at once cleared the way for renewed settlement, 
and both St. Christopher and Barbados flourished so rapidly, that by 
the early forties the English population of each was probably in the 
neighbourhood of 30,000. The surplus from these two parent colonies 
spread outward into several of the surrounding islands. Nevis was 
settled in 1628 by a small group of people under the leadership of 
Anthony Hilton, an ex-planter from St. Christopher, and seems to 
have thrived comparatively well. Antigua and Montserrat on the 
other hand, being more remote, were not regarded as so favourable 
to cultivation: consequently attempts were not made to plant them 
until the middle thirties. Both, however, by 1636 were in the throes of 
early settlement, though the slowness with which they developed 
stands in marked contrast to the progress of the more fortunate 
islands. Twenty years later, when prosperous Barbados had well 
over 30,000 white inhabitants, Antigua, her equal in size, had not 
more than 1,200. 

Proprietary and governmental rights over all these islands resided 
in the Earl of Carlisle, but the terms of constitutional import within 
his patent were not at all precise. For the better regulation of his 
people he was empowered to make laws, which were to be issued 
only "with the consent and approbation of the freeholders*'. But 
this safeguarding of popular liberty was virtually nullified by the 
insertion of a further clause, empowering him upon emergencies to 
ordain laws without that consent. Since no attempt was made to 
define what should constitute such emergencies, the provision in 
effect gave the Earl unbridled legislative authority. A still later 
clause gave him unlimited power to tax and exact rents from his 
people, 6 while he was, of course, given sole appointive authority. 
He could dispense government either in person or by deputies, and 
was given power to execute justice in all causes whatsoever, to remit 



Growth of Organised Government 9 

offences, and grant pardons. He was given full authority to organise 
the military defence of his possessions, and to make free use of 
martial law in any time of tumult or invasion. These terms may all be 
reduced to the one comprehensive statement, that all legislative, 
executive, taxative, judicial, and military authority centred in the 
Proprietor, who was permitted to exercise it through deputies. 
Lip-service was paid to one or two principles of constitutional 
freedom, which were, however, so devoid of machinery for making 
them effective as to be of no practical use. 

The patent in no place specified the form of governmental institu- 
tions which should be set up for the internal regulation of each 
colony. This was left to the sole discretion of the Earl himself. If he 
chose, he might by virtue of his powers exercise almost despotic 
sway, or he might on the other hand govern wisely and well, estab- 
lishing local institutions and endowing them with constitutional 
liberties, which, though detracting from his own personal authority, 
would nevertheless contribute to the happiness of his subjects. Since 
he did not reside within his government, he found it necessary to 
wield his authority through the separate governors whom he ap- 
pointed to each island. To each of these he granted the same powers 
which the Crown had granted to him, subject only to the condition 
that they must submit all important matters to him for confirmation, 
and pay heed to all instructions that he should send them. 6 In 
theory, therefore, each governor was a person of only subordinate 
authority, owing his very position to the Proprietor, and having 
his every decision subject to the latter's instructions and review, 
but in practice he was of far greater consequence. His distance from 
his master enabled him to commit many an act, destructive of the 
interests either of the people or of the Proprietor, the results of which 
were beyond a remedy by the time the superior power of the Pro- 
prietor could intervene. 7 

The commissions issued by Carlisle to his governors were as 
devoid of institutional definition as was his own patent. That granted 
to Warner in 1629 for the governorship of St. Christopher left all 
power to the Governor, not even specifying the need for a council of 
advisers. He was given a mere general authority "to do all ... 
things ... for the advancement and establishing the public good of 
the said plantation . . . according to the laws and laudable customs 
of England". Perhaps it was by virtue of an authority such as this 
that the first Councils were established or it may be that the 
Governors along with their commissions received instructions, now 
unknown to us, which ordained the setting up of these bodies. In any 



10 Early West Indian Government 

case, be the authority what it may, Councils were constituted very 
early both in Barbados and St. Christopher. They were chosen by 
the Governors, who naturally enough confined their selection to 
men upon whom they could depend for support. Carlisle's first 
Governor of Barbados, Charles Wolverston, upon his arrival 
nominated a Council of twenty to be his assistants, while we know 
that by 1630 Warner in St. Christopher had set up a Council of ten 
members. Nevis, too, under Anthony Hilton, was in possession of a 
Council as early as 1629, her second year of occupation. 8 In all three 
islands the local Councils enjoyed an unbroken existence from that 
time onwards. 

Throughout the next ten to twenty years the Governors and 
Councils held supreme command. Councillors remained subservient 
to the Governor who appointed them, but their participation in his 
acts lent a less arbitary guise to the administration. All legislative, 
executive, and judicial power was concentrated in their hands. By 
them all regulations were framed and issued, from them all ad- 
ministrative acts proceeded, and before them all criminals and other 
lawless characters were arraigned for trial and sentence. A spirit of 
arbitrariness pervaded all their doings. A summary harshness 
marked the trials which were heard before them, the punishments 
extending even to whipping, branding, and death. Popular liberties 
were practically non-existent, and life itself was cheap to those who 
dared protest.* All the evidence available points to the oppressiveness 
which characterised the island administrations so long as they 
remained untempered by the inclusion of any popularly elected 
element. 

Prior to the development of Assemblies, the Governors and 
Councils possessed unlimited powers of taxation, which they did not 
hesitate arbitrarily to exercise. In Barbados, for example. Henry 
Hawley in 1634 demanded a poll tax of 40 Ib of cotton or tobacco 
per head 20 for the use of the Proprietor, and 20 for his own 
purse. He pretended that it was to be used in making fortifications 
within the island, but it was never so expended, though it was con- 
tinued annually down to the year 1641, when it was exacted by 
Governor Huncks for the last time. In St. Christopher Sir Thomas 
Warner with the consent of his Council levied a similar tax of 
20 Ib of tobacco per head for the Earl of Carlisle, and 20 Ib for 
himself, in addition to a further quantity for the maintenance of a 
minister and a small party of guards. This was continued for certain 
down to the year 1646, and probably on till 1649, the year of 
Warner's death. The taxes so demanded were collected as summarily 



Growth of Organised Government 1 1 

as they were levied. As soon as the time arrived for the crops to be 
gathered in, the Provost Marshal in each island demanded the 
amount of duty, and in default of payment had power to distrain 
upon the goods of the defaulters for its satisfaction. Until the taxes 
were paid no person was allowed to dispose of his crop. 10 

Participation by the people at large in the government of the 
islands was almost unknown before the establishment of the Bar- 
badian Assembly in 1639. We know that upon isolated occasions 
mass meetings of all planters upon an island were convened by the 
local governor, where business of extraordinary importance made 
such a step desirable. Such primary assemblies were, however, of 
practically no constitutional significance. The story of Henry 
Hawley's convocation of the first representative Assembly in Bar- 
bados is too well known to require description. It should be noted, 
however, that for the first two years the House was a mere advisory 
body, and that not until the advent of Governor Bell in 1641 was it 
given a right to initiate legislation. In the other islands we hear of an 
Antiguan Assembly in 1644, and one in St. Christopher three years 
afterwards. 11 Montserrat, however, was more backward. It is fairly 
certain that even by 1654 there was still no popular element in the 
government of that island, for we read that one Samuel Waad, a 
brother-in-law to Governor Roger Osborne, was by the latter 
ordered to be shot, because he in a public gathering "did solicit the 
governor . . . that they might be regulated by due course of law as 
other of the islands were, which was to be by common Council and 
Assembly"." The fact that Osborne was still at his post in 1660, 
would tend to indicate that Montserrat did not achieve popular 
government until the Restoration. 13 Concerning the Nevis Assembly 
our knowledge is almost blank, save that we know such a body was 
in existence by 1658. 14 When it began its life we do not know, but 
probably it was in being at the beginning of the Protectorate period. 

The growth of popular representation within the separate govern- 
ments quite destroyed the institutional uniformity which up to that 
time had existed. Thenceforth each individual island continued its 
political progress at a rate different from the rest; some like Barbados 
and Antigua hastened rapidly towards radicalism, while others like 
Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Christopher apparently made only slow 
advance in the vindication of popular rights and liberties. For 
purposes of convenience, therefore, let us alter our method of 
treatment, and relinquish our attempt at uniform description, in 
favour of a more particular account as far as we have evidence to 
show it of the political development of each island. 



12 Early West Indian Government 



2. Representative Government in Barbados, 1640-1660. 

Hawley's "Parliament" in Barbados consisted of eleven councillors 
and twenty-two "chosen burgesses*'. 16 The number of Assemblymen 
was never altered, and when in the time of Governor Bell the 
number of parishes was finally fixed at eleven, a representation of 
two delegates from each division made up the full composition of the 
House. The Council, on the other hand, varied considerably from 
time to time, a record of 1641 giving the names of thirteen members 
and the Secretary, 1 * while we know that the Board established by 
virtue of commissions from the Commonwealth authorities was 
fixed at six. 17 Throughout the whole period of Daniel Scarle's 
governorship it was kept scrupulously at that figure. 

Of the relationships which obtained between the Governor, the 
Council, and the Assembly, our knowledge is meagre, but we can 
piece it together in a few particulars. When in 1642 the political 
combatants in England resorted to arms, both sides strove to win 
the support of the Colonies. Barbados, though royalist in sympathy, 
for the first few years definitely fore-bore giving allegiance to either 
side, resolutely refusing to be made a party to the central dispute. 
Proprietor, Crown, and Parliament alike had their authority dis- 
regarded, and the island for the rest of the decade pursued a course of 
virtual independence. To accomplish this Governor Bell had to 
unite all branches of the legislature in his support to give all a 
stake in the administration. Complete self-government was estab- 
lished. Bell personally selected all his Councillors, but it is clear that 
he followed their advice so slavishly that before long they usurped 
a position of co-equality with him. 18 The Assembly, which was 
frequently in session, was much consulted in all matters of im- 
portance, and bore an active share in the government of the island. 
The whole community was practically unanimous in the stand which 
had been taken, and harmony between all branches of the legislature 
was complete. They were almost one body, unified in their devotion 
to the common weal, instead of three separate entities, each selfishly 
intent upon the furtherance of its own interests. Many of the Council 
had previously sat in the Assembly, and the affinity between the two 
Houses was very strong indeed. John Bayes, in describing this close 
attachment, wrote that "the Council and Assembly were so cemented 
together, as the one could not be dissolved without the break-neck of 
the other." 19 This affinity certainly continued throughout the period 
of the Walrond ascendancy, when the representatives were permitted 



Growth of Organised Government 13 

to share in many functions which rightfully belonged to the Execu- 
tive. We find them joining in the appointment of commissioners of 
defence for the various parishes, and of judges to act as arbitrators 
in cases of dispute between merchant and planter. These are the 
first instances now traceable of appointments being made directly by 
legislative Act, a form of appointment which invested the Assembly 
with a distinct share in the selective process. 20 

With the arrival of Lord Willoughby in 1650, we might well expect 
some reduction in the Assembly's growing powers. His commission 
from the second Earl of Carlisle gave him plenary powers in all 
things, extending even to matters of legislation and taxation. The 
forward state of the island prevented his taking full advantage of 
these, but the Assembly in granting him a permanent revenue of 
4 per cent, on all goods exported by merchants and 2 per cent, on all 
exported by planters, 21 did yield to him a financial independence 
which might have been of very great use to him in pruning their 
powers, had time only permitted him to make the attempt. It seems 
probable that he did deny their right to share in the making of 
appointments, a contemporary description of the island recording 
the fact that "My Lord creates all officers." 22 We have no evidence, 
however, that he was able to effect much in the reduction of the 
Assembly's powers, the approaching forces of Parliament under 
Sir George Ayscue making it absolutely essential that political 
harmony be preserved at all costs. In any case the problem of 
repelling the invader probably drove all else from the minds of the 
inhabitants, Willoughby included. 

The capitulation to the Parliamentary forces made no difference to 
the internal system of island government. The Governor continued 
to be appointed from England, the Council to be chosen by him, 
and the Assembly to be elected two from each parish by the resident 
freeholders. Since no law yet specified a definite term for the 
Assembly's continuance, that body remained in being just so long 
as the Governor thought fit to retain it. The Council of State in 
England formally commissioned Sir George Ayscue to assume 
command of the island, and to choose a Council of six "rightly 
qualified" persons to act as his assistants. 23 Apparently they took it 
for granted that the Governor and his Council would as a matter of 
course control all policy and wield all executive authority; con- 
sequently no clauses were inserted within Ayscue's commission to 
specify the particular powers which he should wield. This was a 
distinct weakness, which was destined to cause serious inconvenience. 
Ayscue obeyed orders, and for a short time himself did hold the 



14 Early West Indian Government 

reins of government, constituting as his six Councillors, Daniel 
Searle, Henry Hawley, Thomas Modyford, James Drax, John Burch, 
and Richard Hawkins. The first of these was his own Lieutenant, 
who had been second in command of the Parliamentary forces, 
while the other five were all planters thought to be favourable to 
the Parliamentary cause. When the time came for Ayscue to leave 
the island, he appointed Searle to be Governor in his stead. This was 
quite in accord with the wishes of the English authorities, and the 
powers of the new Governor were intended from the first to be 
identical with those of his predecessor. The island Councillors, 
however, readily saw an excellent opportunity to reap political 
advantage out of the situation. They claimed to have been appointed 
on just as good authority as Searle himself, and denied that he had 
any power to remove them. They further insisted that in all Council 
decisions he possessed no vote superior to their own, and asserted 
that he was a mere Councillor like themselves, his position being 
that of one primus inter pares. So strenuously did they deny his right 
of veto, that he was constrained to hold it in abeyance pending an 
appeal to England upon the question. Scarlc's position was made as 
unpleasant as possible, the islanders being determined to make the 
most of his confusion. Among people of so royalist a temper the 
recent surrender to Parliament had been a deep humiliation. Defeat 
had changed royalist zeal to imperial indifference. If they could no 
longer actively oppose the English Parliament, they could at least 
reduce to a minimum any association that existed between the two 
countries, and so preserve for Barbados that virtual independence 
which had already marked its position under the early governorship 
of Philip Bell. Public opinion zealously supported the creation of 
such an independence, unfettered by restrictions from England, yet 
subject to the protective assistance of the parent state in time of need. 
As Searle himself put it, they aimed "to remain under England's 
protection, but not to own England's jurisdiction". 14 The whole 
atmosphere of public life was pervaded by this narrow spirit 
supporters were predominant in both Council and Assembly. The 
Governor, they said, was too king-like, and many argued that he 
should be elected by the inhabitants themselves, just as the mayors 
of corporations were in England. Others, including even the Coun- 
cillors themselves, 15 challenged the method of the Council's appoint- 
ment, and vainly suggested that the latter should be elected by the 
freeholders just as the Assembly was. 

The same strivings towards self-government early found fault 
with the Governor's prerogative powers. The islanders insisted that 



Growth of Organised Government 1 5 

he should exercise no authority but that which the laws of the 
island expressly gave him, and that, too, only in the manner which 
the laws themselves prescribed. They challenged his independent 
right, as Bayes said, "to judge of any small matter, or issue out 
his warrant upon any urgent occasion". 26 They aimed at nothing 
less than the complete Rule of Law, and Barbadian law at that. No 
power which the Governor enjoyed solely upon the authority of his 
commission was safe from legislative interference, or even complete 
abolition. An excellent illustration is to be seen in the Assembly's 
alteration of the whole Chancery system. From the earliest times 
the Governor and Council, acting upon their commission from the 
Proprietor, had sat as a court to hear appeals and matters in equity, 
all of which had hitherto been well conducted to the satisfaction of 
the inhabitants. Indeed, so voluminous had become the amount of 
Chancery business, that the Assembly in 1652 raised the cry that it 
was taking up too great a proportion of the Council's time, and on 
that score they framed and passed a measure which withdrew all 
Chancery jurisdiction from the Governor and Council, and placed it 
instead within the hands of the ordinary divisional courts. Searle 
opposed the bill, but was outvoted by a majority of his colleagues 
who favoured the change, so it was effected despite his disapproval. 27 
Throughout the concluding months of 1652 a whole crowd of laws 
was enacted, many of which struck at the discretionary powers of the 
Governor, and were forced through contrary to his wishes. For- 
tunately we still retain a record of these Acts. The year was a very 
busy one in the realm of local legislation. The political transformation 
brought about by the capitulation to the English Parliament neces- 
sitated the re-enactment of nearly all the existing laws in order to 
bring them into harmony with the new authority. The opportunity 
was taken to make a revision of the whole island code, many old 
laws being completely restated and many new ones passed. These 
Acts were listed by John Jennings, Clerk to the Assembly, and 
published in 1654. M An examination of these reveals the fact that 
no fewer than ninety measures were passed during the years 1652-3, 
dealing with a wide variety of subjects, many of them making serious 
changes in the judicial and other administration. Some of them 
altered courts and court procedure. Many set scales of fees to be 
taken by the various public officers, and ordained that security be 
given by them for the honest performance of their duties. Others 
prescribed the terms upon which men should serve in the Militia, 
or the Horse, or hold military commissions; while a few concerned 
the regulation of trade. All these things had come to be regarded 



16 Early West Indian Government 

many of them for the first time as matters proper for legislative 
regulation. The extent to which they whittled away powers left 
previously to the Governor's unrestricted discretion, may be gauged 
from Bayes' report that "by their several votings [they] have so 
eclipsed the Governor's power, that at present he signifies little only 
his title, having not the fifth part of that power which all former 
governors have had." 29 

But the Governor still retained one power of which the popular party 
were justifiablyjealous, and which they were correspondingly anxious to 
restrict. He could convoke, prorogue, and dissolve the Assembly at 
will, and, so long as he could carry on without their financial 
support, he could refrain even from giving them a meeting. Searle's 
Assembly now tried to strengthen their position by making them- 
selves financially indispensable to him even to the control of his 
salary itself. For the private support of their governors previous 
Houses had granted certain taxes for the whole period of their 
office. Governor Bell had been granted one pound of tobacco per 
acre, while Lord Willoughby had received the 4 and 2 per cent. 30 
Searle's Assembly now altered the whole system. They commenced 
the practice of raising taxes for only small periods, 31 thereby making 
the Governor's salary conditional upon their own regular con- 
tinuation. It would also appear by this time that they had vindicated 
their claim to be the sole originators of tax bills. 32 But these practical 
safeguards failed to satisfy them. They wanted nothing less than an 
absolute legislative guarantee of their right to perpetual existence. 
Accordingly throughout the late summer of 1653 they brought all 
possible pressure to bear upon the Governor to induce him to 
consent to an Act providing for the election of a fresh Assembly 
every year, the new one to meet before the old one had disbanded. 

Searle vehemently opposed such a scheme, and at length succeeded 
in thwarting their design. 33 His success was due in part to a great 
change which had been wrought in his position in August, 1653. 
After considerable delay, the Council of State in England had at last 
pronounced judgment upon the matter of his position at the Council 
board. The decision was in his favour, and a fresh commission was in 
June, 1653 sent out to him. This gave him power to appoint his 
own Councillors, and so opened up a way by which he was enabled 
to dismiss the old and summon a totally new body of advisers. The 
new commission made no mention of the veto power, but we know 
that thenceforward it was allowed him. 34 The power of the Governor 
to control his Council as well as their legislative measures, was thus 
finally and fully established. No longer were they able by a spurious 



Growth of Organised Government 17 

equality of power to compel his assent to measures which he per- 
sonally disapproved. In fact the situation in which the Councillors 
now found themselves was ironical to the last degree. 

Temporarily secure in their position at the Council table, they 
had in the past co-operated with the Assembly to impose restrictions 
upon the Governor's discretionary powers. They had succeeded, 
and the free powers of their victim had been seriously curtailed. 
They did not foresee that in setting legislative channels to the exercise 
of the Governor's authority, they were setting identical channels to 
the exercise of their own. In bridling the Governor they equally bridled 
themselves. With the arrival of the commission of 1653, their dis- 
comfiture was well and truly brought home to them. They were 
now a subordinate body of mere assistants to an officer who himself 
wielded little independent authority, and throughout the remainder 
of the Protectorate period they never really rose from that position 
of subordination. They paid a heavy price therefore for their former 
willingness to sacrifice the prerogatives of their own position to the 
pressure of popular demand. 

But if the Council had profited nothing as a result of the limitations 
set upon the Governor's authority, the country as a whole had 
certainly made most material gains. So greatly had the discretionary 
portions of the prerogative been whittled down by the enactment of 
legal conditions for their exercise, that the Rule of Law was estab- 
lished as a very prominent feature of local life. This willingness to 
respect only locally established law, with the corresponding tendency 
to ignore any authority of more arbitrary origin, attracted the 
attention of numerous observers several of whom have fortunately 
left us a record of their observations. Francis Willoughby in his 
second period of office early remarked to Charles II upon the 
people's disposition to believe "that they were not to be governed 
by your Majesty's commission, nor anything but their own laws". 35 
This spirit never subsided: it was strengthened rather than diminished 
by Willoughby's opposition, and triumphed again under the admini- 
strations of his successors. The Triumvirate of Henry Willoughby, 
Hawley, and Barwick succeeded in procuring supplies from the 
Assembly only at the price of a definite promise that "the inhabitants 
. . . should be governed according to the laws of England and the 
constitutions and laws of this place, and not otherways." 36 Atkins, 
too, paid tribute to the self-same phenomenon when in 1677 he wrote 
that "without a law . . . confirmed [by the Governor and Council] 
they will do nothing", and stated further that the islanders looked 
upon this as "their primary right by which they held all they had". 37 



18 Early West Indian Government 

The Assembly, too, had gained as a result of that early struggle. 
It had proved its ability, in the interests of the people, to change by 
legislation the most long-standing institutions, to curtail the very 
oldest authorities. It had failed, it is true, to force the passage of its 
own perpetuation bill, but it had made advances in most other 
directions. It had manifested a tendency to make appointments by 
means of legislative Acts, and so to continue an interference in 
what was more properly an executive function.* 8 It had succeeded 
in grasping a share in the Treasurer's appointment. Whether or not 
it had enjoyed this during the time of Governor Bell, we cannot tell. 
It is clear, however, that when Ayscue was in the island he insisted 
that the appointment be retained within the Governor's hands." 
But scarcely twelve months afterwards the Assembly under Scarle 
assumed a right to participate in the selection not only of the 
Treasurer, but of the Excise Clerk as well. 40 It thus made these 
officials partly responsible to itself for the honest performance of 
their duties, and there is no reason to suppose that it cscr lost this 
power during the remainder of the Protectorate period. 

But it was not only in the appointment of the Treasury officials 
that the representatives encroached upon the field of actual financial 
administration. Their influence went much further than that. Early 
in the decade they secured a right to share in the audit of the Trea- 
surer's accounts, so to assure themselves of the honesty of his 
dealings. This work was generally performed by a joint committee 
of members from both Houses, who reported to the legislature what 
stock still remained within the Treasurer's hands. 41 The legislature 
did not safeguard expenditure by the insertion of appropriation 
clauses in the tax Acts; it adhered instead to a custom whereby no 
public money could be spent upon any work or service, until that 
service had received the approval of both Houses. This, of course, 
obviated any necessity for appropriation clauses, and is amply 
confirmed by a statement made by the Council in 1661. "For 
defraying ... all public charges of government, forts and the like", 
they wrote, "we have, by the consent of the Council and Assembly, 
laid a yearly imposition on wine and strong liquors brought ... to 
this island, which if it at any time fall short, we by the common 
consent of the Council and Assembly raise a levy upon ourselves, 
which is brought into the hands of the Treasurer, and disposed of 
by the same consent that raises it" 4 * 

Once a certain work had been mutually approved, it was generally 
left to the Governor and Council to see it done. If it were a matter 
of only trifling importance the Board might simply order the 



Growth of Organised Government 19 

Treasurer to carry it out. If, on the other hand, it were of a more 
serious character the Council could either give the authority itself, 43 
or else depute a committee of able planters to arrange a contract 
upon the public's behalf. An instance of this last is to be seen in 
the Council records of 9th May, 1654, on which day the Board set 
up a committee comprising William Vassall, Lieut. Colonel Cod- 
rington, Edward Collinson, Peter Levi, and Captain Thornborough, 
to "treat agree and conclude with any person or persons for re- 
building the [Indian] Bridge, ... Mr William Johnson Treasurer 
[to make] payment for the charge thereof . . . out of the public 
Treasury". 44 At other times a joint committee of both Houses 
might be set up to make a contract, as when on 25th May, 1654, 
Colonel Lewis Morris and Lieut. Colonel George Stanfast were 
deputed "forthwith [to] contract with and purchase [from] Colonel 
Edmund Reade one house standing at the Hole, at such reasonable 
price as conveniently they can, which is to be paid out of the public 
Treasury". 46 The claims which resulted from such contracts being 
for clearly ascertained amounts were generally paid from the 
Treasury upon the Council's own authority. Amounts of a less 
ascertainable nature, on the other hand, being usually for services 
of an emergent or incidental sort which had not secured the previous 
approval of the Assembly, had to pass the scrutiny of the lower 
House as well as the Council before they could be paid. Evidence of 
this is seen in the Council Minutes of 3rd October, 1654, which run 
th us: "Upon the petition of Richard Wilmott to the Governor, 
Council and Assembly for some goods due to him as a public debt; 
and also upon reading the order of the Assembly dated the 26th 
July, 1654, that the petitioner should prove his account before the 
Commissioners of Public Debts, and procuring [proving] his 
accounts to be paid by the Treasurer one third present, and the 
rest in order and course; it is ordered by the Governor and Council 
that the Commissioners do forthwith state and audit the account 
of the said Wilmott, and what shall be proved to be due, that 
Mr William Johnson Treasurer, do forthwith pay one third, and the 
other by order and course." 4 * Additional evidence of the same 
process is forthcoming from a record of 3rd July, 1661, when the 
Council sent down to the Assembly the account of a Mr Hart, 
with a request that the House "take some speedy course for the 
payment" of it. The representatives gave it their immediate attention 
and ordered that Hart deliver his account to the "Committee of the 
Public Treasury at their next meeting", who were directed to "take 
a speedy course for satisfaction of what shall be found ... to be 



20 Early West Indian Government 

justly due*'. 47 Over this more variable section of the public accounts, 
therefore, the House, either directly or through its representation on 
the committee of public accounts, certainly possessed a right of 
scrutiny before payment could be made. 

To sum up: the extreme simplicity of the Barbadian administra- 
tion, and the close personal relationships which existed between the 
members of its component parts, had tended to break down the 
barrier between the legislative and executive departments. After all, 
the very separation of government into divisions is itself only a 
measure of practical convenience, calculated to render more 
efficient the control of a large and complex state. Barbados was 
neither large nor complex. The whole island, the whole administra- 
tion, and the personal abilities and inclinations of every official 
within it were well known to every inhabitant. They did not clearly 
distinguish between those things which ought properly to belong to 
the Executive and those which appropriately belonged to the 
legislature. The Assembly, without purposely intending to encroach 
upon the administrative field, was nevertheless often guilty of doing 
so; while the Governor and Council, themselves none too clear 
upon the rightful bounds of their own province, not infrequently 
tolerated the encroachment, because at the time they did not realise 
the harm which it wrought to their position. 

By the end of the Commonwealth era the measure of the Assem- 
bly's advance was clearly distinguishable. In the short twenty years 
of its existence it had robbed the Governor and Council of all their 
early independent law-making authority, and had seriously curtailed 
their discretionary latitude even in the executive field. In addition 
the House had erected for itself a legitimate power to share not 
only in all legislation and taxation, but also in the realm of finance, 
and to a lesser extent in those of public works 4 * and appointment. 
In the remaining fields of administration, however, it had not so 
seriously encroached. While by law it had regulated the organisation 
of the militia, 49 it did not seek to usurp the Governor's essential 
right of declaring martial law, and of appointing all commissioned 
officers. While by law it had similarly regulated the conduct of the 
courts and court procedure,* 4 it did not challenge the Governor's 
right to appoint both the judges and the justices of the peace. Its 
interests lay thus predominantly in the sphere of legislation, taxation, 
and finance, in which its advances were far more noteworthy than 
they were in any other quarter. 



Growth of Organised Government 2 1 



3. Representative Government in the Leeward Islands before the 
Restoration. 

Of the relationships existing between the Governors, Councils, and 
Assemblies of the Leeward Islands during this period our knowledge 
is almost a complete blank. We know that the Assemblies enjoyed 
no security of tenure, and were liable to be summoned by the 
Governors only because the latter desired supplies. With the possible 
exception of Antigua it does not appear that any of them ever made 
use of their financial power to create such security. When summoned, 
they, unlike the Barbadian House, met along with their respective 
Councils. 51 With nearly all of them we have strong presumptive 
evidence that they were not yet powerful enough to safeguard the 
proper rights and liberties of their constituents, let alone to interfere 
in matters of executive concern. For all the islands we have com- 
plaints recorded against the Governors which, if true, would indicate 
that the discretionary powers possessed by the latter were still compara- 
tively large, and that the Assemblies held only a subordinate place." 

To this general rule the island of Antigua was a possible exception. 
It was peopled largely by people from Barbados, which fact alone 
suffices to explain the radical temper of its politicians. Its represen- 
tative Assembly had existed in all probability from the mid-forties. 
The inhabitants, like their fellows in Barbados, had exhibited an 
exceedingly royalist temper, which was only subdued by the arrival 
of the Parliamentary forces, who reconstituted the government with 
officers of more tried allegiance to the republican order. The new 
Governor, Christopher Kcyncll by name, soon encountered great 
opposition from the local Assembly. The merits of the dispute can 
no longer be clearly resolved, but it is clear that the Assembly's 
antagonism, though in part capricious, was nevertheless founded 
upon solid complaints. They complained of the way in which the 
Governor's cattle were allowed to wander at liberty over the whole 
island, thereby destroying the crops of the other planters. They 
opposed the manner in which the various officials exacted exorbitant 
fees in the performance of their duties, and yet grossly neglected 
their responsibilities. They showed further dissatisfaction with the 
neglect of the Governor and Council to protect the residents from the 
attacks of Carib raiders; while it is equally clear that they were 
extremely dissatisfied with the existing administration of the public 
finances. The more radical section was equally resentful, in a way 
which reminds us of contemporary Barbadians, of the way in which 



22 Early West Indian Government 

the meeting of the Assembly depended upon the capricious summons 
of the Governor. 

Matters came to a head in 1655 when the representatives addressed 
to Keynell a petition demanding that the Secretary and the Provost 
Marshal deposit security for the diligent performance of their 
duties. They further demanded that a committee should be estab- 
lished to appoint places most suitable for the quartering of troops, 
and to lay in provisions for the same. They asked for the appoint- 
ment of a second committee to supervise the issue of all money 
from the treasury, and finally suggested that the Speaker might be 
empowered to convoke the whole body of the legislature, including 
even the Councillors, whenever he should think fit. Keynell sharply 
bade them mind their own business. In July a new Assembly met, 
and at once determined to push ahead with legislation to effec 
desires. The resultant bills all tended to exalt the Assembly's powers 
at the Governor's expense. The first, significantly enough, sought to 
alter the financial system. It stipulated that all fines, etc., should be 
levied in the name of the Protector and paid in to the treasury; that 
two Treasurers should be annually nominated by the legislature as a 
whole; and that four commissioners should be selected, two from 
each House, to meet regularly for the examination of the Treasurer's 
books, and to authorise all disbursements. A further bill sought to 
discontinue the existing tax a permanent one by which 30 Ib 
of tobacco per head was annually granted to the Governor. Two 
more provided that the Secretary and Marshal should furnish 
substantial security for the efficient conduct of their offices, while 
another strove to make sweeping changes in the judicial system. 
Hitherto all litigants had had to repair to a central court at Fort 
Ayscue to have their suits judged, a procedure which had occasioned 
great delays. The Assembly now sought to apply a remedy by the 
establishment of four divisional courts, each composed of one judge 
and two assistants nominated by the whole legislature. Appeal was 
still left, however, to the Governor and Council as a Court of 
Appeal. Finally, and from a constitutional point of view perhaps the 
most important measure of all, was one entitled an Act for the 
convening the deputies of the several divisions, which sought to make 
it lawful, after the Governor's first convocation of a new Assembly, 
for the Speaker to continue all subsequent sittings when and where 
he might think convenient.** He was to be permitted to continue 
these sittings for two or three months if the majority of deputies 
so desired, therein to prepare bills which would later be presented to 
the Governor and Council for their approbation or rejection. 



Growth of Organised Government 23 

For some days the Governor and Council were half inclined to 
assent to these proposals, but divisions of opinion later broke out 
among them, culminating in Keynell's downright refusal to pass 
any of them. He straightway prorogued the legislature in order to 
give passions time to abate. Some of the Council, siding with the 
representatives, prayed him to re-summon the Assembly and pass 
some of the measures proposed. He refused, and secretly decided 
to take himself off to England, there to lay his troubles before 
Cromwell. The Council forbade him to leave the island, but he, 
taking the decision into his own hands, took ship to Nevis, en route 
for England, leaving one Major Garden as his deputy. A day or 
two later three of the four resident Councillors met in conference 
with thirteen out of the sixteen Assemblymen to discuss the situation 
caused by Keynell's departure. The assembled gathering refused to 
recognise the authority by which Garden acted. They denied that 
Keynell had possessed any authority under his commission either to 
leave the government or to appoint a successor, insisting that at the 
time of the island's capitulation in 1652, Ayscue had intimated that, 
in the departure or death of the Governor, the Council and Assembly 
should share between them the governmental power, until the 
arrival of fresh instructions from England. They therefore resolved 
that this power now resided in the Council and Assembly combined, 
and called upon all colonists to observe the laws published by their 
authority, and to submit to all officers whom they appointed. All 
such appointments were to be signed by not less than three Coun- 
cillors and seven Assemblymen. 

Garden saw that no time was to be lost. Sending post-haste after 
Keynell he managed to intercept him before he got beyond Nevis. 
The news of these latest occurrences brought the Governor back 
immediately. Upon his arrival he dissolved the Assembly and 
imprisoned several of the leading malcontents. He then compelled 
the island to disavow the acts of its representatives and to recognise 
Garden's authority. Having thus suppressed the opposition he once 
more left the island.* 4 We find him in England in 1656 laying his 
case before the Protector, from whom he solicited a new commission 
granting him wide authority, including full executive jurisdiction, 
and even a personal power if necessary to tax the islanders for 
defraying the costs of his administration. 66 Just to what extent he 
was able to carry these into effect we have now no means of telling, 
but it is extremely unlikely that he ever succeeded in taxing the 
riders without their own consent. Moreover, the fact that early 
in the Restoration 64 the islanders succeeded in modelling the financial 



24 Early West Indian Government 

administration upon lines very similar indeed to the plan put 
forward in 1655, is an indication that Keynell and his successors 
gradually allowed to the Assembly one or two of the powers for 
which it struggled. 

The similarity between the Barbadian financial system and that 
proposed by the Antiguans in 1655 is striking. The Barbadian House 
enjoyed a joint share in the nomination of the Treasurer; the An- 
tiguan Assembly claimed the same. A committee of the Barbadian 
House shared in the audit of the Treasurer's accounts, and in some 
cases judged the merits of claims for payment out of the public 
funds: the Antiguans strove for an almost identical power. More- 
over, the committee system of public defence attempted by the latter 
in 1655 was not at all dissimilar to the commissioners of defence set 
up in Barbados during the ascendancy of the Walronds in 1650. 
These early Antiguan practices, though somewhat rudimentary in 
character, exercised considerable influence on Leeward Island 
development in days to come, as later chapters will show. 



4. The English in Jamaica, 1655-1664. 

Jamaica fell into the hands of the English in 1655 in consequence 
of Cromwell's Western Design against Spain. Fortunately for us the 
Spaniards, despite long occupation of the island," had failed to 
settle it effectively and could raise scarcely five hundred fighting 
men for its defence. Open resistance being thus of no avail, the 
majority of Spaniards with their slaves retired to the forests and 
mountains, where for five years they kept up a harassing resistance, 
ambushing parties of soldiers and hunters and attacking our out- 
posts. 

Meanwhile fever and pestilence struck right and left among our 
troops, taking even greater toll than the Spaniard. Had the King of 
Spain cared enough for Jamaica to put forth a serious effort to 
retake it, he must have succeeded; but fortunately he showed no 
such inclination, with the result that the guerillas at last lost heart 
and moved to one or another of the neighbouring Spanish posses- 
sions, leaving us in undisputed control. 

Cromwell strongly desired to retain the island and lost no time 
in trying to promote its settlement. The soldiers themselves were 
encouraged by free grants of land to remain, and attempts were 
made to attract settlers from the other West Indian colonies, from 
North America, and from Great Britain itself. Fourteen hundred 



Growth of Organised Government 25 

settlers transferred from Nevis and some five hundred from Bar- 
bados, and finally a fluctuating stream set in from England, Scotland 
and Ireland. Thus, despite the ravages of disease, the population 
slowly increased until by 1660 it numbered between 3000 and 4000 
people. The early English plantations, like the Spanish before them, 
were almost entirely in the south east corner of the island from 
Morant westwards to Macario Bay. The chief town was Port Royal, 
the headquarters of many buccaneers, a thriving place of between 
six and seven hundred inhabitants: next in importance came Spanish 
Town with scarcely three hundred. 

The military commander on the island was also Governor. In 1660 
this post was held by Edward Doyley, an officer of the original 
expedition of 1655, who had either outlived or outstayed all his 
former superiors. He had been in command since 1657 and by his 
energy and ability had been fairly successful in maintaining order and 
promoting settlement despite the political uncertainty of the times. 

Upon the Stuart Restoration peace was made with Spain and 
Jamaica retained. Early in 1661 Charles II continued Doyley in the 
governorship pending the making of more permanent arrangements 
for the management of the island. Military government, however, 
was to give place to civil, and for this purpose an elected Council of 
twelve members* 8 was established to advise and assist Doyley in 
his task. 

This arrangement was comparatively shortlived, however, for 
within a few short months Lord Windsor was appointed Governor 
with power to nominate his own Council and to summon an 
Assembly of elected freeholders. Doyley was too much a soldier to 
feel much enthusiasm for the institution of civil government and, 
beyond swearing in the councillors as justices of the peace and 
establishing courts of law at Morant, Port Royal and Spanish 
Town, he did little to alter the shape of things. Full civil government 
had to await the arrival of Windsor, who landed in mid-August, 1662. 

Under Windsor and his deputy, Sir Charles Littleton, considerable 
progress was made in the new direction, though it was not till 
October, 1663, that writs were issued for the election of the promised 
Assembly. This consisted of twenty members, elected from the 
various settled districts in proportion to their populations. Port 
Royal returned three members, Spanish Town two, and Morant, 
the North Side, Seven Plantations, and some other sparsely settled 
districts one each. The Assembly held its inaugural meeting on 
20th January, 1664, and sat until February 12th when it was pro- 
rogued, but met again for a short time in May. One of its first 



26 Early West Indian Government 

measures was an Act validating various ordinances issued by the 
Governor and Council in times past, and repealing certain others, 
especially two tax ordinances. The House then proceeded to bring in 
and pass five money bills, for it was determined not only to raise 
enough taxes to support the new administrative system in every way 
it desired, but also to establish its own pre-eminence in the matter 
of supply. 

The representatives were much afraid that, as Jamaica was a 
colony of conquest, the King might seek to impose arbitrary 
taxation; hence they hastened to declare the illegality of any "further 
or other tax or levy or assessment . . . imposed or levied upon the 
island or inhabitants thereof, without the assent of the Governor, 
Council and Assembly*'. 6 * At the same time they hastened, as has 
been said, to supply the financial needs of the colony as amply as 
they could by means of an impost on imported liquors, a poll-tax 
on all persons over twelve years of age, a tax on all uncultivated 
lands, and the imposition of a licence fee upon all retailers of strong 
liquor. 60 Next they determined to keep a very tight control over the 
actual expenditure of the moneys so received. This they sought to do 
by giving their House an equal share with the Governor and Council 
in the selection of the two public treasurers into whose hands the 
tax proceeds were to be paid, and by ordaining that the money 
was to be issued only with the "consent of the Governor, Council 
and Assembly"." 

In framing these Acts of January, 1664, the Jamaican Assembly 
was not following English usage, for the House of Commons had 
not yet begun the practice of appropriating supply and examining 
the royal accounts, nor did it presume to interfere in the appointment 
of tax officials. Rather were the Jamaican representatives following 
the Interregnum example of other plantations such as Barbados and 
Virginia, where wide separation from England coupled with the 
breakdown of the royal connection had engendered the feeling that 
government was more a matter of local concern than of the King's, 
and the appointment of tax officials more the prerogative of the 
people than of the Governor. 

In May, 1664, Deputy Governor Littleton left Jamaica for England 
and a month later Sir Thomas Modyford, the new Governor, 
arrived. Modyford was a man of wide experience, one-time English 
royalist turned Barbadian planter and finally Governor of that 
island for a brief time. He was astute, clear-headed and high-handed 
yet, despite this, his West Indian background made him popular 
among the Jamaicans. He summoned a new Assembly to meet in 



Growth of Organised Government 27 

October. Few of its members had sat in the previous House and in a 
comparatively short session (Oct., 1664-March, 1665) it declared all 
the Acts of the latter void on the grounds, among others, that they 
had not been signed by Littleton. It then re-enacted, though with 
several important alterations, the revenue Acts of its predecessor, 
granting the taxes to the King "for the public use of this island," 
and ordaining that the entire revenue be paid to "the Receiver of 
His Majesty's public revenue" who was appointed by the Governor. 6 * 
The administration of the revenue was thus restored to the due 
care of the Governor and Council and the proper officials. In the 
absence of evidence it is impossible to say what induced the 
representatives to do this, but two likely reasons spring to mind: 
first, the known antipathy of this House to the previous one; and 
second, the firm insistence which the experienced Modyford pro- 
bably employed. Be this as it may, by this Act the financial ad- 
ministration certainly reverted to the orthodox constitutional 
pattern of the Restoration period, to which it continued to conform 
for a considerable time to come. Finally this second Assembly, 
still under the shadow of uncertainty as to its fate as a colony of 
conquest, passed a law "declaring the laws of England in force in 
this island", hoping thereby to stave off arbitrary interference from 
England and ensure that the constitutional liberties possessed by the 
older West Indian colonies would be enjoyed by itself. 



Chapter II 
THE ISLAND LEGISLATURES 



1. Introduction 

The Restoration was an age of as much importance in the sphere 
of colonial constitutional development as it was in every other 
department of colonial activity. The royal domains were in progress 
of being enlarged; Jamaica had just recently been acquired, and the 
King was already preparing to resume possession of the Caribee 
Islands from their proprietor, the Earl of Kinnoul. Moreover the 
government of Virginia, as a result of innovations wrought during 
the Commonwealth, was in urgent need of overhaul. Thus statesmen 
were faced with the serious problem of providing a suitable con- 
stitutional frame for every one of the royal provinces of their d 

This difficulty was somewhat lessened by the fact that in Virginia, 
Maryland, and the Caribcc Isles the provinces most in favour with 
British officialdom at the time there had already grown up from a 
variety of causes a triple form of constitution which bore an un- 
deniable, though comparatively accidental, resemblance to the 
English frame. Contemporary lawyers, quick to recognise this broad 
likeness in point of form, speedily came to invest colonial con- 
stitutions with a corresponding similarity in point of function, 
the Governor representing the King, the Council corresponding to 
the House of Lords, and the Assembly being the humble counterpart 
of the House of Commons. Thus in defining anew the governmental 
forms and relationships which should for the future obtain within 
each royal province, lawyers and others came to model them in a 
broad sort of way upon their own interpretation of the English 
constitution itself. 



2. Island Legislatures Exercised Only Subordinate Jurisdiction. 

Colonial legislatures, though resembling the parent body, were in 
all important respects subordinate to it. Their laws were subject to 



Island Legislatures 29 

disallowance by the Crown if found to conflict with English law or 
policy. The islands were also subject to imperial legislation, even 
taxation, whenever an English act specifically included them. 2 The 
claims of their Assemblies to powers identical with those of the 
House of Commons were firmly denied, even by the Commons 
itself, 3 which recognised that the logic of such claims implied an 
equality of status and an independence of action which neither it 
nor any other portion of English society in the 17th or 18th century 
was prepared to allow. Moreover the governors and chief office- 
holders within the islands were appointed under letters-patent by 
the Crown itself, showing clearly that the island administrations 
were considered an integral part of the royal jurisdiction. 

Admittedly, the island legislatures were not so subservient to the 
English government as was the Irish parliament under Poynings' 
Law 4 for they had unfettered right to make whatever laws they chose, 
provided these were not repugnant to the laws of England or unduly 
restrictive of the royal prerogative, but at the same time they were 
far from being independent. 

3. The Council and Assembly. 

Governor Sir Thomas Modyford in a despatch to the Council of 
Trade and Plantations about 1668 described the Jamaican legislature 
in the following words: "The legislative power", he wrote, "is settled 
in the Governor as His Majesty's commissioner, in his Majesty's 
Council as representing the Lords' House, and in the Assembly . . . 
being a humble model of our High Court of Parliament, each of 
these respective bodies enjoying a negative as well as an affirmative 
vote." 5 This description would have applied equally well to all the 
other West Indian colonies. 

The Council in each colony really performed a dual function. In 
the transaction of administrative business it was an advisory body 
to the Governor, i.e. an executive council. In law-making sessions, 
on the other hand, it was a true legislative council, the upper house 
of the legislature. This was earlier and more clearly to be seen in 
Barbados and Jamaica than in the Leeward Islands, for in Barbados 
and Jamaica the Assemblies met separately from the Councils from 
practically the beginning of their history, whereas in the Leeward 
Munds most of the Assemblies continued to meet in joint sessions 
with their Councils until late in the reign of Charles II. 8 Indeed the 
Montserrat Assembly, the last to separate, did not begin separate 
meetings until 1696. 



30 Early West Indian Government 

At first the business at Council sessions in all islands was all 
mi\ed-up. administrative affairs and legislative matters being con- 
sidered one after the other at one and the same meeting. Gradually, 
however, these things became more formalised, the Councils be- 
ginning to keep executive business and legislative affairs as far as 
possible to separate sessions. Indeed in Jamaica this distinction 
became so far advanced that when the Council was in legislative 
sessions the Governor ceased altogether to attend, allowing the 
senior Councillor to preside. In the other colonies this exclusion of 
the Governor was not carried to such a length, but whenever he was 
present in legislative sessions of Council after about 1 725, he was 
denied any right to vote, 7 the idea being that his opportunity to 
decide on the merits of a bill would rightly arise when it came before 
him for assent. 

As befitted their status, the Councils were naturally invested with 
a good deal of dignity as well as authority. They had as their clerk 
and their marshal the deputy secretary and the deputy provost 
marshal of their respective islands, and they gradually developed 
their own codes of rules and privileges. 

Similarly the Assemblies in the course of time developed well 
defined forms of their own. Each had its own clerk and its own 
marshal (or messenger), who were generally its own appointees.' 
Each had the right to choose its own Speaker, draw up its own rules, 
discipline its own members, judge of their qualifications, and decide 
all disputed elections. In addition it could inquire into public 
grievances, summon persons before it, commit for contempt, and 
even "impeach" high public dignitaries for gross misdemeanours. 
The privileges of assemblymen included freedom of speech and 
debate, and extended even to immunity from personal arrest during 
the entire period of each Assembly and to a limited protection of 
their chattels from distraint. These rights and privileges were based 
on the corresponding rights and privileges enjoyed by members of 
the House of Commons in England. In the same way they were 
frequently abused by those who possessed them, but were always 
staunchly insisted on and defended; 9 and were probably no more 
than was necessary for the dignity and protection of those who chose 
to run the gauntlet of public affairs in those uncertain times. 

4. The Law-Making Process. 

Laws in each colony were customarily enacted by the Governor, 
Council and Assembly. Having passed each house three times, they 



Island Legislatures 31 

were presented to the Governor for his assent, which was ordinarily 
given provided they did not infringe the terms of his Commission 
and Instructions. In the case of ordinary bills it did not matter into 
which house the measure was first introduced, but money bills had 
customarily to be introduced first into the Assembly 10 which, in 
imitation of the House of Commons, claimed the sole right to 
initiate taxation. Each house had a free right to amend ordinary 
bills, but at one time or another during the eighteenth century every 
West Indian Council save that of Montserrat gave up its right to 
amend money bills, 11 thus leaving to the Assemblies the exclusive 
management of supply. 

Having received the vice-regal assent, the Acts were despatched to 
England for the scrutiny of the Privy Council and the Board of 
Trade. This did not necessarily delay their operation because, unless 
they contained a clause suspending their operation until the will of 
the English authorities had been made known, they took effect 
immediately the Governors had assented to them. Such as were 
found fault with in England were generally rejected by the Crown 
and went out of operation as soon as the Order-in-Council dis- 
allowing them came to hand. A few others, on the other hand, being 
highly approved in England, were confirmed and allowed to remain 
permanently in operation that is, until the local legislatures of their 
own will and accord chose to repeal them. The majority, however, 
were neither confirmed nor rejected, but simply allowed to "lie by", 
thus remaining indefinitely in operation, though liable at any time 
to disallowance from England or to repeal by the island legislatures 
themselves. 11 

To this account of how island laws remained in operation, Jamaica 
is a seeming exception, but the differences in her case are much 
more apparent than real. In the Crown's long struggle with the 
Jamaican Assembly for a permanent revenue, the confirmation of the 
island laws was used as a kind of bargaining card. When in 1681 
the Assembly for the first time departed from short-term Acts and 
granted a revenue for seven years, the chief island laws were con- 
firmed for seven years also. When two years later the House softened 
sufficiently to grant a 21 years* revenue, the principal laws (including 
the previous batch) were continued for a similar period. Upon this 
revenue being extended in 1703 for a further 21 years, the laws were 
correspondingly continued; and when in 1728 a permanent revenue 
was granted, they were at last permanently confirmed. Onwards 
from 1728 each new Jamaican law simply followed the normal 
course of having to take its chance of confirmation or otherwise in 



32 Early West Indian Government 

England. Thus, though the details might differ, the result was 
practically the same: the cream of Jamaican laws gained permanent 
confirmation; a great many others, being indifferently regarded in 
England, were allowed simply to "lie by" and a few, being seriously 
objected to, were disallowed. 

This system, whereby the majority of colonial laws, instead of 
being definitely confirmed or rejected, were allowed to remain in 
indefinite operation, satisfied the imperial authorities very well, 
since, whenever changing conditions rendered a measure incon- 
venient, the way was clear to disallow it. The result within the 
colonies, however, was harmful, since it invested legislation with a 
harmful uncertainty and lent an air of undue sanctity to confirmed 
laws, which the colonists were naturally reluctant to repeal, lest 
the new Acts should fail to gain confirmation at Home. Thus many 
an obsolete old statute was allowed to slumber on in the belief that 
"a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush**. This seems to have 
been particularly true of Jamaica where the struggle to secure 
permanent confirmation of their early laws had been so protracted, 
but it was also noticeable in other islands. 



Chapter III 
ISLAND EXECUTIVES SURVEYED 



1. The Governor 

The Governor within a royal province, representing the King, was 
charged with the preservation of the royal prerogative 1 within his 
territories, and was given powers sufficient to acquit himself of this 
responsibility. The prerogative powers of the King in England were 
quite well known, so it was not difficult for lawyers to attribute all 
of these to his representative overseas. 

The King as chief magistrate within his realm had power to choose 
fry hk assistants a body of rnuqcillors: the Governor was cm- 
powcred to choose a similar body. The King' had powers alone frn 
HgmXej adjourn, prorogue and d^oNe Parliament; the Governor 
was avcn a corresponding authority over his provincial legislature. 
The King, as a constituent part of the English legislature, possessed 
a negative voice in the making of all laws: the Governor iw/iwHji 
similar veto. The monarch in English tradition was the fountain nf 
justice, to whom belonged the right both of establishing courts and 
appointing judges and justices to them: his provincial representative 
was given a similar right. lq the Crown alone lay the right to pardon 
oil u/hn nff>nHiH against thg laws, and this discretionary power was 
likewise placed in the Governor's hands. 

The King was the sole dispenser of office and privilege in him lay 
the right to dispose of all offices within the kingdom, and tn establish 

similar power within his domains. In England the King was Com- 
mandcr-in-Chicf of all the military forces; in him resided the sole 
right of raising and regulating the army, of appointing military 
officers, and of building forts and other defences. The Governor 
in turn was authorised to organise a force of militia^ to drill and 
*jfnt*ifi JL to prepare and publish Articles of War for application in 
times of insurrection or invasion, and to raise appropriate defences^ 
English law regarded the King as the supreme arbiter of commerce, 
recognising his right to establish markets and fairs, to set up havens 



34 Early West Indian Government 

and ports, and to grant charters of incorporation to such bodies as 

were thought deserving: each Governor overseas was granted 

corresponding powers. Lastly, the Crown was the supreme Governor 

of the Established Church, and in continuation of this ecclesiastical 

jurisdiction the royal Governor wfls constituted Ordinary wiihin 

his province, with power to grant licences of marriage, letters of 

"administration, probate of wills, and to collate to all vacant 

Jgndjces. 1 



2. The Governor and Council 

Moreover, just as the Governor was meant to be the provincial 
counterpart of the monarch, so the provincial Council was the local 
equivalent both of the House of Lords and of the Privy Council. 3 
But even at the time of drawing up the new constitutions, their 
framers realised that many a power, which the King might properly 
wield alone, could not with safety be entrusted to the uncontrolled 
discretion of his representative overseas. While therefore in theory 
they granted to the latter truly regal powers, they were careful to 
limit the freedom with which these should be exercised. From the 
very first, the consent of the local Council was made necessary to the 
performance of many of the chief vice-regal functions, ^vcn the 
earliest Restoration con J the OoPnKM' T in the 

nf courts the falling of Atfctnblift. thy building of 



foils, the dmJmv! the pio;mee into parishes, the 1'Miitmg ot hinds 
itkrs, the publication or Articles 01 war, tnc regulation ol fees, 
ami the establishing of ports, to act only in accordance with the 
majority a J vice andconscnt of his Council. Subsequent rcquijeaienti 
placed still further restrictions upon his freedom of action, until by 
the closing years of Charles II, the only powers still remaining 
within a governor's free discretion were those which permitted him 
to appoint to, or suspend from, all civil, judicial or military offices 
within his province, and to dominate a fractious legislature by the 
use of prorogation, dissolution or veto. Towards the end of the 
seventeenth century, moreover, his hitherto undisputed right of 
filling all vacant offices was further curtailed by the arrival of an 
Instruction which necessitated the consent of Council to all future 
appointments of judges and justices of the peace. 4 Puril?8 *hg 
following century, therefore. Ac only powers still left within his 
undisputed grasp were those of prorogation, dissolution, and veto7 
minor appointment, and suspension? 



Island Executives Surveyed 35 



3. How Independent were the Councillors? 

During the early years of the Restoration, this obligation to act 
only with the advice and consent of his Council imposed no great 
hardship upon a governor, for they were all his own personal 
appointees, and liable at any time to be displaced by him. Con- 
sequently he was generally able by threats of dismissal to browbeat 
them into submission to his schemes. After a little while however, 
the English authorities, partly to minimise this abuse, and partly 
because they themselves desired to exercise greater control over the 
provincial administration, took the appointment into their own 
hands.* To the governor was left only the right tn snsppnH a rnnn. 
cillor for contumacious conduct, pending the royal pleasure in the 

SBSs 

Early in the eighteenth century yet another step was taken towards 

strengthening the independence of the individual councillor. It was 
now ordained that in ordinary circumstances no councillor might he 
suspended unless the majority of his fellow members were con- 
senting to the step. Only upon extraordinary occasions was the 
Governor permitted to dispense with this condition, and then only 
when he possessed special reasons, which were to be transmitted 
to the Board of Trade without delay. 7 

This last proviso certainly offered an avenue of escape, whereby a 
governor, by pretending the offence to be more serious than it 
really was, could dispense with the Council's consent, even in 
ordinary cases. This, however, seldom availed him anything, for the 
aggrieved councillor, having appealed to and justified himself before 
the Crown, generally secured an order for his re-admission to the 
Board, and so resumed his seat to the deep humiliation of his would- 
be oppressor. The history of the West Indian islands furnishes 
numberless instances of this, and shows clearly that the English 
authorities, realising the grave disservice which would result from 
a toleration of such vice-regal tyranny, jealously safeguarded the 
independence of the local Boards. The most serious consideration 
was always given to the case, before they went to the length of 
confirming a councillor's suspension. On one or two occasions, even 
when they did support a governor in such an act, they nevertheless 
censured him severely for any unnecessary arbitrariness he might 
have shown in giving effect to it. 8 Such reprimands tended to make a 
governor much more circumspect in the way in which he exercised 
his suspending power, and made the Council far more independent 



36 Early West Indian Government 

of his control than is generally realised, and many a West Indian 
Governor, like Governor Lyttelton in Jamaica (1762-66), got rather 
a jolt when he discovered the independence that Councillors were 
capable of. 9 



4. Selection of Councillors. 

For some years after the Crown first assumed the sole right of 
selecting the members of the local councils, it took no steps to 
ensure that there should always be ready at hand a list of those 
most fitted for appointment. As a result the choice of councillors 
during these early years was a thoroughly haphazard business, any 
island inhabitant having sufficient influence with the right authorities 
in England having a good chance of being chosen. Consequently, 
an island governor was occasionally required to admit to his Council 
men whose abilities and reputation he personally disapproved. 
Sir Richard Dutton of Barbados was one of the first to revolt 
against this slip-shod system of selection; he urged upon the Lords 
of Trade the desirability of taking the local governor into their 
confidence whenever council appointments were contemplated. No 
islander, he urged, should be appointed a councillor until his 
character had first been ascertained from the governor himself. 10 
The soundness of his suggestion appealed to the good sense of the 
Lords, who proposed in reply that he despatch to them a list of 
twelve men best fitted from among the planters to fill future vacancies 
at the council board. 11 

This provision became regularly included within the Instructions 
given to all subsequent Barbadian and Jamaican governors 1 * for a 
further generation. The same arrangement, though in a modified 
form, was extended also to the Leeward Islands. There each governor 
was required to send home from time to time the names ot 
planters for each island, whom he deemed best qualified for appoint- 
ment to the local boards as suitable vacancies should arise. 1 * For 
nearly seventy years this system was adhered to without alteration. 
When, however, in 1752 the Board of Trade temporarily succeeded 
to a position of independent authority over the colonies, it decided 
upon a radical change, obliging all governors whenever a Council 
vacancy occurred, to send home the names of three persons suitable 
for selection to fill it. This method of recommendation continued 
throughout the remainder of our period. 14 

As a general rule the Crown, in choosing new councillors for any 
island, appointed one or other of those recommended by the 



Island Executives Surveyed 37 

Governor. Examples to the contrary were very rare, and perhaps 
because of that, are worthy of some notice. Planters who were not 
fortunate enough to secure a place within the list of official nominees 
might still if they possessed sufficient influence make independent 
overtures direct to the English authorities. In 1686 the Crown 
directed that Richard Harwood should be admitted to the Barbadian 
Council. The rest of that Board were scandalised. Harwood was 
but an overseer, a man of "servile condition, personal inability, and 
other scandalous circumstances". They persuaded Acting-Governor 
EdwynStedeto suspend him from taking his seat until they could make 
formal protest to the Crown in the affair, and apparently they were 
successful in securing the cancellation of Harwood's mandamus. 15 
But there is at least one instance of a person being appointed to 
the Barbadian Council in direct opposition to the desires of the 
Governor. In 1 730 Governor Worsley, hearing that one John Ashley 
was making efforts to secure appointment to that Board, wrote 
specially to the Duke of Newcastle in an effort to prevent it. The 
Privy Council, however, made independent enquiries into Ashley's 
character, and being satisfied with the result, persisted in choosing 
him for the place. 16 Moreover a few years afterwards during the 
governorship of Sir Thomas Robinson, there occurred a further 
instance of a very similar nature. Robinson's unconstitutional acts 
of expenditure having aroused the hostility of his Assembly, the 
latter devised a unique method of attempting to thwart him. Knowing 
full well that the Governor could not act in direct opposition to his 
councillors, the House sought through the influence of its agents 
in England to 'pack' the Council with men who sympathised with 
the popular cause. By canvassing members both of the Board of 
Trade and of the Privy Council the Island agents sought to secure 
the appointment only of persons of approved sympathies. It would 
appear that they were not wholly unsuccessful in their efforts, for 
John Gibbons, a son of the Assembly Speaker of the day, did 
receive appointment to the Council directly as a result of this 
influence. 17 It is important to realise therefore that the choice of 
councillors through private influence did not completely cease with 
the establishment of the more regular and official system of vice- 
regal recommendation. 

5. Quorum of Council 

From the earliest years of the Restoration it was intended that the 
Council in each royal luluny should consist uf twelve members. 



38 Early West Indian Government 

Partly through lack of imperial supervision, and partly through 
exceptional local circumstances, the numbers fluctuated to some- 
times more and sometimes less than this figure. In 1697, however, 
the newly constituted Board of Trade decided to adhere strictly 
to the limit of twelve, 18 and throughout the succeeding century this 
seems to have been fairly rigidly maintained. 

For some years too, some doubt had prevailed as to the quorum 
necessary for the conduct of council business. The commission 
given to Francis Lord Willoughby enjoined him in many matters of 
weight to act only with the consent of a majority of his Board, but it 
is certain that he paid little attention to this requirement. That 
given in 1672 to his brother William gave clearer definition to the 
provision by requiring that in his more important functions the 
Governor act only with the consent of at least seven out of his 
twelve advisers. Early in 1673 however, William protested against 
this restraint. "It is rare", he wrote, "that I can procure seven to 
meet/* Business in consequence was often much obstructed because 
such a condition demanded the almost unanimous consent of all 
present before any matter of importance could be undertaken. 19 As 
a result of his protests the position was so far amended that the 
quorum necessary for the conduct of business was fixed first at 
seven, and still later at only five members." This came to be con- 
tinued throughout the whole of the eighteenth century. In the 
Leeward Islands it became the accepted rule that a Lieut. Governor, 
being himself on the Council, could proceed to business so long as 
four other members were present, this combination being considered 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements laid down by the imperial 
authorities. 11 

Deaths in the West Indies during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were very frequent, and might easily give rise to serious 
reductions in the numbers of councillors. Since the islands were 
several weeks distant from England the speedy filling of such 
vacancies presented a problem of great difficulty, especially as 
English official procedure was notoriously slow. It was necessary 
therefore, that every local governor be given power to deal with 
such emergencies. A clause came quite early to be included within 
his commission, empowering him to make certain temporary appoint- 
ments to the Board whenever its membership should fall so low as to 
endanger the conduct of public business through lack of the necessary 
quorum. As soon as the number of resident councillors fell below 
seven he was allowed by the addition of his own nominees, to bring 
the number up to that figure and no more. When doing this, 



Island Executives Surveyed 39 

however, he was not given an entirely free hand, but was expected 
to choose his substitutes from among those whose names had already 
been recommended to the English authorities. 23 

Moreover, his additions to the Council made under such circum- 
stances, were permanent only if they were subsequently confirmed 
at home. If the Crown, instead of approving the vice-regal appointees, 
chose to select others to fill the vacant places, then the governor's 
men had to relinquish their temporary offices as soon as the Board, 
by virtue of such royal appointments, had been restored to its 
minimum of seven. Considerable confusion attended the carrying 
out of this provision. Some governors, of whom Daniel Parke of the 
Leeward Islands was perhaps the worst offender, obstinately per- 
sisted in filling up their councils beyond the prescribed limit, and 
received severe reprimands for their pains. Others did not recognise 
the fact that their temporary appointees, when not confirmed at 
home, automatically lost office as soon as royal nominations restored 
the council to the minimum of seven. But with the passage of time 
the repeated rulings'* given by the Board of Trade in disputed 
cases of this nature gradually drove the matter home and lessened 
the recurrence of such misunderstandings. 

Even as late as the sixties of the eighteenth century, however, this 
matter still provided an occasional storm. During the acting- 
governorship of President Rous, the Council of Barbados fell to 
six members. To bring the Board up to the required minimum, Rous 
straightway appointed a prominent planter named Irenaeus Moe. 
Not long afterwards, however, one Gedney Clark came forward 
with a direct royal mandamus of appointment, to claim a seat at 
the Board. The newcomer, while not demanding Moe's actual 
withdrawal, nevertheless desired precedence over him. The President 
and the rest of the Council, however, supported Moe on both counts. 
They supported his claims not only to the retention of his seat, 
but to his precedence as well. 16 But Clark was not to be baulked so 
easily. He demanded that the matter be laid before the Board of 
Trade. The latter quite properly and consistently refused to confirm 
Moe, who thereupon retired from the Council, leaving Clark to the 
undisputed enjoyment of his rightful place. 26 Such instances of the 
royal neglect or refusal to confirm a governor's choice were, however, 
comparatively rare, and we can accept it as a general rule that 
whenever the governor by temporary appointments brought his 
council up to a minimum of seven, his nominees were confirmed in 
due course by the Crown, and so admitted to a permanent place. 



40 Early West Indian Government 



6. Precedence at the Council Table 

The West Indians of old were sticklers for dignity and privilege, 
and more than one controversy at the Council table arose over the 
question of precedence. 17 It is interesting to note that the Crown 
demanded that the seniority of one councillor over another should 
depend upon the dates of their appointment, as indicated by the 
dates upon their respective mandamuses. 1 * The Leeward government 
and Jamaica obeyed the imperial behest in this respect, but the 
Barbadians throughout the entire eighteenth century clung to a 
custom of their own, by which precedence was determined, not by 
the date of the mandamus, but by that upon which each member 
was first sworn to his place. The differing results arising from the 
two practices are at once apparent. In the Leewards, a newcomer 
holding a direct royal appointment would take immediate precedence 
over a mere governor's nominee, even though the latter may have 
been officiating for some considerable time. In Barbados the reverse 
obtained. In the Leewards the time of receiving a mandamus was 
of no consequence. In Barbados on the other hand, it was a matter 
of considerable urgency, for a councillor who secured the quick 
delivery of his mandamus might beat to the council board and so 
secure precedence over one whose document bore an earlier date, 
but who had been less fortunate in its delivery." 



7. Devolution of Government in Barbados and Jamaica 

Before we turn from the Council in order to give our attention to 
other subjects, it is well to note that the early CoynP 1 * " both 
Barbados anfl Jamaica wr" *mp^ercdas collective bodies to 
undertake the government of their rcspcctweTslands in the absence, 
either through furlough* Of ifctifl, of both the UovcmoT &hd the 
Lieutenant Governor** since Jamaica not infrequently possessed 
both, the Jamaican Council was seldom called on to perform this 
duty, but in Barbados, which did not ordinarily possess a lieutenant 
governor, the Council now and then had to administer the govern- 
ment for short periods. This collegiate responsibility, however, 
proved extremely inconvenient, giving rise to repeated disagreements 
among Council members, each of whom considered himself as good 
as any of his fellows. A composite body was manifestly unfitted for 
such a task, nevertheless it was not until 1707 that the Board of 



Island Executives Surveyed 41 

Trade was induced to abolish this system in favour of a more simple 
one. But in May of that year an additional Instruction was des- 
patched both to Barbados and Jamaica to provide that the admini- 
stration, in the absence of both the Governor and his deputy, 
should devolve upon the President of the Council until the arrival 
of a superior. 31 

At first the President when acting in this capacity was given 
powers as complete as those enjoyed by the governor himself, but 
this proved to be an evil, and was soon afterwards rescinded, a 
further Instruction of 1710 obliging him "to refrain from the passing 
of any Acts except such as were immediately necessary to the well- 
being of the island".** So vague a restriction was of little effect, but 
it was all that existed until 1722, when far more drastic limitations 
were imposed, forbidding an acting-governor either to dissolve an 
existing Assembly, or to suspend officials of any kind, without the 
consent of at least seven of his fellow councillors. 38 This arrange- 
ment, giving complete satisfaction, came to be permanently adopted, 
and thus the temporary absence of the governor from Barbados, or 
the governor and lieutenant governor from Jamaica, was seldom 
attended with upset or considered of much consequence. 



8. Lieutenant Governors in the Leeward Islands 

But if the presence of a lieutenant governor in places like Barbados 
and Jamaica was a matter of small consequence, it was far otherwise 
in the Leeward Islands, where the lieutenant governors were always 
of considerable importance. Since it was physically impossible for 
the Govcrnor-in-Chief to reside in every island at one and the same 
time, it was always necessary to have in each island a local admini- 
strator with power to continue the ordinary functions of govern- 
ment during times when the Governor was visiting or residing in 
some other member of the group. Thus from the earliest years of the 
Restoration the appointment of a lieutenant governor in every 
island became an obvious necessity. 34 

Prior to 1672, these lieutenants were all appointed by the 
Governor-in-Chief of the Caribee Islands resident in Barbados, 
but after the separation of that year they came to be chosen by the 
newly created governor of the Leeward group. In the year 1686, 
however, this right of selection was taken from the latter and vested 
in the Crown itself a further example of the then prevailing 
tendency towards a greater concentration of powers within the 



42 Early West Indian Government 

royal grasp. 16 Although the authority wielded by the governor over 
his lieutenants was thus materially curtailed, he was still allowed a 
personal power both to suspend them from office pending the 
Crown's final pleasure, and to appoint substitutes in their stead. 
In 1715, however, the consent of the local Council was made 
necessary in ordinary circumstances to all future suspensions of this 
kind, so that the old discretionary authority of the governor was 
practically swept away. 16 As would naturally be expected, sus- 
pensions of lieutenant governors from this time onwards practically 
ceased. 

The position of a lieutenant governor in the Leeward Islands was 
in some respects distinctly unusual. The chief function of such an 
officer in other colonies was the resumption of the government upon 
the death or absence of the Govcrnor-in-Chicf, and in ordinary 
circumstances his commission lay dormant until such a contingency 
gave it force. In the Leewards, however, each lieutenant governor 
performed many ordinary duties of administration even while his 
superior was still legally within the government, though in some 
other part of it. Under such circumstances we should expect to find a 
considerable overlapping of jurisdictions, the more so since the 
powers of the lieutenants were by no means as precisely defined as 
they ought to have been. 

The commission given to the Governor-in-Chicf certainly con- 
tained a few clauses relating to them and their powers, but 
told only half the story. In the absence" of the governor, 
lieutenant governor with the consent of his local council was em- 
powered to appoint judges and other officers, to grant lands, to 
issue public money, to adjourn, prorogue and dissolve Assemblies, 
and approve or reject such bills as the legislature might send up 
to him. 17 To offset these somewhat large powers, however, the short 
commission given by the Crown to each lieutenant governor directed 
him not only to exercise his jurisdiction conformably to the terms 
of the vice-regal commission, but also to obey such orders as his 
superior might address to him. u In other words, the way was thus 
opened whereby a commander-in-chief, simply by issuing orders to 
his subordinates, could set effective limitations upon the otherwise 
extensive powers seemingly allowed to them. And indeed, this was 
the very thing which did take place as the seventeenth century drew 
to its close. 

For some years previous to the governorship of the elder Codring- 
ton, the inhabitants of one or two of the islands had been inclined 
to think that their lieutenant governors, during all times when the 



Island Executives Surveyed 43 

Governor-in-Chief was away from their particular shores, were 
fully entitled to the enjoyment of complete administrative powers, 
even to the extent of being able to issue writs for fresh elections, and 
to give a provisional approval to all bills pending their transmission 
to the governor for his final assent. 89 So long as these claims went 
unopposed, each separate lieutenant governorship was in effect 
permitted to erect itself into a semi-independent jurisdiction during 
all times save those when the Governor-in-Chief himself was present 
within the island. Codrington, however, grew exceedingly dis- 
satisfied with the manner in which some of his subordinates strove 
by a liberal interpretation of their powers to enlarge their independ- 
ence to the farthest degree. He decided that some limitation was 
necessary, and found his power of being able to issue orders to them 
a very convenient weapon with which to effect their subjugation. 

Nevis for years had been the worst offender. In 1696, therefore, 
Codrington placed Samuel Gardner, its lieutenant governor, under 
effective restraint by issuing to him a set of closely defined instruc- 
tions for the future conduct of his office. Henceforth he was to 
summon new Assemblies only with the consent of his council, 
and was neither to prorogue nor dissolve them before he had first 
acquainted the Governor-in-Chief with his intention. The latter, 
after pointing out that the power of veto belonged wholly to himself, 
further denied to Gardner any right to give a provisional assent to 
bills. Finally he practically withdrew from the lieutenant governor 
any independent power of suspension, and prohibited him from 
filling up vacancies within any of the local offices, except upon 
occasions of the most urgent necessity, and then only with the 
advice and consent of his council. The appointing power within all 
the islands was to be retained as far as possible in the hands of the 
Governor alone. 40 In vain did the Nevis planters protest, and pray 
for a return to their previous customs. Codrington was adamant: 
his authority as Commandcr-in-Chicf must in the future be given 
greater respect than it had hitherto enjoyed. 41 

At least one of Codrington's restrictions was destined to become 
permanent: after his death we hear no more of the claims of lieuten- 
ant governors to a provisional assenting power in legislation. In 
other respects, however, they temporarily regained their earlier 
authorities, and for a further twenty years preserved an independent 
power both to adjourn, prorogue and dissolve Assemblies, and to 
issue fresh writs for further elections. 42 But from the time of Governor 
Douglas's departure in 1713 these powers of a lieutenant governor 
over the House began to be destroyed. Subsequent governors 



44 Early West Indian Government 

prohibited their subordinates both from dissolving Assemblies and 
from issuing writs for fresh elections, allowing them only the lesser 
power of adjournment and perhaps of prorogation. Their right to 
appoint to local offices was likewise practically withdrawn. 4 * 

The early uncertainty as to the powers of lieutenant governors 
resulted almost entirely from an ambiguity in the clauses of the 
governor's commission which concerned them. As has already been 
noted, each lieutenant, in the * 4 absencc" of his superior, was given 
a grant of quite clearly specified powers. No one, however, was 
quite sure what the term "absence" was meant to signify. Did it 
mean a mere absence from each individual island while on a visit to 
some other member of the group, or did it apply only to a governor- 
in-chicfs absence from the entire province of his government? 
Perhaps in certain particulars it was the former which was meant, 
and perhaps in other particulars it was the latter. From what we 
have already indicated it is clear that until the period of change in the 

~orK/ infif rrnfh j-^ntttru tk* t*r*m tmrmm jji^mtltj ! ML t _i_rn_r jJ -i_jl * 

carry eigniccnin century, IDC wrm was locaiiy uimpmBO 10 moan 
the governor's absence from each separate island. Such a con- 
struction was, of course, extremely favourable to each 
governor, who was thereby allowed to perform man 
functions whenever his superior was in other portions of the group. 
It was against this interpretation that the elder Codrington was the 
first to revolt 

The work which he rnmmrarrd, kit suooestors of the early 
Hanoverian period completed The pendulum swung very much the 
other way. Governors came to tee that the term "absence" did not 
possess a uniform meaning, but that in certain dames it was used in 
the first sense, while in others it was used in the second. They used 
their own discretion in deciding which interpretation to place upon 
etch particular. They did not need to apply home for a ruling, for it 
was rightfully in their power to decide the issue for themselves. 
By giving their rnaaiirli to each lieutenant governor they could 
compel his obedience to any change which they desired. Accordingly 
they restrained the lieutenants from dissolving Assemblies or issuing 
fresh writs of election, and from appointing civil, military and 
judicial officials or disavsMg the same; on the grounds that such 
were powers far too extensive to be entrusted to a mere subordinate, 
so long as a comma ndrr-in-chief was present anywhere within the 
government Should a lieutenant desire any of these things to be 
done, he must move his superior to issue the appropriate writs or 
other mstnmnts Decenary to the process. But the powers of 
issuing public money and of adjourning the AxaMici were 



v 



Island Executives Surveyed 45 

recognised, upon the other hand, to be essential to the functions of 
the lieutenant governor: consequently they were allowed to him, 
and enjoyed by him at all times, save those comparatively rare 
occasions when some superior officer 44 was present upon the island. 

The net result of this change was a serious diminution in the 
lieutenant's powers. He was reduced in fact as well as in law to a 
position of definite subordination. Nevertheless there were still 
many things of quite significant importance which he could and did 
perform, so that, within his own island at least, he continued to 
occupy a place of considerable prominence. He was the presiding 
member of the local council, 45 his actual membership of that body 
being proven by the fact that he had therein a vote upon all matters, 
legislative as well as executive. 44 In the absence of the governor-in- 
chicf each lieutenant governor in conjunction with his council 
carried on the local administration, issuing orders for the per- 
formance of public tasks, superintending the execution of the laws, 
and issuing money from the local treasury in payment of works 
undertaken at the public expense. 47 We have already seen how 
Codrington took from the lieutenant governors their erstwhile 
privilege of appointing to vacant offices within their jurisdictions. 
Henceforward all major positions within the whole group, left 
unfilled by the Crown, came quite properly to be filled by persons 
appointed direct by the governor himself. Occasionally, however, 
the latter might allow the local lieutenant governor and council power 
to fill very inferior offices at their own discretion. For instance, on 
6th August, 1718, the President of Nevis who was acting-lieutenant 
governor of the island communicated to the rest of the Board 
"three blank commissions for the appointing of coroners, which his 
Excellency desired may be filled up with such persons as his Honour 
and Council should approve of'. 4 * But this practice of delegating to 
others the power of making appointments never became common, 
although the govcrnors-in-chicf of the Leeward Islands throughout 
the eighteenth century customarily sought the opinion of the council 
most concerned before filling any post of importance within its 
territory. 

In times of emergency too, when danger of insurrection or 
invasion might threaten the island, the lieutenant governor in the 
absence of any superior, became entitled to powers of military 
regulation and control similar to those belonging to the govcrnor-in- 
chief himself. But such authority, excrcisablc only upon such extra- 
ordinary occasions, cannot be reckoned of much constitution il 
significance. 



46 Early West Indian Government 

We should remember, too, that wherever the lieutenant governor 
was given authority in the absence of his chief, he was obliged to 
wield it only with the advice and consent of his fellow councillors. 
Thus was his discretionary independence reduced to the merest 
shadow. Even in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which, as Ordinary, 
he exercised by deputation from the governor himself, the lieutenant 
was restrained to act only with the consent of his Board. 4 * Because of 
this we may with confidence assume that the real executive within 
each island in the absence of the governor-in-chief, was rather the 
council as a collective body, than the officer who merely presided at 
the head of its table, and gave his signature to its official acts. 

9. The Lieutenant General of the Leeward Islands 

Besides the governor, the lieutenant governors, and the councils, 
there was in the Leeward Islands one other official, the dignity of 
whose position ranked second only to that of the first-named, yet 
whose description I have purposely postponed to this late juncture. 
This was the lieutenant general. This dignitary was quite unknown 
to the islands before the reign of William III. In 1689, however, the 
Lords of Trade and Plantations, having agreed upon the need for 
bridging the wide gap which they imagined existed between the 
commandcr-in-chicf and his lieutenant governors, decided upon the 
creation of an additional lieutenant governorship to extend over the 
whole group. A certain Thomas Hill was selected to fill the position, 
which at the last minute became changed in title to that of "Lieuten- 
ant General over all the Leeward Caribee Islands*'. His principal 
duty was to assist the governor-in-chief in all his difficulties, and to 
undertake the government of the whole group in the event of the 
lattcr's absence or death. 

By the terms of his appointment this last requirement was 
especially demanded of him, but apart from that the commission 
varied little from the usual type of authority given to an ordinary 
lieutenant governor.** Some yean were to elapse before the lieutenant 
general's status relative to each separate island was fully determined. 
Naturally the lieutenant governors were all exceedingly jealous of the 
new appointee. They could not dispute his title to the chief command 
of the whole group in the absence of the governor-in-chief, but some 
of them did oppose his right to any authority greater than their own 
at times when the latter was present. 

Something of this spirit may be gathered from an incident which 
took place in Antigua upon the arrival of Governor Douglas in 



Island Executives Surveyed 47 

1711. At the reading of the newcomer's Instructions it was dis- 
covered that, through some clerical mistake, the name of Lieutenant 
General Hamilton had been omitted from the list of councillors 
appointed to that island. The local lieutenant governor with the 
support of his fellow councillors at once made this a pretext for 
opposing Hamilton's admission to their body. The dispute grew very 
bitter, until it was deemed of sufficient consequence to be referred 
home to the Board of Trade, who without the slightest hesitation 
gave their support to the Lieutenant General. In reporting the 
matter to the Queen they asserted that it was both reasonable and 
for the service of the Crown that Hamilton, by virtue of his superior 
office, should be admitted into the council of each separate island, 
with power to preside and vote therein whenever present. 51 This 
ruling being confirmed by the Queen, an additional Instruction was 
speedily despatched to Douglas, bidding him to admit Hamilton to 
these powers without delay." 

The superiority of the lieutenant general being thus so con- 
clusively established, no further troubles arose. Whenever present 
upon any of the islands he regularly supplanted the local lieutenant 
governor in the presidency of the local council. While sitting there 
he had full power to give his vote along with the rest upon all 
matters, whether of legislative or administrative concern. Under 
ordinary circumstances his powers were closely analogous to those 
of the lieutenant governors. He was given no powers of discretionary 
action superior to theirs, but was compelled as they were, to obey 
the orders of the governor-in-chief. He could be suspended by the 
latter just as they could, for just the same causes and in exactly the 
same way. Moreover all the acts which he performed in any island 
where he dwelt, required the majority consent of the local council to 
make them legally effective. The post carried no official salary. 58 
Consequently the post of lieutenant general, though superior in 
dignity to that of a lieutenant governor, was under ordinary con- 
ditions of little additional advantage as long as the governor-in-chief 
was present within the government. Indeed throughout the eighteenth 
century one or other of the lieutenant governors not uncommonly 
occupied the higher office as well. 54 

10. Devolution of Government in the Leeward Islands 

This description of the lieutenant general brings us to the last 
point of importance respecting the Leeward Islands; a point which 
has to do with the important matter of governmental succession. 



48 Early West Indian Government 

The commission given in 1672 to Sir William Staplcton as first 
commander-in-chief of the newly constituted government provided, 
in the event of his death or absence, that the lieutenant governor of 
Nevis should undertake the administration. 56 Later Instructions 
enlarged these terms by ordaining that government in the absence 
of the commander-in-chief should devolve first upon the lieutenant 
general, then upon the lieutenant governor of Nevis, and last upon 
the Council of Nevis acting as a collective body. 44 When, howc 
the Board of Trade in 1707 abolished the collegiate authority of the 
Barbadian Council in this respect, they took care to do the same for 
the Nevis body. By the new provision the government of the whole 
group was made to devolve first upon the lieutenant general, then 
upon the lieutenant governor of Nevis, and finally not upon the 
Nevis Council but upon its President instead.* 7 

It was not long, however, before efforts began to be made to 
procure an alteration in these terms. The neighbouring islands began 
to voice their complaints against the preponderant share of political 
favour which the island of Nevis enjoyed. The latter, as the residence 
of Sir William Staplcton, had been the first centre of government 
within the group, but towards the close of the seventeenth century 
it had begun both politically and economically to lose its pride of 
place. Instead, Antigua had grown to be the most flourishing, 
progressive, and politically active member of the group. Its wind- 
ward situation marked it out as the place most suitable for (he 
governor's residence. In times of danger it was far easier to remove 
from it to the other islands which lay to the leeward than it was to do 
the reverse. Perceiving the strategic advantage attaching to this, the 
English authorities from 1708 onwards directed all governors to 
make Antigua their seat of residence. 19 

Having thus struck the first blow in the overthrow of Nevis, the 
other islands were not slow to follow up the attack. In 1728, Acting- 
Governor Mathew informed the Board of Trade of the deep sense of 
grievance felt by all the rest that Nevis, by virtue of the devolution 
settlement of 1 707, should still continue to enjoy a dignity so out of 
keeping with its real importance. The complaints were specially 
indignant that, in the absence both of the governor and the lieutenant 
general, the government automatically should devolve upon the 
lieutenant governor of Nevis, to the complete exclusion of all other 
lieutenant governors. Mathew suggested that this arrangement might 
with advantage be amended. He recommended that government, 
in the absence of both the governor and the lieutenant general, 
should fall to the senior lieutenant governor resident anywhere 



Island Executives Surveyed 49 

within the group. 59 Three years later his suggestion bore fruit. The 
Board of Trade, after having again reviewed the whole question, 
recommended to the King the adoption of the very scheme which 
Mathew had put forward, with the additional proviso that, if there 
should be no lieutenant governor present in the islands, then the 
President of St. Christopher might assume the administration. On 
being approved, this provision became formally embodied in the 
commission prepared for William Crosby, 60 the newly appointed 
Governor of the islands, and these were the terms which continued 
to regulate the succession throughout the remainder of the century. 



Chapter IV 
BRIDLING THE PREROGATIVE 



1. Introduction 

Every royal governor in his Commission and Instructions was 
granted prerogative powers wftjcfl ft* HI authorised to put into 
operation whenever peed should ante. These articles, whjchjnve 
him authority over a great variety of subjects ranging from the 
, hlishment of courts to the military regulation of his province in 
times <>! cmermKV. uere of ypcci.il \.tluc during the early years of 
isi.nul ile\elopment. when they sanctioned the performance of many 
things upon which local laws were still silent. 
With the passing of years, however, plantation respect for pre- 
thority rapidly declined. As Assemblies grew to positions 

they were teinptfff to"~takc 



increasing 



previously subject only to vice- 



regal control. In many cases it was a governors abuse of his 
prerogative powers which convinced the people that the only security 
for their liberties lay in the regulation of their local institutions by 
their own laws. 1 At other times it was the widespread popular 
disregard of orders based only upon a governor's personal authority, 
that induced the Assemblies to support his prerogative demands with 

of this is found in 



supplementary local enactments 
the Militia Acts. As a third factor there was the inevitable tendency 
for all Assemblies, just as a matter of course, to give legislative 
attention to the reform of any local jurisdiction seeming to require 
it, quite regardless of the propriety of their action in so doing. 

As a result of these influences we find by the close pf the seven- 
teenth* century that numbers or things which had once lain within, the 
discretionary jurisdiction of the Governor, had gradually come to be 
regulated by local jaws. Such matu 
regulation of courts, the ation of 

collection of Quitrents. the appointment .of fees to be taken by local 
officials, and even the organ i the local Assembly in mort 

of which the local legislatures bad assumed a right to interfere. 



iment and 
militia, the 



Bridling the Prerogative 51 

This gradual exaltation of legislation over mere prerogative 
authority was not won, however, without a considerable struggle. 
Some governors opposed it more actively than did others. In 
Barbados for instance, the strenuous efforts put forward by Francis 
Lord Willoughby, Sir Richard Dutton, and James Kendall for the 
preservation of their discretionary authority, were in marked contrast 
to the indulgent administrations of William Lord Willoughby or 
Sir Jonathan Atkins, both of whom cared more for public goodwill 
than they did for the strict maintenance of their prerogative powers. 
Similarly in Jamaica the strict administrations of governors like 
Lord Vaughan and Lord Carlisle were very different indeed from 
the popular administrations of governors like Sir Thomas Lynch. 
In the Leeward Islands popular interference with the prerogative 
was not quite so frequent but did occasionally occur. 



2. Courts 

The ordinary courts in Barbados and Jamaica had been con- 
sistently regulated by island laws ever since the Restoration. Bar- 
bados led the way with its Court Act of 1661 which simply regulated 
afresh the Courts of Common Pleas that had been in existence for a 
quarter of a century, and its General Sessions Act of 1663 which 
regulated anew the meetings of the Supreme Court or Court of 
Grand Sessions. Jamaica followed suit in 1664 with an Act for 
establishing courts of judicature in this island and another Act 
authorising Justices of the peace to decide all pleas not exceeding the 
value of forty shillings, both of which, being limited to two years' 
duration, were re-enacted from time to time and so kept in operation 
until such time (1681) as permanent Court Acts could be passed. 
Both the Barbadian Act of 1661 and the Jamaican Acts of 1681 
were confirmed by the Crown and, modified in certain respects by 
later enactments, remained in operation throughout the rest of 
our period. 1 

For Court purposes Barbados was divided into five precincts, in 
each of which petty suits and offences were tried by Justices of the 
Peace in Quarter Sessions. Each precinct, too, had its Court of 
Common Pleas having jurisdiction over civil actions; and finally 
there was the Supreme Court, better known as the Court of Grand 
Sessions which normally met but twice a year in Bridgetown for the 
trial of all serious criminal cases. Appeal from the verdicts of these 
courts was to the Governor and Council, Wfib had junsdicTTtm both 



52 Early West Indian Government 

as a Court of Appeal and as a Court of Chancery. The Jamaican 
system bore a broad resemblance to the Barbadian. Jamaica too, 
was divided into precincts in each of which petty suits and offences 
were tried by the Justices of the Peace in Quarter Sessions. Each 
precinct also had its Court of Common Pleas which had jurisdiction, 
however, only over cases not exceeding 20 io_amount. All the more 
serious civil as well as criminal cases were tried by the Supreme 
Court which met quarterly in Spanish Town, presided over by the 
Chief Justice and four or five assistants. When in 1 758 Jamaica was 
divided into three counties, the ordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court was restricted territorially to only one of these the County 
of Middlesex while entirely new Courts of Assize were set up for 
the counties of Surrey and Cornwall, to be held in the towns of 
Kingston and Savanna la Mar respectively. These Assize Courts 
were given a status practically equal to that of the Supreme Court 
itself. As in Barbados the Governor, ancLCouncil acted as a Court of 
Appeal; but the < bore no part in rhamwy prnmtliflgj the 

Governor in Jamaica being sole Chancellor and having the assistance 
only of three Masters in Chancery of his own choosing. 

In the Leeward Islands the first courts Petty Se^ior^. Common 
Pleas, and General Sessions seem to have been first set up by pre- 
rogative action and the Assemblies seem to have been slow to 
interfere. In 1692, however, the Antiguan legislature remodelled the 
Antiguan courts by passing a Court Act* for the purpose, and 
within a few years the other Leeward Islands all copied the example. 
In 1693, however, a curious situation arose in Antigua which shows 
the kind of mentality that court Acts quickly engendered. By the 
Act of 1692 the Antiguan Courts of Common Pleas were to be held 
only during the months March to July every year an arrangement 
that was extremely inconvenient to the merchants and other transient 
folk that visited the island. These people asked Governor Codrington 
to use his personal authority to institute extra court sittings for their 
special benefit. Being entirely sympathetic, Codrington gave the 
necessary directions, only to find himself hotly opposed by the 
Assembly which contended that such sittings were utterly illegal as 
having no foundation in law. The Governor in reply asserted with 
some truth that the Court Act was far from being definitive, and did 
not bridle the prerogative in the matter of further court regulation. 
The House, however, persisted in its claim that his action was 
contrary to law, and in the end apparently gained the point. 4 

Just at this time, however, when it seemed that the island Assem- 
blies by force of usage were establishing a right to legislate upon 



Bridling the Prerogative 53 

matters of prerogative interest, a serious challenge suddenly arose 
from a comparatively unexpected quarter. The supervision of 
colonial affairs had been for over twenty years entrusted to a 
special Committee of the Privy Council, when in 1696 a change was 
decided upon. The old Committee was disbanded, and in its place 
appeared the new Council for Trade and Plantations, commonly 
known as the Board of Trade. The old Committee had been some- 
what dilatory in its examination of such provincial laws as had come 
before it for consideration, but its successors, with new-broom-like 
thoroughness, were for a time much more careful and efficient. 
Colonial governors were held more strictly to their obligation to 
send home promptly copies of all the Acts newly passed within their 
dominions, and these were regularly submitted to the law officers 
of the Crown for their examination and report. 6 The latter were 
disturbed to find how deeply colonial Acts of the past had en- 
trenched on matters of prerogative jurisdiction, and they did what 
they could to resist this tendency. Attorney General Northey 6 
became particularly resentful of the way in which provincial laws 
still strove to supersede the prerogative in the organisation and 
control of courts. Consequently he objected against, and secured 
the disallowance of some Court Acts of the Leeward Islands, the 
passage of which had cost the younger Codrington an extraordinary 
amount of time and effort. Reporting against an Antiguan Court Act 
of 1704, Northey gave his opinion in the following words: "By 
Your Majesty's Commission ... to your Governor of this island, he is 
empowered to erect courts and name judges and other officers, and 
what such Governor may do, is [here] done by this Act; which 
seems to be prejudicial to the authority given ... to your Governor." 7 
The measure was accordingly disallowed. 

There is clear evidence, however, that the Board of Trade and 
even Northey himself soon afterwards retreated from this rather 
extreme point of view. 8 Doubtless they came to realise how risky 
it was to leave the organisation of lower colonial courts with their 
multiplicity of suits and styles of procedure to the sole discretion 
of each governor. Accordingly we find by the second decade of the 
century that the propriety of West Indian Acts for this purpose was 
conceded in England, and such laws were allowed to remain in 
operation provided their general terms were quite satisfactory. 

But although this concession was thus early made in the case of 
inferior courts, it was not considered applicable to the case of higher 
ones. The establishment or alteration of such a court as the Chancery 
was still deemed to belong solely to the Crown. Whenever a colonial 



54 Early West Indian Government 

legislature presumed by Acts of its own to trespass upon this higher 
field, its action was hotk 1 by the imperial authority, and its 

measures subjected to summary disallowance.* This continued, 
Moreover, for a further sixty years. 

H\ hi\ Commission and Instructions a West Indian Governor was 
made sole Chancellor within his province, but in Barbados an old 
Act of 1655 joined the Council with him injhjs work. 10 This practice 
Became so firmly established that the Act was not disallowed at the 
Restoration, and the Barbadian Councillors for generations con- 
tiq^cd to enjoy with the Governor a co-equal share in all Chancery 
jurisdiction. In Jamaica, however, the Governor was always sole 
Chancellor, teing assisted in this duty by three Masters in Chancery 
of his own choosing. 11 In the Leeward Islands, too, the form of 
Chancery proceedings down to the eighteenth century depended 
entirely upon the will of the Governor, who altered them from time 
to time at his own discretion, sometimes allowing the lieutenant 
governors and their councils to exercise jurisdiction, and sometimes 
confining the power wholly to himself. 

At the beginning oi itccnth century, however, an attempt 

was made in Ant ? aflj^ipJB|B8Ban practice or joining the 

Council With . rnor, and t cry JHTJS<UCOOO to the 

Lieutenant uovernomKi yotfoai flunog UK UflYSL 
A law for the purpose was accordingly passed and assentedto by 
the Commandcr-in-Chicf but, on being sent to England, was 
speedily disallowed upon the ground that the power of altering the 
form of Chancery lay most properly within the Governor's pre- 
rogative. 11 The fate of this Act automatically annulled a further 
measure which had sought to extend this system to every island of the 
Leeward group." tyothmg more was attempted until in 1715 the 
Antiguan legislature passed a further Act which joined 
permanently with the iuclin ihc Court 



The Board of Trade recalling that this from earliest times had been 
the Barbadian custom, now consented to its extension to Antigua, 
and reported the Act fojLfifiiftEBiiifittr 14 

Thus encouraged, the Antiguans next planned to make their 
Chancery perpetual instead of dependent wholly upon the presence 
of the Governor within their island. Accordingly they sought in 
1728 to revive the earlier scheme disallowed in 1705which had 
permitted the Lieutenant Governor or President to hold the court 
in his absence. The resulting Act again met with vigorous opposition 
from the Board of Trade. Although the Board did not object to the 
ends designed in this Act, it did deny that an Act of Assembly 



Bridling the Prerogative 



55 



was the proper instrument for securing those ends. The measure had 
in effect set up a Deputy-Chancellor, with power to assume all 
Chancery administration whenever the real Chancellor was absent. 
The Board considered this to be an invasion of the prerogative 
"because the appointment of Judges and Chancellors" was a power 
which ought "always to be exercised immediately by your Majesty". 
The Act was therefore disallowed, though steps were taken to 
satisfy the wishes of the Antiguans by the insertion of suitable 
amendments in the royal Instructions given to all future governors. 
That which the Antiguans desired was accomplished, therefore, not 
by means of their legislative efforts, but by means of prerogative 
indulgence. 14 

Some years later the planters of St. Christopher, emboldened by 
the ostensible success which had attended the efforts of their neigh- 
bours, and wishing to establish a permanent Court of Chancery 
within their island, passed an Act 1 * empowering the Lieutenant 
Governor or President to hold rtraT court in the absence of the 
Governor-in-Chief. AsJp^Antigua, the C 

and their votes were to be taken in the 



judges in 

pymgof all judcr rhislneasure also met with great opposition 

in England. Again the imperial authorities fully sympathised with 
the planters' aspirations, but were of opinion that the wrong con- 
stitutional method had been followed in trying to attain them. 

the King, had prayed him to establish sucn a courTaTthcy desired. 
Tilt All fUf UlM'ipf 



was disallowed, Put the-Governor 

wajTTrfttructedto recQjnnV"^ ihc passage of a frrsh Acttrf a nature 
"timTPir TA myt j| f gf nnmillni : the new measure "to take effect without 

T}iis decision indicates a decided weakening. Instead of adopting 
th attitude of firmness and the same avenue of prerogative settle- 
ment which they had taken in the Antiguan case, the Privy Council 
for the lira time really did surrender to colonial enactment the right 
BotTi Ib'cstabKsh and to regulalfe the form and organisation of higher 
courts. That this was no unintentional step is confirmed by the fact 
that When, only a year or two afterwards, the Montserrat legislature 
following the lead of the others passed an Act to establish a 
permanent Court of Chancery within its shores, the measure was, 
after some hesitation, confirmed. 17 The Board of Trade had come at 
last to realise "that the efficacy of Royal Commissions ... in such 
cases was questionable" and that an Act of the local legislature 
suitably drawn for that purpose was just as advantageous. 



56 Early West Indian Government 

It must be allowed, therefore, that by the early seventies of the 
century the Board had conceded the propriety of colonial Acts for 
the establishment of all courts, high as well as low. It had been 
fighting a gradually losing battle. Throughout their history the 
legislatures of all the West Indian colonies had passed repeated 
measures for the establishment and control of the ordinary courts 
J of Petty Sessions, King's Bench, and Common Pleas; now in all 
but Jamaica 18 the regulation of Chancery itself had fallen to their 
province, 

/ -j p Thejx>sition of the Governor and his Council therefore had been 
profmrn^HyjOiaiiged- I& the seveflB0QBHB3E51iad been the 
correct authority both for establishing new courts and for altering 
methods of procedure in the old: by the cl ghteenth 

century practically all this power had been removed from their 
discretionary control and vested in the legislature as a whole, by 
whose act alone could further alteration be made. Moreover, many 
of the actual writs which in earlier times had proceeded from the 
Governor in person, now issued from one or other or the court 
officials themselves. The Governor was not only excluded from a 
ver of altering courts, but was also bereft of much of his former 
jurisdiction within them. In three fields only was power still left to 
him. He still officiated with his Council as a Court of Appeal from 
judgments of the lower courts, and, either with or without the 
Council's as i . i s province. Finally, no 

Court Act ever sought to take from him his undoubted right, with 
the consent of Council, to appoint judges and all non-patentable 
court officials the number of judges was almost invariably specified, 
but their appointment was still left properly to the discretion of the 
Executive." 

Similarly the Governor's power to dismiss judges and non- 
pa ten table officials was not challenged except in Jamaica where 
persistent efforts were made in the latter half of the eighteen ih 
century isc the security of Supreme Court judges by enacting 

that they hold their appointments "during good bchaviour~jnslejui 
of during pleasure. The first Act for this purpose, passed in 1751, 
was speedily disallowed in England as being too restrictive of the 
prerogative. 10 A quarter of a century later, however, the Jamaicans 
returned to the charge with a further bill of the same nature (1 778) to 
which Governor Dalling refused his assent, but remitted it home for 
the Privy Council's perusal and advice. In the confusion of the times 
it docs not appear that the Governor was ever instructed what to 
do if the agitation were ever renewed. When, therefore, in 1781, 



Bridling the Prerogative 57 

highly incensed by a recent episode in which four Supreme Court 
judges had been somewhat high-handedly displaced, the legislature 
passed a very similar measure "to make the places of the judges of" 
the Supreme Court of judicature and justices of Assize . . . more 
permanent and respectable" by, in effect, converting their tenure to 
one of good behaviour, Dalling assented to it and sent it to England 
for confirmation. It permitted a governor, with Council's consent, 
merely to suspend a judge until the Crown's determination of the 
merits of the case should be made known; the judge to be supplied 
with a copy of the reasons for his suspension in order that he might 
justify himself before the Privy Council if he could and so retain 
his commission. After some hesitation the Act was confirmed in 
England, thus making distinct legal history as the first colonial law 
of its kind ever to win acceptance. 11 

3. The Militia 

It was not in the judicial field alone that legal bounds were placed 
upon the vice-regal discretion. The history of island militia laws 
illustrates the same process. From the very earliest years the gover- 
nors had been endowed with prerogative authority to organise their 
people into convenient military units suitable for employment in 
times of emergency. Their Commissions and Instructions empowered 
them to set up Articles of War for the regulation of the inhabitants 
in time of slave insurrection and foreign invasion. The Assembly, 
according to these documents, was given no share in military 
organisation." 

The authority of the Governor and Council, however, soon 
proved very inadequate for the purpose intended. Their orders 
were only tardily obeyed: unsupported by any locally known laws 
they were deemed tyrannous, and were disregarded by the planters 
upon every possible occasion. As long as military efficiency remained 
dependent, therefore, upon the governor's chances of enforcing 
obedience to his personal behests, the island forces continued in 
grave disorder. At last many governors in desperation were com- 
pelled to invoke the aid of their Assemblies in order to supplement 
their authority with the backing of known laws.* 3 

In Barbados the planters had been accustomed even prior to the 
Restoration to regulate their militia by means of local legislation, 84 
and they continued that method throughout the future, generally it 
would seem with their governor's sincere approval. Sir Jonathan 
Atkins, writing in 1680, stated the fact that he had no reliable 



58 Early West Indian Government 

powers of command there, save under the Militia Act, "for they are 
under no restraint except so far as they are bound by that law".* 6 
The position was much the same in Jamaica where one of the first 
laws ever passed by an Assembly was the Militia Act of 1664 making 
statutory provision for the island militia, which up to then had been 
regulated only by order-in-council. This Militia Act, like all other 
laws of this early period, was limited to two years' duration unless 
confirmed in England, and since this confirmation was not forth- 
coming, it was re-enacted from time to time to keep it in being. 
Finally, in 1681, the Jamaican constitutional crisis being over, and a 
change in the royal Instructions permitting laws to remain in 
indefinite operation unless disallowed at home, the legislature 
hastened to take advantage of the new condition by passing a batch 
of fundamental laws, among them a Militia Act (1681)** which, being 
confirmed in England, remained in operation for the remainder of 
our period as the basic law upon which the organisation of the 
militia rested for over a century. In the Leeward Islands, too, the 
Assemblies even in the early years of Stapleton's governorship are 
found assisting in the regulation of the local militia by the aid of 
special laws. 

In none of these early Militia Acts, however, is there evidence of 
any tendency for the Assemblies to place undue restrictions upon the 
essential prerogatives of their governors. Such Acts were intended to 
assist rather than to obstruct the latter in their work. The usefulness 
of local laws for the assistance of governors in their military organisa- 
tion was fully recognised in England at quite an early date, and they 
were welcomed accordingly. The manner in which Englishmen of the 
early Restoration period had passed laws for the regulation of their 
own militia, and so withdrawn the civilian forces from the dis- 
cretionary control of the Crown, possibly caused them to sympathise 
with colonial endeavours in the same direction. In any case, an 
additional Instruction sent in 1684 to Sir Richard Dutton in Bar- 
bados, spoke of the desirability that "a due regulation of the militia 
be established by known laws" and after adverting upon the 
temporary nature of the existing Act, directed him to take pains to 
secure the passage of a suitable Act of more permanent duration. 17 
Thus there was never the same opposition to Militia Acts that there 
was to laws for court establishment. 

But with the passing of the years, further militia laws came to be 
framed within most of the islands, which show that here and there 
legislators had begun to use their influence to less praiseworthy ends. 
Whereas these Acts had been first devised as a security against 



Bridling the Prerogative 59 

governmental tyranny, they now became employed as a means of 
acquiring a degree of freedom amounting almost to licence. In an 
age so characterised by international rivalry, the island defences 
should have been maintained upon a high level of efficiency. But such 
efficiency in a civilian force necessitated much irksome training. The 
average planter found such military obligations highly distasteful, 
and there is good reason to fear that in the Militia Acts of later days a 
surrender was often made to the popular demand for easy training 
obligations, with the result that the discretionary powers of the 
Governors and their Councils were much curtailed, muster days 
reduced to an absolute minimum, and general efficiency much 
impaired. 18 

Concerning the Barbadian Act there is overwhelming proof that 
this was the case. Governor Byng, writing to the Board of Trade in 
1740, asserted that the island forces presented "but an indifferent 
appearance", the Horse being "not properly furnished either with 
coats, hats, saddles, carbines, belts, swords, or boots, nor provided 
with arms as they ought" to have been, while the regiments of foot 
were "not provided with muskets or fuses, coats, hats, shoes, or 
other accoutrements, nor in any respect armed or clothed in the 
manner directed by law". In short, he feared that there were many 
"defects in the laws appointed for the settlement of the militia" of the 
island. 29 Later governors told the same story, but, owing to defects 
and omissions in the Act, were practically powerless to effect a 
remedy. The truth was that the military obligations imposed by the 
Act hung so lightly upon the shoulders of the inhabitants that none 
was prepared to agitate for its amendment. 30 

In Jamaica, too, the militia in the eighteenth century became 
notoriously inefficient, though for rather different reasons. The Act 
of 1681, though good at the outset, gradually sank into obsolescence. 
Having been confirmed in England, it was allowed to remain in 
operation long after it had ceased to be effective. Its worst feature 
was a clause by which no commissioned officer, once having resigned 
or been superseded, could be compelled to serve again in any 
capacity inferior to that in which he had first acted. Since both 
resignations and supersessions were common, the net result of this 
was a great accumulation of gentlemanly drones known as "re- 
formed" officers, who were virtually exempt from service. Thus the 
people who ought to have been the bulwark of the system men of 
ability and station were the very ones conspicuously absent from 
all musters. 

Moreover, even in the points where the Act of 1681 was strong, 
gradual but systematic efforts were made to whittle it away. It had 



60 Early West Indian Government 

given the Governor and Council of War, 81 for instance, complete 
freedom to proclaim martial law in times of great emergency. In 
course of time this proved irksome to the people and distasteful to 
the Assembly which, too cautious to make a frontal attack on the 
Governor's powers in such a justifiable particular, was astute enough 
to assail them from behind. For example, in the 1730s when the 
Maroon revolts necessitated repeated periods of martial law, the 
Assembly, unwilling to permit the Governor and Council to proclaim 
martial law for months on end, commenced the practice of enacting 
laws to sanction the proclamation of martial law for periods of 
from three to six months, thereby creating the impression that an 
Act of the legislature was the more correct constitutional procedure 
for this purpose. 82 Another strong feature of the 1681 Act was the 
freedom it left to the Governor and Council of War to frame articles 
of war for the control of the inhabitants in times of martial law. 
The liberty-loving planters came gradually to resent this, and from 
1760 onwards the legislature, at the Assembly's instigation, began 
passing annual Acts specifying and detailing the substance of all 
articles of war, thereby robbing the Governor and his military 
associates of the freedom of action which had once been so useful. 88 

That these changes were the result of deliberate policy is shown by 
the way in which the Assembly, when the time was ripe, boldly 
advanced to the logical completion of its plan. In 1778 it tried 
virtually to constitute itself the Governor's Council of War, with 
power to oblige him when to declare martial law and when to end it. 84 
This move being steadfastly opposed by Governor, Council, and 
Crown, the Assembly was temporarily thwarted in its aspirations, 
but shortly afterwards did succeed in getting a law passed and 
accepted, which swamped all future Councils of War by the in- 
clusion of all its own members. 85 Thus it may be said to have gained 
a considerable part of the power for which it had so stubbornly 
striven. With Assemblymen occupying a possible 43 places in his 
Council of War, bold indeed would be the Governor who tried to 
follow an independent line of policy. 

Unfortunately it cannot be said that the Assembly's interference 
in the composition of Councils of War or formulation of articles of 
war did anything to increase efficiency. Quite the contrary. Not 
until 1783 did it make any effort and then with little success to 
remove the abuse of the reformed officers; and in its zeal to protect 
the citizens from anything like arbitrariness it inevitably increased 
the difficulty of keeping the militia well disciplined. Long's well- 
known criticism of the Jamaican militia written in 1774 merely 



Bridling the Prerogative 61 

confirms reports that had been current for over fifty years that it was 
hopelessly ineffective. Long, with some cause, blamed successive 
generations of governors, but it is clear that much of the fault lay 
with the planters themselves. 

In the Leeward Islands the situation does not appear to have been 
quite so bad. Nevertheless, throughout the whole group, the dis- 
cretionary powers of the executive were in ordinary circumstances 
very much reduced. The Governor and Council could organise the 
militia only in a manner subject to all the limitations and conditions 
laid down in the Acts. Some indication of a governor's impotence 
in the face of such restrictions may be gathered from an angry 
protest delivered by Governor Mathew in 1744 to the Assembly of St 
Christopher concerning the defensive situation of that island. "I am 
not disappointed", he remarked, "at finding but little of discipline 
among you. Your militia laws are such as seem to have intended 
there should be none. I now heartily regret that I assented to any of 
them, and that such a one still subsists to the subversion of all 
military duty and subordination. Tis better for me to put my 
character at stake by doing my best to defend the island in the 
strength of my commission and his Majesty's right to array his 
subjects for defence of his dominions, than to run the risk of being 
condemned for miscarrying under the preposterous limitations of a 
law that has no meaning for the King's honour and service, or for 
our own country's safety and defence. It must be no bad news for 
our enemies to know we choose rather to risk poverty and slavery 
under them rather than trust one another under fears of evils 
that never did nor ever can happen." 3 * 

So throughout the West Indies in the military field as in the 
judicial, the prerogative had become subordinated to local law. In 
the eyes of the planters freedom had supplanted potential tyranny; 
a certain measure of self determination had supplanted the danger 
of external regulation: the fact that this freedom was capable of 
abuse was considered a matter of secondary importance. 

The several militia laws which were enacted in each island included 
such matters as the following within the scope of their regulation. 
They generally defined each man's obligation to serve, stated how 
many regiments should be established, frequently specified both the 
times and places of exercising, and described the dress and equip- 
ment with which each man was to provide himself. In addition they 
prescribed the punishments which should attend absence from 
parades, neglect of equipment, or disobedience of orders: they 
established the authority of the officer or court which was to take 



62 Early West Indian Government 

cognizance of these offences, and ordained how the fines and other 
penalties should be carried into effect. They thus established known 
regulations, neglects of which were punishable by reasonable 
penalties, imposed by a properly established tribunal. In times of 
peace, therefore, the free discretionary powers of an island com- 
mander were almost completely abolished. 

In times of emergency the powers of Governor and Council were 
offered freer play, though restrictions still remained in many matters 
of most primary concern. All the Acts closely regulated the making 
of alarms. 37 Most of them specified the number of vessels, the 
appearance of which would be sufficient to justify the raising of an 
alarm. In addition, too, the laws of Montserrat, Nevis, and St 
Christopher allowed the island commander an independent right to 
order an alarm whenever he should think it necessary, but those of 
Antigua and Barbados refused this concession. In the two latter 
places the Governor and Council had to secure the Assembly's 
consent before they were permitted to raise special alarms or issue 
proclamations of martial law; and in Jamaica after 1779 the Council 
of War whose consent was necessary to all proclamations of martial 
law consisted mainly of Assemblymen. 

Further provisions within the Acts tended likewise to preserve the 
people from undue arbitrariness even in times of martial law. 
Instead of allowing the governors to make any regulations and 
punishments they liked upon such occasions, the progressive 
tendency of all militia legislation throughout the eighteenth century, 
was for the island legislatures themselves to ordain measures for the 
complete regulation of the forces, in times of alarm as well as in 
normal times. But, of course, the actual extent to which they suc- 
ceeded in controlling the action of the Executive in times of emer- 
gency depended very largely upon the circumstances peculiar to 
each occasion. 

Moreover, we have no evidence, except in the case of Jamaican 
Councils of War after 1779, that the Assemblies ever tried to usurp 
the essential administrative functions properly belonging to the 
Governor and Council as the correct military authority within each 
island. We do not find Assemblies, for example, ever assuming to 
themselves a power of military appointment, or a right to issue 
orders or commands. Instead of this they were content simply to use 
legislative machinery to set up a network of rigidly narrow channels, 
within which alone the governor was able to exercise that executive 
authority which properly belonged to him. 38 



Bridling the Prerogative 63 

4. Quitrents 

The only West Indian island on which Crown grants of land were 
widespread enough to yield quitrents of much value was Jamaica. 
Here in the early years liberal grants of land were made to all new- 
comers upon condition that they paid an annual quitrent of a halfpenny 
or so per acre. 39 Undoubtedly the fixing of the quitrents and the 
methods taken for their collection were originally in the discretion 
of the Governor and Council, but the matter was of such importance 
that we find even the earliest Assemblies beginning to take it into 
their own consideration and frame laws to regulate the making of 
surveys, the issue of patents, the taking of fees for these, and after 
1672 fixing even the quitrent rates. 40 Finally in 1681 the legislature 
passed an Act ascertaining the quitrents and manner of receipt thereof 
and in 1683 an Act for regulating surveyors, both of which were con- 
firmed in England and remained in operation for a good many years. 

As a source of revenue the quitrents proved somewhat dis- 
appointing on account of the neglectful way in which they were 
collected. Evasions and arrears were general, and it is difficult to 
resist the conclusion that the Assemblies as a whole were content 
that this should be so. In Modyford's time the total receipts 
amounted to no more than from 300 to 400 a year. They fluctuated 
greatly according to the pains taken in collecting them. For the year 
ending 30th September, 1707, the return was very high, totalling 
just over 2,000; three years later it fell to what must surely be an 
all-time low record of just over 87 ! Nevertheless they probably 
averaged several hundred pounds a year, as evidenced by an estimate 
made in 1728 that, efficiently collected, they would yield about 
1,400 a year. An Act passed in 1745 considerably augmented the 
revenue, especially by compelling the payment of arrears, so that the 
receipts for a time amounted to considerable sums, but afterwards 
fell off again. 41 

The important fact about the quitrents is, however, not what 
income they yielded it was negligible enough, anyway but that 
the liberties of the planters liable to quitrent were never allowed to 
depend on the tender mercies of Governors and Councils, but were 
constantly safeguarded one might almost say, too well protected 
by their fellow planters in the legislature. The whole quitrent system 
from the earliest days of Assemblies was regulated by known laws, 
for when the Acts of 1681 and 1683 grew obsolete, they were 
promptly replaced by later ones, and so on through the succeeding 
century. 41 



64 Early West Indian Government 

5. Fees 

The same Rule of Law came to be extended, though to a much 
less extent, into the domain of island fees. The history of fee taking 
provides, in fact, some interesting examples of ultimate victory for 
the prerogative. From the earliest years of the Restoration the royal 
commission had given to every Governor and his Council full 
power to establish and alter the scales of fees to be taken by all 
officials within his territory. The West Indian Assemblies gave early 
indication, however, of their claim to interfere in any cases where 
they felt disposed. 

The very first Jamaican Assembly, meeting early in 1664, among 
other things passed two other Acts to regulate the fees of the island 
Secretary and the Provost Marshal, both of whose fees had previously 
been established by order-in-council only. Later Assemblies ex- 
tended this process, until by 1672 the fees of the Secretary, the 
Provost Marshal, the Surveyor General, the Chancery, the Grand 
Court, the inferior courts, and the coroners were all laid down by 
law. 48 The first permanent Jamaican Act of this nature was that 
passed in 1683 which set fees for the Naval Officer and the Clerk 
of the Markets as well as for those already mentioned, and remained 
on the statute book for nearly thirty years. 44 The earliest Barbadian 
Acts of the Restoration period to prescribe fees were three laws 
passed in 1667, 1668 and 1678 respectively, which together regulated 
the fees of all public officials and remained on the statute book for a 
great many years. 4 * 

The disposition to regulate fees by law did not become common 
in the Leeward Islands, however, until the close of the seventeenth 
century and the beginning of the eighteenth century. 4 * 

In 1696, however, the Antiguan legislature, in passing an Act to . . . 
oblige the Secretary and Marshal to give security for . . . the faithful 
performance of their offices*' 1 prescribed the fee which the Secretary 
should demand for making transcripts of laws for the convenience 
of private persons. In the following year the same island attempted 
the passage of a wider Act for regulating the fees of all local officials. 
After some controversy the measure was finally passed early in 1 698. 
Apparently it was a temporary measure and remained in operation 
only two years. 48 From this time onwards the Antiguans desisted 
from any further efforts to establish fees by positive law, and 
remained content with prerogative regulation in such matters. 4 * 

Nevis was the next Leeward Island to attempt fee regulation by 
means of positive laws. In 1705 the local legislature passed Acts 



Bridling the Prerogative 65 

settling fees for both the Secretary and the Marshal of the island. 
But both of these were disallowed in England "as entrenching upon 
her Majesty's prerogative and diminishing the rights of officers 
holding under your Majesty's Letters Patent". 50 The Board of 
Trade, with the vigilant Northey at its side, had not yet outlived its 
jealousy of colonial Acts for the performance of functions that 
belonged more properly to the Governor and Council. Despite this, 
when some further Acts from Nevis to regulate the fees of the 
Secretary, the Marshal, and the justices, came before the Board in 
1711 it exhibited a change of attitude by permitting them to remain 
in operation. 51 This being so, one would have expected the neigh- 
bouring islands to reap a corresponding advantage, but strangely 
enough, except for St. Christopher, 52 they failed to do so a fact 
which demands an explanation. 

Though the Board of Trade had surrendered in the matter, the 
Leeward Island governors of the period were not prepared to do so. 
Some of these were exceedingly jealous of the recent encroachment 
which had been made upon their preserves, and were determined to 
resist all such attempts in the future. Their resistance was the more 
effective in that their power of veto enabled them to reject any bill 
of which they disapproved. The able and respected Walter Hamilton, 
appointed Governor of the Leeward Islands in 1715, soon found 
himself obliged to oppose the Montserrat planters for instance, 
when in 1718 they passed bills to regulate the fees of their Secretary, 
their Provost Marshal, and their Chief Justice. The Governor point- 
blank refused his assent on the grounds that "the settling of fees" 
was entirely vested in himself and Council. 53 At the same time he 
expressed his willingness to compromise by allowing the House to 
co-operate with the Council in drawing up a docket of fees, to which 
he in term would be pleased to give his official confirmation. This 
course was apparently adopted, and not for another ten years do we 
hear of any further attempt of the kind. 

In 1729, however, the Montserrat Assembly, in framing a new 
Court Act, sought to include within it the table of fees to be taken 
by the several court officials in the performance of their duties. The 
Council passed the measure but when it was presented to Lord 
Londonderry, he peremptorily refused to assent to it. Sending it 
back to the legislature he demanded that the tables of fees be 
deleted, and that the Assembly should "not intermeddle in a point 
not belonging" to it. 54 The House, preferring the withdrawal of the 
fees to the loss of the whole bill, acquiesced in his demand, and from 
that time onwards the fees of the court officials, as well as all other 



66 Early West Indian Government 

officials in Montserrat, were regulated exclusively by the Governor 
and Council. Londonderry's successor in office, 65 however, was not 
so careful of his dignity, with the result that in 1 732 he gave his 
assent to a Nevis Court Act 66 which established the fees to be taken 
by the various court officials in the very fashion which had been 
denied to Montserrat only three years before. 

In Jamaica, as we have already seen, the regulation of fees was 
early undertaken by the Assembly by the passage of a number of 
short-term Acts culminating in a permanent Act for regulating fees, 
passed in 1683. But by the beginning of the eighteenth century this 
Act was already becoming out-of-date and a new one required. The 
Assembly in 1 706 prepared a bill which sought to regulate anew the 
fees of all public officers and even prescribed lawyers' fees, but 
Governor Handasyd refused his assent because he considered its 
fees unreasonably low. 67 Three years later the House returned to the 
charge with a slightly more reasonable bill which received Handa- 
syd's assent, but raised a storm of protest in England among patent 
officers, lawyers, and the like; and the Board of Trade advised the 
Assembly to prepare and pass a more generous measure in order to 
quiet these objections. It did so in 1711 in an Act that again set 
tables of fees for all public officials and lawyers. This in due course 
was confirmed by the Crown and passed into permanent effect, being 
still on the statute book at the end of our period. 6 * 

After some years the fees demanded by public officials began to 
increase despite the Act, and in 1728 the Assembly expressed concern 
at the tendency but took no steps to restrain it; consequently it 
continued unabated until thirty years later the law had become a 
dead letter, many of the fees actually charged being from twice to four 
times as much as the law of 171 1 allowed. This was due partly to the 
rapacity of the patentees and their deputies and partly to the financial 
inflation of the times which caused all prices and wage levels to rise. 
Fee taking in all the colonies had become exorbitant, and an 
additional Instruction to all governors in 1764 bade each enquire 
into the position and, if necessary, issue a proclamation restraining 
public officials from taking fees in excess of "what have been 
established by proper authority". Governor Lyttelton issued such 
a proclamation on September 29th of that year, ordering all officials 
on pain of prosecution to refrain from demanding fees in excess of 
those allowed by law. 6 * 

Several patent office deputies refusing compliance, the Attorney 
General was instructed to commence prosecutions. Vigorous protests 
were lodged in England against these measures, the patentees 



Bridling the Prerogative 67 

contending that their fees were sanctioned by force of usage and were 
not as unreasonable as the islanders claimed. Vested interests won 
the day, the Board of Trade and the Privy Council reversing their 
attitude and instructing Lyttelton to protect the patentees in the 
enjoyment of their customary fees, and to discontinue the pro- 
secutions.* The patentees and their deputies thus emerged triumph- 
ant, and in all but minor instances continued to the end of our 
period to enjoy the exorbitant fees which custom had established. 
The Assembly felt practically powerless against them. Indeed, the 
only patent officers in Jamaica whose fees during the latter half of 
the eighteenth century were wholly or substantially regulated by 
island law were the Clerk of the Supreme Court and the Receiver 
General. 61 Otherwise the only officials whose fees were so con- 
trolled were the locally appointed ones such as constables, justices 
of the peace, coroners, the Chief Justice and his assistants, the 
Masters in Chancery, and, at the very end of our period, the 
Governor's private secretary.* 8 

In Barbados the question of the legislative regulation of fees came 
to a head in 1733. The Acts passed in the early period of the island's 
history having become ineffective and obsolete, popular clamour 
demanded new ones. The Council held a detailed enquiry into the 
matter and carefully noted and reported the facts of the situation. 
At the invitation of the Governor, Lord Howe, the Assembly then 
set to work to prepare a new Act for the better regulating . . . the 
fees of the several officers and courts of the island. This was passed in 
due course, received the Governor's assent, and was sent home for the 
royal confirmation. The new table of fees, however, evoked loud 
protests from the various patent officers within the island, who, 
claiming that the fees were wholly inadequate, petitioned the Crown 
for the rejection of the measure, and were largely responsible for its 
subsequent disallowance.* 3 The rejection of this Act was a severe 
blow to the Assembly, but instead of passing a new one, it was 
content to allow the Governor and Council to settle fresh tables of 
fees, in the drawing up of which it doubtless exercised considerable 
unofficial influence. 

From this time onwards Barbadian governors took pains to keep 
fees within the bounds of moderation, and down to the governorship 
of James Cunninghame the Assembly never again troubled to 
interfere. But the unconstitutional fees which this man demanded 
in order to supplement the diminished income which the legislature 
had allowed him, re-opened the whole question of fee regulation. 
The Governor's exactions were viewed with displeasure by the 



68 Early West Indian Government 

imperial authorities. The Privy Council, seriously disturbed by the 
turmoil which rent the island, came to recognise not only the 
propriety, but even the desirability of allowing island fees to be 
regulated by local laws. Cunninghame was recalled, and David 
Parry, his successor, was instructed to recommend to the Barbadian 
Assembly the passage of an Act for the better establishment and 
regulation of all fees. 

Nothing loath, the islanders obliged him by enacting that the 
regulation of all fees was the joint concern of the Governor, the 
Council, and the Assembly. They erred, however, in "tacking" this 
declaration to the Act which made provision for the new governor's 
salary, with the inevitable result that the entire Act was summarily 
rejected by the Crown, and the binding force of their declaration 
thereby wholly destroyed.* 4 It does not appear that the Barbadians 
took any further steps that century to re-establish in law the principle 
of Assembly participation in the fixation of fees; but the result of 
the Cunninghame controversy had been so great a moral victory in 
their favour, that doubtless they thought it unnecessary to affirm 
the dictum any further. 

From this somewhat involved story of island fee taking, two 
broad truths emerge. First, we see that the early successes of the 
Jamaican and Barbadian Assemblies in controlling fees by island 
law were not vigilantly followed up, and the legal rates, carelc 
allowed to decay, proved incapable of revival on account of the 
strength of patentee influence in London. Thus the scales of fees m 
both islands for the greater part of the eighteenth century, when 
regulated at all, were controlled more commonly by prerogative 
action than by positive law." Secondly we find that two of the 
Leeward Islands, Nevis and St. Christopher, attained some success, 
even in the eighteenth century, in regulating their fees by local laws, 
but the other two, Antigua and Montscrrat, had to remain content 
with prerogative control. 

6. Assembly Organisation 

Another important field wherein positive law attempted, though 
only with partial success, to supplant the prerogative, was that of 
Assembly organisation and control. By the terms of the vice-regal 
commission the Governor and Council had always been given full 
discretionary authority to summon Assemblies of the freeholders, 
and to make laws in conjunction with them. Further, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief was given unrestricted powers of adjournment, 



Bridling the Prerogative 69 

prorogation and dissolution. The control which a governor was 
intended to possess was modelled upon that wielded by the Crown 
over the House of Commons. A governor, by virtue of the freedom 
allowed him in the issue of writs, was legally able either to increase 
or to decrease the representation permitted to any towns or parishes 
within his domains. Moreover, by his powers of prorogation or 
dissolution he was able either to cut short or to prolong an Assembly 
at his personal discretion. The imperial authorities viewed with 
hostility* 6 any colonial law which, by setting restrictions either 
upon the membership or upon the continuance of Assemblies, 
sought to impair a governor's freedom of action in these respects. 

In the West Indian colonies, as well as in the other provinces of 
the old Empire, the representatives tended constantly to chafe at the 
arbitrary control which a despotic governor could employ. During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries therefore, numerous Acts 
were passed for the more uniform regulation of Assembly member- 
ship and duration. A short sketch of the passage, the substance, and 
the ultimate fate of these laws will help us to see the extent to which 
the discretionary control enjoyed by West Indian governors over 
their Assemblies came to be reduced during the period of our review. 

It was in Barbados that the Assembly first sought to regulate the 
terms of its own existence by a law of its own making. Barbadian 
experience during the Commonwealth period had shown the 
islanders the extreme inconvenience of allowing their Assembly an 
unrestricted tenure of office. Past Houses had remained so long in 
existence that they had sometimes ceased to represent the voters 
who had placed them there. During the brief governorship of Sir 
Thomas Modyford (1660) a change was decided upon: a law was 
passed to which the Governor assented, whereby the duration of all 
future Assemblies was strictly limited to a period of one year. 67 The 
Act was not unduly restrictive. It did not interfere with a governor's 
right to dissolve the House within a shorter period if he so desired, 
nor did it oblige him to summon an Assembly at all if he wanted 
none. This law of 1660 continued permanently in operation, although 
its existence was threatened temporarily in 1706, when a Triennial 
Act was passed to supersede it. But the speedy disallowance 88 of the 
new measure at once revived the old, which continued in full force 
for the remainder of the eighteenth century. 

Onwards from the time of Governor Atkins (1674-80) the Bar- 
badian legislature began to pass periodical laws to define electoral 
qualifications and to regulate the conduct of elections. 69 When 
under the Board of Trade these Acts came in for closer scrutiny. 



70 Early West Indian Government 

they were found to be generally useful and quite proper to be con- 
firmed. 70 Finally in 1721 was passed the final Act of the series, 
which remained in operation for the rest of the century. It enacted 
a complete set of regulations for the conduct of elections, from the 
issuing of the writs to the making of the returns: it stipulated that 
all disputed elections should be judged only in the Assembly, and 
established a minimum qualification for both elector and candidate. 
It made no stipulations concerning the numerical composition of the 
House. This was doubtless thought to be unnecessary, since the 
Assembly from the days of the Commonwealth itself had always 
been made up of twenty-two members, elected two from each of the 
eleven parishes. This new law did, however, provide that the presence 
of any twelve members would be a sufficient quorum for the conduct 
of business. 71 

Thus by the early eighteenth century the discretionary authority 
of a Barbadian governor over his Assembly had become in many 
respects seriously curtailed. His power indefinitely to prolong a 
complaisant House was summarily withdrawn: his power to alter 
its numerical composition had from the force of custom become 
void, whilst that of making discretionary rules for the qualification 
of electors or the taking of votes was completely superseded. 

The Jamaican Assembly did not have the advantage of Common- 
wealth precedents in the formulation of its early claims and privileges. 
The pioneer Assembly summoned by Sir Charles Littleton met only 
in January, 1664, and lasted little more than four months, as also 
did Modyford's one and only Assembly that met in October of the 
same year. No law or regulation governed the holding of these early 
Assemblies, to specify how many should compose them, what 
districts should elect them, or how long they should last. These 
things were left to the discretion of the Governor and Council. As a 
result the composition of each House varied somewhat and sessions 
were capriciously short as well as infrequent. 

Littleton's Assembly had twenty members, Modyford's and 
Lynch's first one (1671) only eighteen; Lynch's second one (1672) 
had nineteen. The representatives in 1674 thought this number 
insufficient and asked Lynch to increase it, but he refused, suggesting 
instead that the Assembly itself frame a bill to specify its own 
composition. The House did so, laying down that all future Assem- 
blies should consist of three members each from Port Royal and 
St. Catherine's, and two from each of the other parishes. The 
Lieutenant Governor and Council passed this into an Act, and 
since laws passed in those early years lapsed after two years unless 



Bridling the Prerogative 71 

they had been specially confirmed in England which never hap- 
pened so far as Jamaican laws were concerned this measure was 
re-enacted 72 from time to time until at length in 1683 it was con- 
firmed for a period of twenty-one years in recognition of the 
Assembly's grant of a Liquor Impost of the same duration. Finally, 
it was permanently confirmed when the Impost was made perpetual, 
and remained the basic law regulating the composition of the 
Assembly throughout the whole of our period. By 1675, too, the 
House had gained the right to choose its own Speaker, draw up its 
own rules, and decide for itself the merits of all disputed elections, 73 
and had thus assumed in most respects the shape by which it was 
ever afterwards to be known. 

The manner of holding elections, the formalities to be observed, 
and the provision of safeguards against malpractice were naturally 
the concern of every honest representative, and the perpetration of a 
number of election abuses in the early eighteenth century induced 
the legislature in 1716 to pass an Act to regulate the conduct of 
elections, which was, however, disallowed in England on account 
more of legal defects than of any objection to its principle. 74 Several 
years later the House therefore returned to the matter 75 and in 1733 
passed another Act to secure the freedom of elections which, being 
devoid of defects, was allowed to "lie by" indefinitely in England. 
It stipulated the way in which the writs should issue and the poll be 
taken, prescribed the forms of property oath to be taken both by 
voters and by newly elected Assemblymen, 74 and laid down safe- 
guards against various forms of electoral interference. Although 
amended in small respects in 1756 and 1760 it remained the law of 
the island for a further half-century until superseded in 1780 by a 
more comprehensive measure which imposed greater safeguards 
against wrongful election practices but left most of the other details, 
including basic property qualifications for both electors and elected, 
practically unchanged. 77 

But if the Crown took little exception to Assembly Acts seeking 
merely to regulate election procedure and other matters, it took 
strong exception to any measure that sought to restrict its right to 
call Assemblies whenever it pleased and retain them for as long as it 
liked. After the first few years 78 the Jamaican governors, on account 
of financial need, could hardly avoid giving Assemblies regular 
opportunities of meeting; and they were strongly tempted whenever 
they met with a complaisant House to retain its services for as long 
as they possibly could. Fortunately for Jamaican liberties the number 
of really agreeable Assemblies was extremely small, and most 



72 Early West Indian Government 

Assemblies were therefore of only short or moderate duration. The 
record for the life of a single House is that of the Assembly that met 
for the first time on 9th March, 1736, under summons from President 
John Gregory, and lasted until 13th July, 1745 a full nine-year 
period during the bulk of which Edward Trelawny was governor. 
In all it met for no fewer than twenty-three different sessions. But 
this condition of affairs tended to produce its own remedy. The 
members themselves grew tired of this interminable House and in 
1741 passed an Act to limit the duration of all future Assemblies to 
three years, and withheld supplies until Trelawny and Council 
consented to it. The English authorities took an excessive time to 
consider the measure and only in 1749 did the Board of Trade 
finally report against it, giving as reasons not only the restriction 
that it imposed on the prerogative, but also the objectionable means 
which the House had used to secure its passage and the fact that 
it had stubbornly refused to insert a suspending clause 79 in it. It was 
finally disallowed in 1752. 

Greatly discouraged, it was a considerable time before the House 
again took the matter up, but finally, in 1778, it passed a bill limiting 
the duration of Assemblies to seven years. Governor Dalling refused 
his assent because it contained no suspending clause, but he sent a 
copy of it to England with a request for directions how to act if it 
should be repeated. The legal adviser to the Board of Trade raised 
no objection to this, but it does not appear that Dalling was ever 
informed of this. When, therefore, the House the following year 
passed a practically identical bill and showed signs of truculcnce, 
the Council let it through and advised Dalling "for peace and 
quietness sake*' to give it his assent which he did.* The Act was not 
really approved in England, but was considered harmless enough 
to be allowed to "lie by" and so passed into indefinite operation. 
The victory, therefore, was won, and Jamaica joined the ranks of 
the more fortunate colonies which had succeeded in imposing a 
limit to the prerogative in this important particular. 

The first inhabitants within the Leeward Islands to attempt the 
passage of an electoral law were the planters of Nevis. In 1672 they 
passed an Act which, besides giving each parish a right to elect two 
members, also sought to restrict the Assembly's continuance to a 
period of twelve months. This measure remained in force only two 
years, after which it automatically lapsed on account of non- 
confirmation. 81 Nearly thirty years elapsed before a further electoral 
law was passed, this time to increase the parish representation to 
three members, and to provide that an attendance of eleven members 



Bridling the Prerogative 73 

would constitute a quorum. 83 As yet no property qualification had 
been set for either candidate or elector; this was partially remedied 
by a supplementary Act of 1736 which ordained that all future 
candidates should possess a freehold estate of thirty acres, or other 
property to the annual value of not less than 40 current money. 84 

The neighbouring island of St. Christopher likewise succeeded in 
passing some Acts by which the local Assembly might be protected 
from governmental interference. By 1711 a law was passed restricting 
the franchise to British or naturalised adults possessing ten acres 
freehold or a house of the annual value of 10. This qualification 
was the same for both elector and candidate. In future, too, Assem- 
blies were to continue for no longer than one year. 85 This in the 
turmoil of the times seems to have been overlooked in England, 
and so was allowed to continue in operation until repealed by a 
subsequent law passed in 1727 for the purpose of extending the 
franchise to that portion of the island which had been ceded from 
the French at the Peace of Utrecht. 

By this new Act the membership of the House was increased from 
twelve to twenty-four, which were definitely and unalterably pro- 
portioned among the various parishes. The new quorum was 
established at fifteen. New electoral qualifications were appointed 
for both candidates and voters, and Assemblies were again limited 
to a period of one year. Moreover the Chief Judge of the Common 
Pleas, the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the Secretary, the Provost 
Marshal, the Treasurer, and other revenue officers were made 
ineligible for seats in the House, although they were apparently still 
allowed to vote. 8 * The Act was not enthusiastically received by the 
Board of Trade, which found many objections to it. Nevertheless, 
because of its importance it was allowed to "lie by", and so con- 
tinued in operation throughout the remainder of the century. 87 

Less fortunate, however, were the sister islands of Montserrat and 
Antigua. They too made attempts to establish their Assemblies upon 
the positive foundation of known laws, but in each case they over- 
stepped the bounds permitted by the Board of Trade. An early 
Montserrat electoral law, which was not otherwise improper, was 
disallowed because it sought to dispense with the oaths of Allegiance 
and Supremacy as necessary voting qualifications within the parish 
of St. Patrick. 88 The inhabitants at the time of Governor Hart 
again turned their thoughts to the same problem, but the differences 
of opinion within the legislature prevented their plans from maturing. 
Yet again in 1748 the Assembly attempted the passage of an electoral 
law, but the same disruptive forces destroyed a second time all 



74 Early West Indian Government 

chance of agreement. The matter demanded urgent solution. The 
parish of St. Anthony for a long time had been most inadequately 
represented and was clamouring for electoral readjustment. When 
therefore in 1748 the House, convulsed by faction, threw out the 
bill designed to remedy the situation, Governor Mathew could 
tolerate the position no longer. Instead of continuing further to 
respect the constitutional susceptibilities of the people, he deter- 
mined to have resort to his still unrestricted prerogative powers. 
He dissolved the House, and of his own authority issued additional 
writs giving representation to the hitherto unrepresented towns of 
Plymouth and Kin sale. Many of the planters were loud in their 
complaints against his action, but a wiser group conceded the 
legality as well as the justice of his decision. 

When the new Assembly met, its members had the good sense to 
accept the position as they found it. They straightway proceeded to 
pass a bill to lend legislative foundation to the step.* 9 They defined 
minimum property qualifications for both voters and candidates, 
restricted the duration of each Assembly to a period of three years, 
and enacted that within four months of a dissolution the Govcrnor- 
in-Chief should issue new writs for a successor. The Treasurer was 
excluded from membership, and the presence of any seven members 
was ordained a quorum sufficient for business. When this Act was 
sent home for the perusal of the Board of Trade, the absence of the 
requisite suspending clause was at once noticed, and this omission 
led to its immediate disallowance. It is extremely doubtful, however, 
whether the Crown would ever have confirmed so restrictive a measure, 
even if its passage had conformed to the requirements of the Instruc- 
tions.* After this failure the island seems to have been content to 
let the matter slide." 

The Antiguan planters were just as unsuccessful in their en- 
deavours, and in some ways it must be admitted that they were 
singularly unfortunate. As early as the time of the elder Codrington, 
they embarked upon legislative regulation of Assembly sessions. We 
know that in 1693 they passed a measure appointing both "the 
number of Assemblymen and the manner of electing the same".* 
This was superseded in 1697 by a more radical law which was, 
however, disallowed in 1700 upon the ground that, by obliging the 
Governor to summon an Assembly at least once every year, it 
infringed too much "the powers which his Majesty had been pleased 
to confer upon his respective Governors**. 99 When the same agitation 
for an electoral law was revived during the administration of Daniel 
Parke, the latter, by opposing some of its clauses, successfully 



Bridling the Prerogative 75 

obstructed its passage. 94 Consequently it was not until 1718 that the 
Antiguan legislature passed a further Act both to define electoral 
qualifications, and to declare the privileges of the Assembly. This 
measure failed to meet with the approval of Richard West, the 
newly appointed legal adviser to the Board of Trade, and was in due 
course rejected. By its terms the Antiguan House had laid claim to 
privileges in excess even of those enjoyed by the House of Commons 
in England which pretensions were considered far too "exor- 
bitant" to be indulged. 96 

The disappointment felt at the loss of so valuable a law left the 
islanders permanently discouraged. Not for another forty years was 
another electoral measure mooted. But in 1761 the spell was broken 
with the appearance of a bill designed both to establish modes of 
election, and to set limits to Assembly duration. It was finally passed 
and assented to by Governor Thomas, but without the inclusion 
of any suspending clause. The inevitable again occurred: the Board 
of Trade, incensed at this neglect, and considering the measure too 
restrictive of the Governor's authority, called to mind the Mont- 
serrat Act of 1 749, and subjected this Antiguan law to a similar fate. 96 

From all these considerations itjs clear that the authority still 
POMCiied by a late eighteenth century governor over his Assemblies 
varied considerably from island to island. His control over those at 
Montserrat and Antigua in 1783 was legally still unfettered, while in 
Nevis it was only his power of altering parish representation which 
had been taken away. In Barbados, Jamaica, and St. Christopher, 
on the other hand, his authority over the representative body had 
become so reduced, that the powers of adjournment, prorogation, 
and dissolution within the limits of its restricted duration were the 
only discretionary powers he still retained. 



Chapter V 
FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN BARBADOS 



1. Introduction 

The representative system which, prior to the nineteenth century, 
was so characteristic a feature of English colonial government, was a 
system which provided material in plenty for constitutional strife. 
All students are agreed that the root matter upon which all major 
questions constantly impinged, and which so frequently proved the 
deciding factor in a dispute, was the subject of finance. All admini- 
stration necessitated the expenditure of money, and the degree to 
which a popular House controlled finance determined that to which 
it controlled the whole administration. 

The financial systems of Barbados, Jamaica and the Leeward 
Islands differed sufficiently to justify their separation into different 
chapters of this work. 

2. Procedure in Tax Legislation 

From very early times the Barbadian planters had claimed that 
the people's consent was a necessary condition to the legality of all 
taxation. In the Articles which they extorted from the Parliamentary 
forces under Sir George Ayscue in 1652 they had inserted a clause to 
safeguard their liberties in this respect. 1 Ever afterwards this became 
one of the major articles in their constitutional creed, to be main- 
tained at all costs; any infringement of which provoked their 
sturdiest opposition, as Francis Lord Willoughby found to his cost 
when, during the period of his second administration (1662-6), he 
sought to extort from them a tax which they considered to have been 
illegally procured without the Assembly's consent. 1 

From this it was but a short step to the claim that in the lower 
House lay the sole right to grant money for the public use. This 
demand, first put forward with rather uncertain success in 1674,* 
was fully vindicated in a subsequent dispute which arose early in 
the governorship of Sir Richard Dutton. 4 From this time onwards 



Financial Administration in Barbados 77 

the Assembly remained the sole originator of money bills, though 
for sixty years more the Council preserved its right to amend. But 
the disputes between Council and Assembly in 1740-1, which took 
place primarily over the Assembly's claim to participate in the issue 
of the public money, were instrumental in bringing into review the 
whole question of tax legislation. The lower House now denied the 
Council's right even to amend money bills, and the popular en- 
thusiasm provoked by that struggle spelt sure defeat for the Council's 
pretensions. Although it was the Assembly which capitulated on 
the major issue by dropping the objectionable bills and introducing 
others in their stead, yet on the really no less important question 
of tax amendment it was the Council which gave way. From this 
time onwards the sole power left to the latter in the matter of tax 
legislation was that either of complete acceptance or rejection. 

The manner of raising supplies in Barbados differed very greatly 
from that which obtained in England. The difference reflects accur- 
ately the different psychological attitudes obtaining within each 
country. Whereas in England the Commons raised money only 
when definitely asked to do so by the Crown, the Island Assembly 
raised fresh or continued old taxes without any such corresponding 
demand from the Governor. In the former the whole administration 
of finance was regarded as the private business of the King, and the 
Commons with reluctance voted additional supplies: in the smallness 
of the island the financial administration seemed as much the interest 
of the Assemblymen as the business of the Governor, and the 
maintenance of public credit in other words, a full treasury was 
regarded primarily as the concern of the Assembly itself. 5 

In accordance with this spirit we find that, while supply often was 
raised at the express demand of the Governor, 8 it was also some- 
times raised upon the initiative of the House itself. The coffers being 
empty and the public debts voluminous, the Assembly more often 
than not would take steps entirely of its own accord to raise a tax 
for remedying the situation. 7 The Excise being on the point of 
expiry, it required no express demand from the Governor that it be 
continued: the Assembly, fully conversant with the circumstances, 
would introduce a new measure simply as a matter of course. 8 

This power of being able to introduce tax bills without any 
previous vice-regal request occasionally gave rise to most unusual 
situations, one of which occurred towards the close of our period. 
In 1774 the Barbadian Excise Act, which previously had been always 
a temporary measure, was inadvertently passed in a form which erec- 
ted it into a permanent law. A year or two later the representatives, 



78 Early West Indian Government 

becoming dissatisfied with the manner in which they had appro- 
priated the moneys arising from that Act, made repeated attempts 
to introduce fresh measures, calculated both to alter its appro- 
priation terms and to destroy the permanence which attached to it. 
These fresh Excise Bills were introduced into the House, not in 
answer to any previous demand from the Governor, but directly 
contrary to his wishes; for he himself was quite satisfied that the 
Act of 1774 should remain in full force. 

Seldom indeed did the Governor and Council ever submit to the 
Assembly any estimates of the cost attaching to any work or service 
which they might propose. Nor were there any "official" members 
of the lower body, through whom the wishes of the Executive 
might informally be conveyed to the representatives. Consequently, 
in estimating the probable expense of any service which the Governor 
had recommended to them, the representatives had either to compute 
the probable costs as best they could, or else arrange for a body of 
commissioners comprising members of both Houses to deliberate 
upon the proposal, and suggest how much required to be raised. 10 
The sum having been ascertained, the Assembly would depute some 
of its members from the commission to prepare and bring in the 
requisite bill, which having in imitation of English procedure sur- 
vived three readings, would be passed on to the Council. In the 
last named a further three readings would be taken. In the event of 
amendments the bill would be sent back to the House, which could 
either accept or reject them. Conferences were frequently held, and 
not until complete agreement was reached could the measure finally 
pass into an Act. 

But not all public works and services required the sanction of a 
full legislative Act. This, with the wearisome details which it entailed, 
was reserved entirely for matters of heavy expense. In countless 
instances of more trifling expenditure, it was purposely avoided. 
Instead, the Assembly would pass a simple resolution, agreeing that 
the suggested service be carried into execution at the public expense. 11 
This simple resolve evidence of the understanding arrived at 
between both Houses was deemed a sufficient authority for the 
conduct of all such works. 

Governor Robinson in 1746 strove to follow a more correct 
constitutional procedure in asking the Assembly for supplies, when 
he submitted to it a lengthy estimate of all the works which he 
judged to be necessary, together with a table of their probable 
cost. The proposed expenditure according to his computation 
amounted to over 1 1,000. This table of Estimates was laid before the 



Financial Administration in Barbados 79 

representatives in the hope that they would proceed to consider ways 
and means to meet the proposed charge. They, however, were far 
from pleased with this new method of demanding funds, besides 
which they resented being asked to raise so large a sum upon the 
foundation of Estimates which did not describe in meticulous detail 
every item of the proposed expenditure. 

Deputy-Speaker Harrison expressed his astonishment that "his 
Excellency could . . . possibly conceive that the gross calculates he ... 
mentioned in his message . . . could be the least satisfactory to the 
House, or engage them to raise a levy for the fortifications till they 
had fully considered of every particular that was recommended and 
proposed to be done, not in a cursory and general, but in the most 
exact and particular manner possible". The representatives there- 
upon threw overboard the Governor's primary need for a large fund 
for fortifications, as also his Estimates, and proceeded instead to 
consider the question of raising supplies to extinguish the existing 
public debt, and to provide a fund for future general purposes. In 
doing this they resorted to their usual methods of the past. From a 
table of figures submitted to them by the Treasurer, they computed 
the amount of the existing debts, and, using that as a foundation, 
proceeded to raise a new poll tax. 12 

Robinson had learnt his lesson. He never again tried to repeat this 
method of asking supplies. When only a few months later he had 
further occasion to address the House upon the "great decay of your 
Town Hall and Common Gaol" he ventured only to recommend 
these objects as "incidents you will have in view while you make an 
estimate of the current services". 13 

The raising of supply, the estimate of what was thought necessary 
to be raised, and the actual determination of the character and rate 
of every new tax were all regarded as the primary concern of the 
representatives: so also was the manner of its appropriation very 
largely their business, especially when after 1740 the Council was 
bereft of its right to amend. 

3. Appropriation, Audit and Issue up to 1685. 

The methods by which the legislature appropriated the proceeds 
from every tax to the particular purposes for which it was raised is 
worthy of the closest attention, since it gave rise to a number of 
consequences of the greatest possible importance to the island. We 
have already described in Chapter I how the islanders of pre- 
Restoration times appropriated their tax proceeds: how they raised 



80 Early West Indian Government 

them by an Act of the legislature and spent them only upon purposes 
sanctioned by the mutual resolves of each House. As the Barbadian 
Council stated in 1661, every tax was raised "by the common 
consent of the Council and Assembly . . . and disposed of by the 
same consent that raised it". 14 

During the administration of Francis Lord Willoughby (1663- 
1666) it is certain that the Governor resorted to more arbitrarv 
means both of raising and of spending public money. His high- 
handedness created such revulsion among the planters that his 
successors in office were forced to return again to the practices and 
principles of the old constitution. Not a penny would the islanders 
yield to them, until they had subscribed to a declaration promising 
for the future that the island would "be governed according to the 
laws of England and the constitution and laws of this place and not 
otherways, anything heretofore . . . seeming to the contrary not- 
withstanding". 1 * 

The records of the next seven years are not conclusive 1 * concerning 
the degree to which the island legislators returned to the appropria- 
tion methods of their predecessors. It is probable that the governors 
did not at once give up the discretionary spending power which 
Francis Lord Willoughby had gained for them. It is clear, how- 
ever, that by the arrival of Sir Jonathan Atkins in 1673 the old 
financial methods were again in operation. Henceforward until the 
advent of Governor Dutton all taxes were raised by the mutual 
consent of both Houses, and the proceeds were from time to time 
appropriated to just those purposes which both agreed to support. 
The Act which raised them contained merely the broad condition 
that all proceeds be employed "for the defraying all ... necessary 
and public charges as the Governor Council and Assembly shall 
direct and not otherwise". 17 

The Governor and Council had therefore no authority to spend 
even a penny of the money before they had first approached the 
Assembly and secured the latter's consent to every particular piece of 
work which they desired to undertake. This in effect obliged the 
Council to take the representatives into confidence over all works of 
executive concern which necessitated public expenditure. Only when 
the latter had fully considered and agreed to a proposal could the 
work be executed. From this authorising power which they possessed 
the representatives gradually came to arrogate to themselves a 
definite executive jurisdiction. Instead of merely concurring in a 
proposal sent down from the Council, they progressed a step further 
and commenced to join with the Governor and Council in giving 



Financial Administration in Barbados 81 

the actual order by which the proposed service was to be set on foot. 
It is abundantly clear that Atkins was quite satisfied to allow them 
this encroachment into what should have been more properly his 
province and his alone. 

In 1678 a mariner, Captain John Poines by name, put forward 
a series of proposals to the Governor, Council and Assembly, in 
which he asked that public assistance be given to him in a task 
which he contemplated, of making a safe anchorage for shipping 
out "of the creek . . . that runneth by the town of St Michaels". 
The three branches of the legislature decided that his scheme was 
worthy of support. Thereupon it was "ordered by his Excellency, 
Council, and Assembly, that Colonel William Bate, Colonel Richard 
Guy, Major John Hallett, and Captain John Johnson ... do cause 
to be hired ... so many boats as they shall find needful, and a con- 
venient number of working negroes as the said Poines shall desire, 
not exceeding one hundred, to be by him employed about the work 
of the haven aforesaid, ... to continue thereon for three weeks; and 
for the charge thereof the said [committee] ... are to draw upon the 
Treasurer of the Excise, who is hereby required to pay the same*'. 18 
All through the years of Atkins* administration this type of joint 
"order" continued to be a characteristic feature of appropriations. 

Moreover the Assembly, not content solely with a power of 
authorising expenditure, claimed also a share co-equal with that of 
the Governor and Council in the actual issuing of money from the 
Treasury. This, too, was a power which had belonged to them during 
Commonwealth days, 1 * though it must have been denied them in the 
early Restoration government of the first Lord Willoughby. By 
Atkins* time, however, they had regained it even more completely 
than before. 

That this was ever allowed them was due largely to an ambiguity 
which attached to the meaning of the word "disposal**. The repre- 
sentatives claimed that their consent was necessary to the "disposal" 
of all public money. This might mean merely that their approval 
was an essential condition to its appropriation to specific uses, or it 
might mean that their consent was necessary to the issue of all 
warrants upon the treasury for the actual payment of creditors* 
accounts. To make perfectly sure of their position they claimed and 
were conceded both rights. We have already seen how their consent 
was made necessary for the authorisation of all works: a perusal of 
the relevant records of the period shows also that all claims upon the 
treasury "public accounts** they were called had likewise to be 
examined and passed by the House before any order or warrant 



82 Early West Indian Government 

could issue upon the Treasurer for their payment.* Such warrants 
were issued upon the joint authority of Governor, Council and 
Assembly, and were presumably countersigned by the Clerk of the 
House or the Speaker as evidence of their having passed the scrutiny 
of that body. 

Atkins, in informing the Lords of Trades and Plantations of the 
financial procedure followed within the island, gave so concise a 
description of it that his report is deserving of quotation. "As for 
the levies of the country*', he wrote, "they make them according to 
the emergency of the occasion, sometimes more, sometimes less; 
sometimes upon lands at so many pounds of sugar per acre, upon 
negroes at so many pounds per head, and sometimes upon coppers 
and stills as they find it most agreeable ... to the people's con- 
venience. When 'tis passed the Assembly they bring it to me and the 
Council. If the Council approve it, they request my concurrence, and 
if there be nothing repugnant to his Majesty's interest, I confirm it. 
This being made law it is published in the churches the Sunday 
following. For the collecting of it there is a day set down in the Act 
for every one to pay their sugars in upon a penalty; the same Act 
appointing collectors, receivers, and Treasurer. There is not one 
penny issued out of it but by order which must first pass the Assem- 
bly, then the Governor and Council, though it be for the smallest 
sum; which orders so approved are recorded by the Clerk of the 
Assembly and in the principal Secretary's office, that the people may 
know what becomes of their money.** 11 

But the latitude enjoyed thus far by the Assembly was soon to be 
withdrawn. The Lords for Trade and Plantations had learned from 
experience how prejudicial such a popular freedom had been to 
the personal authority of the King's representative in all royal 
colonies. Greater discretionary control over the field of finance 
must be given to all governors if they were to be prevented from 
becoming mere title heads of petty colonial administrations. Sir 
Richard Out ton. appointed in 1680 to succeed Sir Jonathan Atkins 
in Barbados, carried across with him powers which were destined 
to work considerable alteration in the financial procedure of the 
island. 

His commission directed that any money henceforward to be 
raised by any Act was to be devoted solely to the purposes "which 
such Act should appoint" but it was to be paid out from the treasury 
solely upon warrants under the Governor's hand, issued with his 
Council's consent. An article of his Instructions further abrogated 
the Assembly's right to pass accounts prior to payment, and ordained 



Financial Administration in Barbados 83 

that for the future the sole privilege to be allowed the lower House 
would be that of examining accounts only after the money had 
issued for their payment. The new Instruction was technically quite 
constitutional. The Assembly thenceforth was to be allowed only the 
right to appropriate all supply to definite purposes: the Governor 
and Council within the limits of such appropriation terms were to 
exercise a free spending power; while the representatives were enabled 
to examine into the accounts of such expenditure in order to satisfy 
themselves that no money had been misapplied. 28 

The new Governor did not lose any time in putting his instructions 
into effect. He insisted upon the full employment of all his new 
powers. He definitely claimed his constitutional right to have the 
financial administration within his own control, and pointed out 
that his claim did not endanger the Assembly's liberties. "The 
power his Majesty hath granted me", he said, "is so confined that I 
cannot issue out any moneys but according as it is appropriated by 
the uses in that Act by which it is to be raised". 28 He showed by his 
words that he realised quite clearly the constitutional limits as well 
as the rights of his position, and the Assembly, despite considerable 
discontent, knuckled down to his demands. 

During his governorship we find that long and detailed appro- 
priation clauses for the very first time became included within all 
tax acts. 24 Within the limits of these, the Governor and Council 
enjoyed a perfectly free hand in authorising expenditure on works 
and services, and in issuing money in payment for them. If money 
was required for some purpose not covered by the appropriation 
terms of existing tax Acts, special application had to be made to the 
Assembly in order to secure their concurrence in the proposed 
expenditure, and to induce them to pass a special Act to sanction it. 25 
It does not appear during Dutton's administration that money was 
ever appropriated by the authority of joint resolution alone. 

All warrants for the payment of money out of the treasury were 
signed as the commission directed solely by the Governor, and 
issued with the consent of the Council. Even the salaries of the 
Assembly's Clerk and Marshal, which had hitherto been paid by 
the Treasurer upon warrants from the Speaker alone, now came to 
be paid only in obedience to orders properly issued under the Gover- 
nor's hand. 2 ' 

The revenues of Barbados were drawn from two sources. The first 
was a duty termed an Excise imposed on all imported liquors. 
This was not a permanent tax, but under ordinary circumstances 
was automatically continued from year to year. Thus it came to be 



84 Early West Indian Government 

regarded as a sort of semi-permanent tax, which kept the treasury 
constantly supplied with a certain quantum of money, which, 
although insufficient to meet the complete annual charges, was 
nevertheless generally sufficient to meet the costs of defence and 
certain other regular expenses.* 7 All further expenditure of a kind 
not covered by the Excise, had to be specially sanctioned either by a 
special Act, or by a resolution of both Houses. 

Moreover, the Council and Assembly were quite prepared to 
authorise such additional expenditure even when there was not 
sufficient money actually present in the treasury to defray it. By 
mutual resolve they would readily agree to the prosecution of 
special public works or services, and yet take no immediate steps 
to raise fresh funds from which to pay for these. Some enterprising 
contractors" could generally be found willing to undertake these 
works, who upon completion of their tasks would send their accounts 
in to the Council for payment. The Governor would then issue 
warrants in payment of such claims. Since, however, there was 
yet no money in the treasury appropriated to this use, the con- 
tractors were forced to keep these orders in their possession and 
wait patiently until the legislature should care to raise a fresh supply 
of revenue from which they could be satisfied.* When this volume of 
clamouring creditors grew too great to be any longer ignored, the 
Assembly would proceed to the levy of a special property tax. to 
create a fund sufficient to pay off all existing creditors and leave a 
more or less reasonable balance for meeting the needs of the im- 
mediate future. This property tax levied upon negroes, land, or 
other property was the second main source of island revenue. 

Dutton's abrogation of the Assembly's right to join in the in- 
spection of public accounts prior to the issue of money in payment, 
made it all the more necessary that its right of audit subsequent 
to payment should be made more effective than it had been in the 
past. From comparatively early times we know that the House bad 
enjoyed a somewhat desultory right to set up a committee to inspect 
the Treasurer's books. 30 But from the advent of Dutton this com- 
mittee came to have a more permanent existence. It was composed 
of a small group of members chosen from each House. Its chief 
function from a constitutional point of view, was the examination 
of the Treasurer's books in order to prevent misapplication of the 
public funds, and to keep the legislature periodically informed of the 
existing state of the public credit. 

In addition it possessed the full and apparently exclusive power of 
being able to sue tax defaulters for the payment of their dues. From 



Financial Administration in Barbados 85 

Dutton's time onwards the committee became a permanent part of 
the financial machine. 31 Its chief functions continued almost un- 
changed throughout the succeeding century. It became customary 
for it to play a very important part in the raising of all fresh supply. 
When the existing volume of public debt grew too great to be 
tolerated any longer, it was the committee of public accounts lhat 
informed the House of the situation, and by presenting a concise 
statement of the financial position, provided the representatives with 
sufficient data upon which to base new taxation. 32 



4. Appropriation, Audit and Issue after 1685. 

The new and strictly constitutional management of the finances 
which was begun by Dutton, worked quite satisfactorily throughout 
the period of his own vigorous administration; but his successors, 
Stede, Kendall, and Russell, all met with renewed Assembly opposi- 
tion over the manner of issuing money from the treasury. It will be 
remembered that during the governorship of Sir Jonathan Atkins 
the Assembly had exercised a very close control over all payments 
made for the public services. Where they had considered a charge 
to be exorbitant they had not hesitated to reduce the amount to be 
allowed for it, or even to disallow the claim altogether. Thus they 
had been able to keep a tight check over all rash or improvident 
expenditure. But the new order of things inaugurated by Dutton 
destroyed their power in this respect. Within the restrictions imposed 
by the appropriation terms of each tax Act, the Governor and 
Council could if they so desired spend lavishly and in excessive 
amounts, without the Assembly's possessing any effective redress. 
For to discover any evidence of misapplication only after the money 
had been spent, was like discovering the stable door open after the 
horse was gone. 

Accordingly the House began to yearn for the freedom which 
had belonged to it under Dutton's predecessors. It pressed hard to 
be allowed again the right of inspecting and settling public accounts 
prior to payment being made. Governor Russell, addressing the 
Lords of Trade upon the subject in 1695, referred to the terms of his 
commission whereby he was given exclusive power to issue the 
public money, and stated "But this is a power the present Assembly 
will not be contented with, for they have vigorously expressed that 
no money shall be disposed of by myself and Council without their 
approbation, and that the Treasurer shall be accountable to them, 



86 Early West Indian Government 

and pay no money but by order of their Clerk' Such a popular 
claim to an active share in the issue of all public money was hotly 
contested by both Governor and Council. In vain did the House 
attempt to gain its object by the insertion of a special clause within 
successive tax bills. The Board invariably deleted the offending 
article, whereat the representatives faced with the threatened 
collapse of the revenue unfailingly desisted in their attempts. 

But although the Board was generally successful in resisting the 
Assembly's claim to a complete participation in all issues, it could not 
prevent its encroachment in certain particular instances, which may 
here be described. The Liquor Excise Acts had always provided for 
the granting of a rebate to those merchants who, having paid the 
duty on their imported liquors, later discovered them to have turned 
sour. In the days of Atkins every such claim for rebate was forced 
to secure the approval of the Assembly as well as the Council, before 
it could be allowed. Dutton, however, had insisted that the dis- 
pensation lay completely within his own control, and during his 
administration all such petitions were granted or refused solely upon 
his and the Council's authority. But by 1700 the representatives 
had regained the right to share in the allowance or rejection of these 
rebate claims. Their jurisdiction in this respect was tantamount to an 
inspection of certain claims upon the public treasury previous to the 
issue of money for their satisfaction. Furthermore it had become 
customary for the Governor and Council to make payment of 
salary to the servants of the Assembly, only when they had received 
an address from the House certifying the amount which was due. M 

The greatest encroachment of all, however, was effected in a 
different manner, which must be clearly understood, if the numerous 
struggles that later flowed from it are to be fully comprehended. 
It will be remembered that during the governorship of Atkins the 
Council and Assembly used frequently to appropriate moneys to 
different purposes upon the authority of mutual resolution, but that 
Dutton denied the legality of this system and apparently insisted 
upon legislative appropriations as the correct constitutional method 
of expressing such approval. During the administrations of his 
successors however, the tendency towards appropriation by mere 
joint resolution became again apparent. 

During the French wars of the late seventeenth and early eight- 
eenth century, Barbados was frequently alarmed by the appearance 
of French privateers who did considerable damage to the shipping 
of its ports. As a result of this, governors were often tempted to 
press sloops into the island service for the pursuit of such marauders. 






Financial Administration in Barbados 87 

But no terms in the existing tax Acts sanctioned such expenditure. 
In consequence, whenever the Governor wished to fit out a sloop 
he was forced to make special application to the Assembly for 
authority to bear the costs out of the treasury. The representatives 
commonly sanctioned such expenditure by the mere passage of a 
simple resolution in its favour. It became customary for the accounts 
of such special "resolution" expenditure to be handed down for 
the examination and adjustment of the Assembly prior to the issue 
of any money in payment of them. 35 Having passed each account as 
fit for payment, the House would thereupon request the Governor 
with Council's consent to issue his warrant upon the Treasurer 
for the sum concerned. 

Since the tendency towards this joint resolution form of appro- 
priation was a growing one, we find by the beginning of the eight- 
eenth century that an ever increasing volume of accounts had 
necessarily to be passed first by the Assembly and later by the 
Governor and Council, before any payment in respect of them 
could be made. 88 It is clear, however, that wherever the expenditure 
on a certain work or service was already covered by the appropriation 
clauses of a tax Act, the Governor and Council still enjoyed an 
unrestricted right both to embark upon the task and to defray the 
resultant charges direct from the treasury. 37 

But before long the House began to view with disfavour even that 
limited degree of executive independence. By 1700 the island expenses 
had become somewhat formalised. Certain heads of expenditure, 
such as the charges for salaries or for executed negro compensation, 
were for such well-known and ascertainable amounts that any 
misapplication of public money in connection with them was almost 
impossible. Certain other expenses, however, such as the charge 
for fortification repairs, or the supply of military equipment, were 
so variable that they left considerable room for rash, excessive, or 
even dishonest expenditure on the part of the Executive. During the 
eighteenth century, therefore, the representatives kept their attention 
focused upon the problem of achieving such alterations in the 
financial system, that all the accounts which arose from these 
variable items should be submitted for their scrutiny and adjustment 
before any payment was made. 88 The story of their efforts is an 
important one, and constitutes the core of all the major constitu- 
tional struggles waged in Barbados throughout the eighteenth century. 

The first evidence of the new movement is to be seen in a tax 
dispute which occurred in 1712. The long continuance of the War 
of the Spanish Succession had resulted in almost constant danger to 



88 Early West Indian Government 

the island from the depredations of French privateers. So frequent 
had the alarms become, that the representatives had been induced 
to include within recent Excise Acts a clause giving to the Governor 
and Council a discretionary right to issue money from the treasury 
upon any services of emergency which it thought necessary. Tem- 
porarily, therefore, the representatives had surrendered their old 
right to be consulted about every such matter. 

But the latitude thus given to the Executive soon came to be 
seriously abused. The House claimed that the Council had taken 
advantage of the concession to spend money upon objects which 
under no circumstances could be considered urgent. Since the 
treasury warrants for the payment of emergent services were simply 
blank orders containing no particulars of the work to which they 
related, 3 * it is clear that the Governor and Council certainly did 
have it in their power to abuse their authority if they so desired. 
The representatives claimed that during the governorship of Mitford 
Crowe (1707-11) the gardener at Pilgrim 40 and some of his other 
servants had been paid excessive salaries, due to the fact that they 
had "constantly had their orders ... as emergencies". 41 

In order to prevent such irregularities for the future, the Assembly, 
when framing a new Excise Bill in 1712, refused any longer to give 
the Governor and Council discretionary power to issue moneys 
from the treasury for emergency services. They determined to revert 
to the earlier practice whereby each proposal for the conduct of an 
emergent service had to secure the special approval of the House, 
before it could be carried into operation. In vain did the Council 
urge that the practice of the more recent years ought still to be 
continued. The Assembly admitted that the recent usage certainly 
favoured the Board's claim to a discretionary issue of money for 
urgent purposes, but coldly added that "the antiquity of an error" 
could not 44 plead its sanction**. Deadlock ensued. The Governor in 
anger dissolved the House and called another. The new body adopted 
exactly the same attitude as its predecessor, and only after some 
months of controversy was the Excise finally passed in a form which 
yielded victory to the popular claims 41 the new Act being passed 
without the clause for which the Council had striven. The re- 
presentatives had learned an important lesson: that by refusing to 
make ordinary provision for a service by the inclusion of a "use" in 
the usual tax Acts, they could compel the Executive to resort to the 
sanction of joint resolution in its place, and so acquire a right to 
peruse and adjust the public accounts which would arise from such 
expenditure. 



Financial Administration in Barbados 89 

Some time afterwards they found the same expedient again useful. 
For many years the charge of supplying fresh equipment to the 
fortifications had been customarily sanctioned by the inclusion of a 
regular "use" in each Excise Act. The principal person upon the 
island who dealt in such materials was the Powder Officer or Store- 
keeper, 43 who, in addition to his ordinary duties, had built up a 
profitable subsidiary business as a sort of public contractor for the 
supply of military equipment. In the governorship of Henry Worsley 
(1723-31) the representatives began to view with suspicion the 
excessive disbursements which, under the sanction of the Excise 
terms, were being made to this officer. Because they doubted whether 
the public was receiving fair value for the money so spent, they 
decided to have all his accounts submitted for their perusal. To 
achieve this end, they refrained in 1727 from inserting in the Excise 
a "use" to cover his expenditure, 44 and so made their approval of his 
accounts an essential condition to the granting of payment. 

In the following year they inserted within the clauses of a new 
Excise Bill, a use "for making and repairing carnages for the great 
guns, and for supplying each fort and platform within this island 
with all sorts of necessaries and utensils", but added as a condition 
that first "a particular account of all such necessaries and utensils 
be first laid before the Assembly to be by them inspected, regulated 
and approved of, and they thereon address the Governor . . . and 
Council for the payment thereof". They set similar conditions to the 
issue of money for the repair of the magazine, the cost of the Court 
of Grand Sessions, the Agent's salary, and the charges of the Attorney 
General. 46 The Council rejected every one of the restrictions which 
the Assembly thus strove to place upon them. Controversy waxed 
long and furious. The Council proved adamant, and the representa- 
tives, to prevent too great a loss of revenue, were finally forced to 
acquiesce in the passage of the Excise free from the objectionable 
restrictions. Worsley asked them to desist from their opposition until 
he had sent home a copy of the Bill, and had received the opinion of 
the Board of Trade upon the propriety of their claims. The imperial 
authorities reported very strongly against the popular pretensions, 
and the Excise Bill was summarily disallowed by the Crown as 
being contrary both to the usage of Barbados itself, "and of all other 
. . . f his] Majesty's colonies". 46 

The representatives had claimed that the granting of their demands 
would not conflict with the Governor's Instructions. He and the 
Council would still have the sole right of issuing the public money, 
despite the fact that in certain instances the Assembly's previous 



90 Early West Indian Government 

"address" or authorisation would be necessary. But the speciousness 
of their assertions was not lost upon Worsley. "The Assembly", 
he wrote, "do not pretend to make out the [actual] warrants and 
orders for money; that servile part they leave to the Governor and 
Council: nor do they command the Governor and Council to issue 
orders in pursuance of their addresses, but they tell them not to 
issue the money for such uses until they have first addressed for it; 
so that notwithstanding that the Governor and Council have found it 
necessary for his Majesty's service ... to employ persons at the 
public expense . . . and that those persons should faithfully do their 
duty accordingly, they shall never have an order for their money 
unless they have interest enough with some leading men of the 
Assembly to procure it for them." 47 

Though Worsley may have exaggerated a little in regard to this 
last portion of his despatch, it is clear that a very serious principle 
was at stake. Should the representatives ever gain their ends, it 
would inevitably follow that one set of men would be responsible 
for authorising the conduct of works and services, and a totally 
different set given discretionary authority either to grant or refuse 
payment for the same. Such a condition of divided authority could 
not be long maintained. The power responsible for giving the orders 
must also be capable of making the payment. Either the Governor 
and Council must be allowed to retain both powers; or the Assembly, 
in claiming the issuing authority, must in the end secure the essential 
power of giving the orders also. 4 * 

The Assembly in 1728 had been severely rebuffed, but its defeat 
was nothing like so decisive as the Council hoped. When once they 
had capitulated in their attempts to force the passage of the disputed 
measure, the representatives brought in a new bill, which being more 
satisfactory to the Council, passed the latter without serious opposi- 
tion. In the new bill, however, the House carefully refrained from 
inserting any "use" to sanction the payment of those whose 
accounts had been the prime cause of the controversy. This meant 
that no fund was set aside from which any of these claims might be 
satisfied. For several years therefore the disputed accounts remained 
unpaid, until in the mid-thirties the Assembly took pity on the 
complainants, and, after having insisted upon an inspection of their 
accounts, consented to their payment. 4 * From 1736 onwards the 
representatives continued, therefore, if only in an informal way, to 
insist as a condition of their making provision for the Storekeeper's 
disbursement, that his accounts before payment be transmitted to 
them for their inspection and address. 60 



Financial Administration in Barbados 91 

In an informal fashion, therefore, they gradually won a con- 
siderable portion of that very jurisdiction which had been denied to 
them in 1728. By the year 1740 they considered the practice to be 
long-standing enough to claim legislative recognition. In a Levy 
Bill introduced late in that year they attempted to revert to all the 
claims of 1 728, by inserting clauses in the new measure to sanction 
the payment of the Storekeeper's and other variable accounts only 
after the Assembly had first passed them and had addressed the 
Governor to sign the necessary warrants. Once again argument 
grew very bitter, and in the end the House again capitulated. 61 

But its desires, though denied attainment, continued as insistent as 
ever. 51 Governors Byng and Robinson took a firm stand to prevent 
any further encroachment. Their successor Henry Grenville (1747-53) 
was, however, a man of very different disposition, who early made an 
almost complete surrender to the popular claims. Joseph Jordan, 
a prominent member of the House and one of the foremost protag- 
onists in the popular cause, who could find nothing but the bitterest 
abuse for Robinson, was able only a year later to move an address of 
praise to his successor, whose new administration "was so agreeable 
to what then wish'd for*'. 6 * The Excise Act passed on 1st December, 
1747, contained several clauses which gave the representatives a 
large share of that jurisdiction over the issue of public money, which 
had hitherto been denied to them. It proved so satisfactory to them 
that it was afterwards continued in its entirety by fresh Acts passed 
from year to year. Such a continuing Act of 8th July, 1760, still 
allowed many formal items of expenditure to be met direct by the 
Governor and Council, but in making payment for a greater number 
of "variable" works and services, specified that the warrants should 
issue only upon the receipt of an address from the Assembly, certifying 
that the relevant accounts had passed the scrutiny of that House.** 

In a fresh Excise Act of 1761 the same system was continued. 
Many formal payments were left as hitherto to the undisputed 
discretion of the Governor and Council, but all payments for the 
naval defence of the island, the salaries of the Engineer, and the 
Secretary at War, the cost of public prosecutions, and expenditure 
upon all matters not expressly provided for in the Act, were to be 
made only after the appropriate accounts had been first passed by 
the House. 66 

The final scenes in the long struggle over the issue of public money 
took place in the 'seventies and early 'eighties of the century, and 
arose as follows. Almost throughout the entire eighteenth century 
the fortifications repairs within each division had been entrusted to 



92 Early West Indian Government 

bodies of commissioners comprising the Assemblymen, the Coun- 
cillors, and the Field Officers resident within the precinct. The care of 
the fortifications was thus left practically within the control of the 
islanders themselves, the share of the Governor having been gradually 
eliminated. Provision was always made in the tax Acts for defraying 
such expenditure as these bodies of commissioners thought fit to 
incur. Each group used periodically to issue a certificate to the 
Governor and Council, wherein they specified what moneys were 
owing to those at work upon their section of the defences, and the 
Governor would then automatically issue his warrant for the pay- 
ment of all such sums.* 4 

For over half a century this system of defraying the costs of 
fortifications had been continued without serious doubts being 
raised as to its effectiveness. But in the 'seventies the representatives 
began to suspect that greater sums were being paid out on these 
services than the nature of the work demanded. As a result they 
began to agitate that all accounts which related to this work be sent 
down for their scrutiny as well as for that of the Council. On 20th 
July, 1773, the Council was forced to reject an Excise Bill because 
the House had inserted in it a clause demanding that all "moneys 
paid for the necessary repairs of the fortifications must be addressed 
for by the General Assembly". Sooner than risk the collapse of 
revenue that would inevitably result from such a deadlock, the 
representatives again relinquished their claims by the passage of a 
fresh measure which was no longer liable to the same objection. 
But their action did not indicate surrender, for only five years later 
the matter was revived, though with similar results.* 7 

Finally in 1 780 in passing a new Poll Tax Bill the representatives 
thought fit to carry the matter to a decisive conclusion. It is clear 
that it was still the question of fortification repairs that was agitating 
them. They determined to insist that all such repairs for the future 
should be paid only after the relevant accounts had been examined 
in their House, and the Council addressed for the necessary war- 
rants. 69 The Board stubbornly resisted the claim; the Bill was held 
up, and public credit practically destroyed for want of revenue.* 9 

This deadlock continued for nearly three years, to the utter ruin of 
the local finances. Commencing a little before the arrival of Governor 
Cunninghame, it raged throughout the full period of his administra- 
tion. The matter at stake soon departed from the original question of 
fortification repairs, and became a general issue as to whether or not 
the House possessed the power, in matters of its own choosing, to 
demand that the accounts of relevant expenditure be transmitted 



Financial Administration in Barbados 93 

first for its inspection and address before any money could issue in 
respect of them. The Governor transmitted to Lord George Germaine 
a draft of the disputed Bill, in order that the latter might give him 
the benefit of his opinion upon it, but not until the arrival of Cun- 
ninghame's successor was the imperial decision made known. // was a 
complete surrender to the popular demands. 

David Parry, assuming the government in 1 783, brought with him 
an additional Instruction which authorised him to give his consent 
to any tax bill, which, although not conformable to the older 
Instruction relating to the issue of public money, was nevertheless 
"agreeable to the usage and established custom and practice . . . 
in our said island".* The victory lay therefore with the Assembly. 
Its power to ordain what classes of accounts should be submitted 
for its inspection was to all intents and purposes conceded. The 
way was opened whereby for the future only the fixed and stable 
charges would be left to the discretionary issue of the Governor and 
Council; while all accounts relating to expenses of a more variable 
and unasccrtainable nature, would first have to meet with the 
approbation of the House, whose "address" would be an indispens- 
able condition of their discharge." At last therefore the Assembly 
was given that power of participating in the issue of public money, 
for which it had striven so arduously and so long. 

Such a concession practically destroyed every vestige of dis- 
cretionary authority which still remained to the Governor in 
financial affairs. For the future his issuing power would be more a 
mechanical formality than a substantial power. As a necessary 
corollary too, he would in future have to allow to the Assembly an 
effective participation in the conduct of all public works, in order 
that the House which authorised should be the House which paid. 



Chapter VI 
PUBLIC WORKS IN BARBADOS 



1. Introduction 

According to the theory of the Barbadian constitution, the 
Governor and Council were the proper authority to whom should 
have been entrusted the whole administration of the island, including 
the conduct of all public works and services. They constituted the 
local Executive, into whose hands should have fallen a considerable 
share of island policy, and the whole field of local administration. 
The Assembly was correctly only a law-making body, and as such 
had theoretically no right to participate in administrative functions. 
Yet, as a result of the developments of a century and a half, we find 
by 1780 that the Barbadian House had come to play a very pro- 
minent part in the actual conduct of the majority of public works and 
services. By that time all the most expensive public undertakings, 
such as the repair of the fortifications, the upkeep of harbour works 
and public buildings, the hiring and equipping of vessels for scouting 
purposes in time of war, and any other matters which required 
heavy expenditure, had become withdrawn from the exclusive control 
of the proper executive, and vested instead within the hands of 
administrative committees chosen jointly from the Council and the 
Assembly. The manner in which these committees acquired their 
jurisdiction, and the extent to which they came to exclude the 
Governor from all share in their functions, will form the subject 
of this present chapter. 

Contrary perhaps to our expectations, we find that this popular 
encroachment into the field of essentially executive functions was not 
of gradual and therefore only late development. From earliest times 
we find evidence of a pronounced disposition on the part of the 
Assembly to trespass upon the administrative field a danger which 
does not seem to have been fully recognised by the Governor and 
Council. The smallness of the island was doubtless partly responsible 
for this tendency. Every planter was thoroughly conversant with the 
full public needs of the moment, and felt a much more immediate 
interest in the conduct of everyday public affairs in so limited a 



Public Works in Barbados 95 

sphere, than would have been possible in a larger and more complex 
state where relationships were more impersonal, public needs less 
narrowly local and individual interests more diffuse. 

There was a conspicuous absence from the administration of all 
traditional standards, dignities, and jealousies. In this respect the 
island departments were very different from the corresponding 
English departments of state. The island Council possessed a far 
greater affinity for the Assembly, than the Privy Council did for the 
Commons. Moreover the fact that the Council besides being an 
administrative body was also the upper House of the legislature, 
tended to bring matters of purely executive concern more closely 
to the notice and attention of the lower House than might otherwise 
have been the case. The two Houses in years previous to the Restora- 
tion had not infrequently sat together for the consideration of 
important public matters, 1 and this coalescence had given the 
Assembly an excellent opportunity on occasions to participate in the 
discussion of matters which should more properly have been reserved 
for purely administrative deliberation. This helps in many ways to 
explain the facility with which Francis Lord Willoughby's third 
Assembly, when asked for an aid to supply defects in the forti- 
fications, decided to ride round the defences themselves, and so 
make their own estimate of the existing requirements. 2 So, too, can 
we explain the action of the Council in 1671, when it established a 
small committee composed entirely of Assemblymen, "to agree 
with . . . persons for the completing a fort at Speight's Bay . . . the 
charge thereof to be paid by an order drawn upon . . . [the] Trea- 
surer".* Such instances were as yet comparatively rare, but the very 
fact of their occurrence at all, goes to illustrate the extreme in- 
formality which characterised the relationships existing between the 
Houses at that early date. 

We should remember too, that the island possessed only a limited 
number of public servants. All supervision of public works had to 
depend either upon managers hired at heavy expense, or upon 
public spirited citizens working for no reward. Since Barbados was 
far too poor to be able to afford many of the former, the demands 
upon the honorary services of the latter were heavy. If the whole 
burden of public service had fallen solely upon the shoulders of the 
Council, the position of each member of that board would have been 
onerous in the extreme. It is therefore not to be wondered at that 
they were only too pleased to receive the help of members of the 
lower House in matters of administration, since in doing so they 
lightened considerably the burden of their own obligations. 



96 Early West Indian Government 

Finally, and perhaps chief reason of all, the representatives were 
always extremely jealous of the manner in which money was spent 
upon the public services. Not content with the power of appro- 
priating the proceeds of each tax to its specific purposes, they were 
further anxious to avoid all wasteful and fraudulent expenditure in 
the practical achievement of those purposes. To guard against this 
it was necessary that they themselves be given some share in the 
actual management and supervision of the works in question. Then 
and then only would they be able to keep careful eye on each item of 
expenditure and so ensure that each project was conducted as 
economically as possible. This without doubt contributed greatly to 
their desire to gain a share in the superintendence of public enter- 
prises, which the Council as has already been shown seemed 
willing enough to yield them. 



2. Fortifications 

In August, 1650, very early in the first governorship of Francis 
Lord Willoughby, the House was appealed to for assistance in 
defending the then royalist island against the impending approach 
of the Parliamentary forces. This was probably the very first occasion 
upon which the island was thrown into a thoroughly efficient posture 
of defence. The representatives readily lent their aid by the passage 
of an Act exacting a heavy levy of negroes from all estates, thereby 
establishing a fund of labour for the erection of defensive works in all 
the more vulnerable portions of the island. Instead of leaving the 
whole conduct of the works to the discretion of the proper executive, 
the legislature proceeded to appoint groups of commissioners within 
every parish, who were entrusted with the practical conduct of the 
entire operations. It is almost certain that Assemblymen occupied a 
prominent position within the bands of commissioners thus estab- 
lished. 4 

This expedient served as a useful precedent for future occasions 
and the commissioner system of managing work on fortifications 
early became an established institution. In early years the Governor 
naturally occupied a position of some eminence within it, his right 
to issue directions for the guidance of the commissioners being fully 
and expressly recognised even down to the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. 5 The fact that the commissioners were thus regarded only as 
subordinate bodies, probably accounts for the fact that even a 
governor like Sir Richard Dutton readily acquiesced in the system, 



Public Works in Barbados 97 

while the law officers of the Crown also regarded it as quite proper 
for royal confirmation.' 

Dutton apparently thought the system quite efficient, and obliged 
the commissioners to a conscientious performance of their duties. 
A Fortifications Act passed early in his government affords a typical 
illustration of the methods employed. This law compelled all 
planters to send a certain proportion of their negroes, fitly equipped 
with food and tools, to work upon the fortifications for specified 
periods, and also levied a monetary tax upon the inhabitants of the 
towns, who, possessing but few slaves, were expected to make their 
contribution in hard cash. It divided the island into convenient 
divisions, and established for each of these a committee of fortifica- 
tions composed of the resident Councillors, Assemblymen, and 
Field Officers. These were authorised to issue their warrants for 
collecting the slaves, and were also empowered to draw direct upon 
the local receivers for the tax proceeds. With the labour and money 
thus placed at its disposal each group was empowered to conduct 
and manage the entire defensive works of its own district. The sole 
restriction placed upon its absolute discretion lay in the one con- 
dition that what fortifications should thereafter be "repaired, built 
or demolished" should "be done by the appointment ... of his 
Excellency with the advice of the Council, to the commissioners as 
aforesaid". 7 The Act clearly illustrates the degree to which the 
islanders themselves were made responsible for the practical admini- 
stration of the defences, the Governor being left only the power to 
appoint what works should be made the subject of their attention. 

The same system was continued from time to time by temporary 
legislation until in the time of Robert Lowther (171 1-17) a perpetual 
Act established it as a permanent element in the island administra- 
tion. The new law defined the obligation of each planter to send a 
proportion of his slaves to assist in the work of fort repairs. Such 
slaves were to be levied by warrant from each body of commissioners, 
who were likewise empowered to exact fines for all defaults. The 
whole management of the works was again vested in each group of 
commissioners, who, as before, comprised the Assemblymen, the 
Councillors, and the Field Officers resident within the division. The 
part of the Governor was reduced almost to a mere formality. He 
was made responsible for setting the machine into operation. When- 
ever he should think repairs to be necessary, he was to give directions 
that they be made. Thereupon the commissioners would assume 
practical command, and carry out the repairs without any legal 
obligation to consider the Governor any further in the matter. All 



98 Early West Indian Government 

expenses incurred in the works were to be certified to the Governor 
and Council, who were thereupon automatically to issue their 
orders upon the Treasurer for the issue of payment. 8 

The degree to which the management of fortifications was lapsing 
from the Governor's control is amply illustrated from a despatch 
written by Lowther to the Board of Trade in 1717, wherein he stated 
how the defences "were managed by the commissioners ... in the 
several divisions" who spent money upon their tasks "so im- 
prudently . . . that the public received little or no advantage from 
it". f The fact that the commissioners were by law so nearly in- 
dependent, and were composed partly of persons outside his personal 
control, hindered any effective intervention on the Governor's part. 

By the middle of the century it seems probable that the com- 
missioners had won almost complete independence, being able to 
set about their business when, where, and in what manner they 
pleased. Sir Thomas Robinson, whose zeal for efficiency tended to 
outrun his discretion, felt obliged to come to grips with them over a 
matter which he rightly considered to be vital to the preservation 
of the dignity and authority of his own position. He had regarded 
with some apprehension the existing state of the defences, and he 
addressed a letter to each body of commissioners, asking them to 
compile a list of the repairs thought to be necessary within their 
division. The commissioners resented this somewhat unusual request* 
which they regarded as an indication that the Governor u.is stming 
to interest himself in the practical conduct of the individual forts. 
In consequence they were extremely dilatory in making their rctu 
Robinson became so incensed by the delay that he felt compelled to 
address the Board of Trade upon the subject. "I am obliged**, he 
wrote, "to give your Lordships a further reason for my writing in this 
strain to the commissioners, for the bulk of those gentlemen 
by oblique means gave me to understand that it was their province 
to order what repairs were to be proceeded upon in the several 
fortifications and not the Governor's; and in consequence of this 
position, if the Governor should take upon himself to order, they as 
commissioners should refuse obedience, and this they pretended 
was a power vested in themselves by a law of this island ... by 
which they own "that the Governor was to give orders when the 
fortifications should be repaired, but what those fortifications were, 
or how to be conducted was under the direction of the commissioners 
alone'." To get over their opposition Robinson, with more tact than 
usual, was content to "recommend rather than order" what he 
concluded to be necessary. No evidence now exists to show what 



Public Works in Barbados 99 

result flowed from this more discreet manner of address. The 
Governor must early have recognised that he was engaged in a 
hopeless task. Joint commissioner management of the forts was an 
institution far too deeply entrenched to be easily uprooted, unless 
he were given the most active support of the imperial authorities. 
Yet this was completely denied him: the Board of Trade's reply to 
his despatch gave him no encouragement; their verdict in the matter 
rather supported the pretensions of his opponents. 10 

New governors arriving in the island for the first time must have 
experienced a sense of great misgiving when they found themselves 
so effectually robbed of a power which, being so essential to the 
efficient conduct of their administration and the discharge of their 
responsibility to the Crown, ought never to have been withdrawn 
from their effective constitutional control. Henry Grenville, not long 
after his assumption of office, had his attention drawn to the ill state 
of the defences. Like his predecessor he too applied to the com- 
missioners for details of what was needful to be done. Then he 
addressed the Assembly upon the need for financial aid; informed 
them that he would send down for their information a full statement 
of the requirements of each division, and concluded by assuring 
them that "you may confide in it that I shall give directions for 
applying the sums you shall think proper to raise for the use, to the 
completing such of them as appear to be most advantageously 
situated for the defence of the island". This threatened encroach- 
ment upon the acknowledged province of the commissioners met 
with a sharp rebuke from the representatives, who, while promising 
the required supplies, coldly replied that with respect to the Gover- 
nor's "directions" for applying the same, "we may venture to assure 
your Excellency that the commissioners of the several divisions who 
have the power of transacting that business, will pay a due regard 
to your Excellency's prudent and seasonable recommendations"** 

Indeed from this time onwards the Governor's influence over the 
commissioners must be regarded as almost purely nominal. The 
Council minutes of the succeeding period are completely devoid of 
any directions or instructions issued to the divisional committees, 
thereby showing that they had become virtually autonomous bodies, 
themselves deciding not only the details but even the times for the 
prosecution of their duties. Sir Jonathan Atkins when describing 
the state of things in 1680 had been able truthfully to assert that 
"I gave my orders as to repairs . . . and other matters of military 
defence, and they appointed their own . . . commissioners to see the 
work done": his successors a century later could boast no such 



100 Early West Indian Government 

authority. Governor Cunninghame in 1782 informed his Council 
how he had "recommended the different boards of commissioners 
to ... meet and examine the ... fortifications and report to him 
thereon, and [had] recommended to them to have what was wanting 
in the respective divisions provided without loss of time". 11 The 
Governor's power over one of the chief departments of his admini- 
stration had in fact during the eighteenth century sunk from one of 
command to one of mere recommendation: the commissioners of 
fortifications had grown from a position of subordination to one of 
effective independence of all vice-regal control. In other words the 
effective executive authority within this department had passed from 
the Governor and Council, and had become vested instead in special 
committees chosen from the legislature and the military officers of 
the island. 



3. Defensive Expeditions 

In all other branches of the defence which entailed considerable 
expenditure, the same movement is to be noted. In all special 
undertakings, such as expeditions to neighbouring islands, the 
fitting out of sloops for the pursuit of enemy vessels, or the estab- 
lishment of defensive works of a special nature, a tendency towards 
joint committee administration is a characteristic feature. 

When as early as 1672 William Lord Willoughby asked the 
Assembly for assistance in despatching an expedition to Tobago, 
that body at once agreed to finance the scheme; but provided that a 
small joint committee of two Councillors and three Assemblymen, 
should be established to provide for the victualling of the forces 
which it was proposed to despatch, with power to draw direct 
upon the Treasurer for such sums as they should require. 11 Similarly 
in May, 1691, when Governor Kendall proposed an expedition for 
the relief of the Leeward Islands from the French, the representatives 
agreed to finance it, but suggested the establishment of a joint 
committee of both Houses to draw up the necessary plans and 
details. The Governor and Council acquiesced in this step, with the 
result that a joint committee of the legislature really framed the 
details of the whole expedition, and then reported its proposals to 
each House. 

It recommended that a regiment of six hundred men be despatched, 
to be raised by an Act compelling every owner of a sugar mill to 
subscribe, equip, and set out one white man suitably accoutred for 
the expedition. For the conveyance of so large a force it was thought 



Public Works in Barbados 101 

that six sloops would be required. On the following day the repre- 
sentatives, in accordance with these recommendations, introduced 
into their House a bill by which to raise the men and money for the 
undertaking. They decided to give a joint committee of the legislature 
complete authority to manage the victualling and equipping of the 
soldiers and the hiring of the sloops, with power to draw direct 
upon the Treasurer for the resultant expenses. The Council agreed 
to the joint committee of management, but opposed giving it an 
independent right to draw direct upon the Treasurer. The House 
was persuaded to drop this part of the bill, and to substitute for it a 
method of payment closely resembling that already described in 
connection with fortification repairs. Though denied the power of 
drawing direct, the commissioners were empowered periodically to 
inform the Governor what sums they required, in order that he 
might issue his warrant upon the Treasurer for the issue of the 
amounts in question. 14 In this form the bill passed both Houses, and 
securing Kendall's assent, immediately became law. The jurisdiction 
of the Governor and Council as the correct island Executive was 
reduced therefore to a minimum. Save for the authority which they 
may have exercised in authorising the actual levy of the soldiers, in 
issuing directions to the regimental commanders, or in mechanically 
issuing money at the request of the commissioners, their powers 
were completely withdrawn. All control over expenditure and the 
practical direction of a large share in the enterprise lay solely within 
the hands of the commissioners. It is an excellent illustration of the 
growing authority to which the Assembly of the time was pretending. 

No further expeditions upon this grand scale were ever again 
attempted. Had there been any such, it is almost certain that the 
Assembly would have continued its claim to an active share in its 
management. Close upon ninety years afterwards there occurred an 
affair, which, though related to a problem of defence instead of 
offence, was not dissimilar in type from the special expenditure 
involved in the expedition of 1691, and may suggest the degree to 
which the House if given suitable opportunity might have pur- 
sued its end. 

On 22 July, 1779, Governor Hay, suspecting danger from the 
French, summoned the Council and Assembly before him in order 
to point out to them the weakness of the island defences. Amongst 
other things he urged that a centrally situated plot of land be 
purchased, for the speedy erection of a large redoubt. Such a 
structure, he suggested, would serve as an excellent haven of refuge 
in the event of an invasion. Upon returning to their own House, 



102 Early West Indian Government 

the representatives resolved to undertake the work suggested. A few 
days later they passed an additional tax bill by which they sought 
not only to provide the necessary money, but also to vest the entire 
management of the project in a joint committee. Such a body, 
comprising five Councillors and seven Assemblymen, was to be 
given full power to purchase both the land and the materials, and to 
manage the whole work of contruction. A clause within the Act, 
intended as a sop to the Governor's dignity, enacted that he be 
humbly "desired to cause the island to be put into a proper state of 
defence, and to give the necessary orders and directions for this 
purpose". But it was a mere pretence: the Act straightway proceeded 
to grant the commissioners an independent power to draw direct 
upon the Treasurer for all their expenses, and so gave them an 
effective independence in all that they wished to do. 16 

Meanwhile, under the superintendence of the commissioners a 
start was made. Later in the same year Governor Hay died, and not 
until the middle of 1780 did his successor James Cunninghame put 
in an appearance. The newcomer at once came to blows with the 
commissioners because of the attempts he made to interfere in the 
building of the redoubt. It is clear that the Governor was powerless 
to compel obedience to any of his directions. The commissioners 
by virtue of their financial independence were able to scorn his 
orders with impunity. He complained bitterly against the action of 
his predecessor in "surrendering the essential right of the Governor's 
. . . approving the application of that fund", and resented the fact 
that "the whole disposition of the money was vested in a body of 
commissioners". In October he sent home a draft of the objectionable 
Act for the Board of Trade's opinion. The latter, however, failed to 
give him the support which he had expected. While sympathising 
with him the Board stated that the Act was quite in keeping with 
numerous others from the island which they had approved of, and 
that they did not think it "prudent ... in the present very critical 
nature of affairs to have the question agitated, or attempt any 
innovation in a practice so long permitted". 18 The Governor was 
forced therefore to swallow his indignation and do his best to 
secure what he could by means of recommendations to the com- 
missioners a position which drove home the utter powerlessless 
of his position, and clearly indicates the degree to which the Assem- 
bly's participation in administrative business was robbing the correct 
executive authority of all effective power. 

Further evidence of the same tendency is discoverable in cases 
where sloops were fitted out for scouting purposes in times of 



Public Works in Barbados 103 

special danger, in order to clear the neighbouring seas of enemy 
marauders. Such ventures usually necessitated special applications 
to the Assembly for supplies. The latter, generally ready enough to 
make the necessary provision, gradually began to demand a share 
in the fitting out and despatch of such vessels. By means of their 
financial influence they almost invariably succeeded in attaining 
their ends. In 1689 Deputy Governor Stede addressed the House 
upon the need for vessels to guard the surrounding waters from 
French privateers. The members agreed that three vessels, manned 
by five hundred men, be fitted out for the island service. In the Act 
providing for this force, a joint committee was appointed both to 
hire and equip the vessels, and to furnish each with its complement 
of men suitably provisioned and supplied with ammunition and 
arms. 17 

Again, a few years later during the administration of James 
Kendall, the Governor desired that a sloop belonging to a certain 
Captain Dowden be sent out for scouting purposes. The Assembly 
after some hesitation agreed to this, but stipulated that a small 
joint committee be employed to fit the vessel out. That course was 
accordingly followed. The Act which made provision for the venture 
stipulated that these commissioners should certify to the Governor 
a statement of all the expenses they incurred, in order that he might 
issue his warrants upon the Treasurer for payment of the sums 
concerned. 18 The Governor still retained therefore a certain measure 
of control over their actions, should they affect too free an inter- 
pretation of their powers. Up to this time, however, such com- 
missioners had shown no desire to do this. They were recognised as 
subordinate bodies, responsible only for matters of routine im- 
portance. Because of this we find that early Acts of this nature were 
not viewed with any disfavour by the law officers in England. 19 

Early in the eighteenth century, however, the ambitions of the 
representatives took a less justifiable turn. They attempted to 
assume an independent right not only to take up and equip sloops 
for the island service, but even to appoint the commanders of such 
vessels. President Farmer Acting-Governor in 1702-3 clearly 
perceived the highly exceptionable nature of their proceedings, and 
alluded to their "great presumption and invasion of her Majesty's 
right, ... in manning and equipping several vessels of war, and 
appointing officers to command them by a committee of your own 
House, without even so much as acquainting me with it". The 
representatives lamely replied that they had adopted this course 
only because the Council had not been in session at the time. But 



104 Early West Indian Government 

Fanner denied the validity of their excuse, reminding them that he 
would have been willing to call a special meeting of the Council had 
he been asked. They were forced to admit that their action in hiring 
the sloops of their own authority had been unconstitutional, but 
they still persisted in a claim to appoint the commanders. They 
threatened that only upon that one condition would they make 
provision for any further services of that kind. After a time, however, 
they had the grace to recede from this claim. 20 

Not for another forty years do we meet with a recurrence of such 
popular pretensions. The War of the Austrian Succession, however, 
brought about a renewal of the French menace; spy sloops again 
became necessary, and again the Assembly strove to subject such 
undertakings to its own independent supervision. Early in 1745 
Governor Robinson recommended that steps be taken against the 
possible approach of the French. The representatives agreed that 
a scouting vessel should be taken into the immediate service of the 
island, and set up a small committee of their own to purchase a 
suitable sloop. To ensure complete independence for this committee, 
they ordained that it be given full authority to draw direct upon the 
Treasurer for all its expenses. 11 The Council, apparently owing to the 
extreme urgency of the circumstances, acquiesced in this irregu- 
larity. Thus emboldened, the Assembly again in the following year 
sent out two sloops of its own authority to cruise about the island. 
No special Act was passed to provide for these and no special 
conditions were established to govern the manner of paying for 
them. The accounts which related to them had therefore to 
pass the Council as well as the Assembly before payment could 
issue. But the Council no sooner received these than it challenged 
the authority upon which the sloops had been despatched, and 
refused to confirm payment until an explanation should be made. 
Considerable controversy resulted, as a result of which the Board 
agreed to pass the accounts, but they resolved never again to do so 
under similar circumstances.** 

The Council was now fully awake to the danger of the Assembly's 
encroachments. The awakening came not a minute too soon. Even 
at that very moment the representatives were making a last desperate 
attempt to attain their goal. Robinson had requested that provision 
be made for another sloop. They saw in this request an opportunity 
of securing legislative sanction for their claim. They framed a 
special bill whereby, in making provision for the desired vessel, they 
vested full control in a committee of their own House. A body 
of eight Assemblymen and merchants were named in the bill to 



Public Works in Barbados 105 

purchase, equip, and set forth the sloop, with authority even to im- 
press sailors into her service. It was the evident intention of the repre- 
sentatives to exclude the Governor from all jurisdiction whatsoever. 
In order to complete the independence of their committee they 
agreed that it should have full power to draw direct upon the Trea- 
surer for all the charges of the undertaking. Having passed the 
Assembly on 10th December, 1748, the bill was carried up to the 
Council, which, fully alive to the pretensions of the lower House, 
after mature deliberation rejected it. 28 

Despite this failure the representatives refused to desist from their 
endeavours. They continued their agitation until, in the more 
complaisant administration of Henry Grenville (1747-53), they were 
at last admitted to the independence they had sought so long. 24 
In still later years, however, they seem to have been content to 
surrender this exclusive authority, and to give back to the Council 
a right to share in the hiring and equipping of sloops, for when in 
1779 Governor Hay recommended to them the despatch of some 
sloops upon the usual service, they at once agreed to provide two 
such vessels, the hire and management of which they entrusted 
once more to a joint committee of both houses. 25 



4. Harbour Works 

The final instances in which such a committee usurped the rightful 
place of the Governor and Council occurred in the field of more 
general works undertaken for the public good. Owing to the small- 
ness of the island the government conducted many enterprises which 
in a larger state, or in a different age, might have been delegated to a 
subordinate authority such as a harbour board or a municipal 
council. Popular encroachment upon powers of the Governor and 
Council in matters of such purely domestic concern might at first 
seem more justifiable than many of the acts of trespass hitherto 
considered. In strict theory, however, this was not so: all matters 
which were placed even if only for convenience sake within the 
exclusive province of the island government should also have lain 
within the administrative jurisdiction of the constitutional executive. 

An early precedent for the employment of a joint committee in the 
conduct of harbour works dated from the year 1678, when John 
Poines submitted to the legislature a scheme for the making of an 
anchorage at Bridgetown. The plan having met with the approval 
of both Houses, was carried out under the supervision of a joint 

o2 



106 Early West Indian Government 

committee, which was given an independent power to draw direct 
upon the Treasurer for all expenses. 26 Eight years later the same 
harbour required further cleaning and deepening. This time a certain 
Captain Stewart submitted proposals both for cleansing the bar and 
for building piers for the improvement of the entrance. Deputy 
Governor Stede asked the representatives to appoint a committee 
of their House to meet with a committee of the Council to examine 
Stewart's proposals. This joint body after some delay reported to 
the Council what steps ought to be taken, and Stede sent down a 
copy of this for the perusal of the Assembly. By mutual agreement 
the two Houses made some minor amendments to the suggested 
scheme, and finally the representatives passed a bill "to enable the 
commissioners to agree with the said Stewart according to the 
import of the articles" and to make financial provision for the work. 
This measure passed the Council, received in due course the approval 
of the Deputy Governor, and on 12th July, 1687, became law. It 
provided for the continued existence of the commissioners as a 
supervisory body until such time as the work was finally com- 
pleted. 27 

Early in the following century a further joint committee was set 
up to draw up an agreement with one Magnus Poppell who had 
submitted further plans for harbour improvements.* 8 For some 
years after this, however, no more steps were taken for the advance- 
ment of the port, with the result that by the early forties the existing 
works had fallen into grievous disrepair. In a speech to the Assembly 
on 25th November, 1746, Sir Thomas Robinson made lengthy 
mention of the urgent need for harbour repairs. The House in reply 
set up a small committee of its own members to inspect the entrance, 
decide upon the existing requirements, and finally to secure con- 
tractors' estimates of the probable cost of the work. Preparatory 
reports were returned shortly afterwards to the general body of the 
legislature, but the Assembly finished its annual session before 
anything definite could be accomplished. A new House having met, 
attention turned once more to the harbour needs, and the reports 
of the previous session were revived for fresh consideration and 
approval. A new committee of the Assembly was thereupon estab- 
lished to bring in a bill for financing the suggested improvements. 
This measure having passed both the Assembly and the Council, 
received Governor Grenville's assent. It appointed a joint com- 
mittee of five Assemblymen and three Councillors to contract for 
materials and labour, and to manage the entire conduct of the 
repairs. The committee was given virtual independence, by being 



Public Works in Barbados 107 

empowered to certify to the Governor and Council all details of its 
monetary requirements, which the latter were to satisfy by means of 
the customary orders issued upon the Treasury. 29 

Two disastrous fires which broke out in Bridgetown in 1766 did so 
much damage to the town, and so depleted the resources of the 
inhabitants, that application had to be made to the imperial Parlia- 
ment for financial assistance when next the harbour works required 
extensive overhaul. The English authorities responded to the appeal, 
donating the sum of 5000 for the work. Meanwhile Captain Robert 
Fenwick had brought forward a plan for cleaning and deepening 
the entrance. On 12th May, 1772, the Assembly established a small 
committee of itself as a "Committee for the Molehead", presumably 
to examine further into Fenwick's proposals and to prepare the 
necessary bill for carrying them into effect. At the end of September, 
1772, this was introduced into the House and quickly passed. On 
being sent up to the Council certain minor clauses were disapproved, 
and it was sent back with amendments. The representatives having 
acceded to these, the bill finally passed the Council and on 3rd 
November received the vice-regal assent. It contained, however, a 
clause suspending its operation until it should meet with the royal ap- 
proval. Owing to some minor objections this was withheld. The 
Board of Trade in intimating the reasons for its rejection, suggested 
the passage of a fresh Act of a less objectionable nature. 

Accordingly on 6th July, 1773, Henry Duke introduced into the 
Assembly a new Molehead Bill, which swiftly passed, met with the 
approval both of the Council and the Governor, and became law 
early in August. By this Act a body of joint commissioners was again 
appointed to manage the undertaking. They were given full authority 
to carry Fenwick's plan into execution, with power even to depart 
from it in any particulars which they might unanimously judge to 
require alteration. Once again power was given them to make all 
contracts respecting materials and workmen, and to superintend 
the construction of the entire work. In order to ensure a con- 
tinuously full membership, it was provided that, should any member 
vacate his seat, then the House from which he sprang was to appoint 
a substitute. The committee was given full power to draw direct 
upon the Treasurer for the whole imperial gift of 5000, and also 
for any other moneys which the Act itself might raise. 30 The com- 
missioners were thus given complete discretionary authority in the 
prosecution of the work; the correct executive the Governor and 
Council being wholly disregarded. Harbour operations dragged 
on for many years, with the result that the committee became 



108 Early West Indian Government 

regarded as a semi-permanent institution, being still in existence as 
late as 1780, 31 and probably for many years afterwards. 

5. Public Buildings 

The construction and repair of the public buildings in Bridgetown 
fell correctly within the purview of the island legislature, and as such 
should have been conducted under the supervision of the Governor 
and Council. The Town Hall and the public gaol were, however, 
first built and afterwards repaired through the agency of joint com- 
mittees, acting almost independently of the Governor's authority.** 
Moreover, after Sir Thomas Robinson's rather arbitrary and spend- 
thrift experiments in the making of repairs and additions to the 
Governor's residence at Pilgrim, the responsibility for the conduct of 
such repairs was withdrawn from the head of the Executive and 
vested in a special joint committee of the legislature, which was 
continued as a permanent body by constant re-appointment from 
session to session. 

After the great Bridgetown fires of 1766 it became necessary to 
ensure that the work of reconstruction be carried out in an efficient 
and orderly manner as possible. A body of joint commissioners com- 
prising five Councillors and nine Assemblymen was constituted, with 
full power to issue regulations to govern the work of rebuilding. 
They were given complete authority to remodel the portion of the 
town which had been destroyed, reconstruct the streets, close old 
by-ways and establish new, and to grant compensation to any 
persons who might suffer loss as the result of these alterations. They 
were allowed to draw direct upon the Treasurer for all their expenses, 
up to a total of 6000. It being estimated that the work would occupy 
a considerable time, provision was made for the re-appointment of 
the commissioners from session to session, and for the filling up of 
any vacancies which might occur in their ranks; each House being 
empowered to fill the vacancies which might occur amongst its own 
representatives. The committee was still functioning, though only in 
an extremely dilatory manner as late as 1780.** 

It is clear that the imperial authorities took no exception to the 
principles of joint committee administration. 54 Their complaisant 
attitude was dictated to no small extent by their ignorance of the 
real extent to which commissioners had gradually grown to assume a 
jurisdiction totally independent of the Governor. As early as the 
seventeenth century the precedents had been established upon which 
all later instances of joint commissioner control were subsequently 



Public Works in Barbados 109 

based. In early years both the commissioners and the Acts which 
appointed them paid a due respect to the vice-regal authority, and 
this fact, as I have already shown, secured their ready acceptance by 
the home authorities. With the advance of the succeeding century, 
however, the whole spirit underlying the situation gradually changed. 
Commissioners were no longer content with a subordinate juris- 
diction. Many of the Acts by which they were appointed no longer 
scrupled to pay even a superficial deference to the Governor's 
authority, and those which still did so generally managed to render 
it nugatory by granting to the commissioners a financial independ- 
ence so complete, that it carried with it an effective independence in 
every other particular. The Board of Trade, however, was singularly 
blind to the dangerous tendency of such legislation. Too frequently 
it was misled by the lip service which the Acts paid to the vice-regal 
authority, and deceived into mistaking the form for the reality. 

Its ruling upon the Redoubt Act of 1779 is an excellent case in 
point. This law had yielded a seeming respect for the Governor's 
dignity by directing that he was to "give the necessary orders and 
directions" for building the redoubt, but had in the very next clause 
yielded to the commissioners an independent power to draw upon 
the Treasurer for all their expenses; which thus left them a loophole 
of escape from paying any heed to the Governor's wishes. Cunning- 
hame complained loudly against the degree of independence which 
they enjoyed, and clearly perceived how their financial freedom left 
them free in every other particular also. The Board of Trade, 
however, paying too much attention to the mere form of the measure, 
pointed out that "the commissioners named therein [were] sub- 
ordinate to him in every part of the duty to be by them performed", 
and that therefore it appeared to them "free from exception". 36 The 
Board was doubtless sincere in its belief that this was indeed the 
position. It may have appeared so in law, but it certainly was not so 
in fact. But even if the Board had awakened at this time to the true 
state of the position, it is very doubtful if it would have been able to 
effect a remedy: by the middle of the eighteenth century far too many 
precedents had already been permitted, and joint committee manage- 
ment of public undertakings had become far too solidly established 
to be easily overturned. 

6. Conclusion 

Of the efficiency of this form of administration it is difficult to 
state a clear opinion. It seems probable that, judged according to 



1 10 Early West Indian Government 

eighteenth century standards it was tolerably economical and 
efficient, though we know that towards the close of the century 
some dissatisfaction was growing up with respect to it. Even so 
great a demagogue as Henry Duke, speaking in 1780, could not 
repress his misgivings concerning the neglect into which many joint 
committee enterprises were falling. Although it was primarily against 
the Committee of Public Accounts that he aimed his chief objections, 
he did not exempt other departments of public administration from 
his criticism. "The Town Committee for several years had [had] 
only a single meeting or two . . . the Molehead Committee was open 
to the same censure." 36 Moreover we know from the remarks made 
by the same man when introducing an Excise Bill that year, that the 
Commissioners of Fortifications spent far more upon their works 
than the results seemed to justify: 87 consequently even they were 
beginning to excite doubts in many minds concerning their efficiency. 
Despite this, however, we find no desire upon the part of the 
inhabitants to surrender this form of controlling their public works. 
Improvement within the scope and structure of the system they 
might and apparently did desire, but any serious departure from 
it was never for a moment contemplated. 



Chapter VII 
JAMAICAN FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION 



1. Introduction 

In contrast to Barbados and the Leeward Islands, colonisation in 
Jamaica was slow. The largeness of the island, its mountainous 
nature, the inaccessibility of much of its land, the lack of good roads 
and communications, its unhealthy climate, and the periodic dangers 
from Maroons and runaway slaves ail combined to discourage white 
settlement. Accordingly the island during the seventeenth century 
only limped along, 1 and its administration, too, was slow in 
maturing. It is not that the settlers lacked spirit, but that the handi- 
caps were tremendous. It took them the best part of twenty years to 
overcome the constitutional inferiority that attached to the island as 
a colony of conquest and to vindicate their right to the same rela- 
tively independent legislative powers that the older West Indian 
colonies possessed; 1 and even after they had succeeded in gaining 
these powers, their constitutional progress for a time was com- 
paratively slow, though from the end of the seventeenth century 
they began to make up for lost time and by their efforts placed 
Jamaica at last in the very front rank of the West Indian colonies. 



2. Procedure in Tax Legislation 

For six years after the conquest of Jamaica the island was kept 
under military government, but in 1661 civil government was begun 
with the setting up of a Council. No Assembly was summoned until 
the beginning of 1664 when the first House, with a membership of 
but twenty, held its brief sessions. Few traces now remain of its 
records, but under Samuel Long's leadership it proceeded to pass 
a number of radical tax measures by which the tax proceeds were 
entrusted to two treasurers of its own choosing, to be paid out 
only on the combined instructions of the Governor, Council and 
Assembly. These laws, though extremely significant, were only 



112 Early West Indian Government 

short-lived, for the very next Assembly, under Governor Sir Thomas 
Modyford's influence, repealed them all and restored the treasury to 
the control of the Governor and Council. 

For the next six years Modyford did without an Assembly, 
continuing the laws by royal proclamation whenever they expired 
and governing in a bluff but high-handed manner. With his removal 
in 1671, however, fairly regular Assembly sessions began again and 
within a few years parliamentary practice within the island had 
developed considerably, the Assembly striving in all things to model 
itself upon its great exemplar, the Commons of England. Public 
opinion held very firmly that supply was the gift of the people, and 
after 1679 the House repudiated the Council's right to originate tax 
bills, 3 though it occasionally allowed the Board an informal share in 
the drawing up of such measures, 4 but from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century it refused even this. Finally, after 1715 the 
Assembly denied the Council any further right even to amend money 
bills and although the latter protested vigorously and enlisted the 
support of the Board of Trade in its claims, it never again succeeded 
in amending one. 6 Thenceforth the sole right of raising and ap- 
propriating taxes lay in the Assembly, the Council retaining only the 
right of rejection if it considered a bill too objectionable to pass. 

From the earliest years of Assemblies, there was never any system- 
atic budgeting. The properly constituted Executive, the Governor 
and Council, at no time made it a practice to lay before the Assembly 
regular and detailed statements of the revenue together with esti- 
mates of projected expenditure; although they were quick to draw 
the House's attention to the state of the treasury whenever funds 
were low. The representatives always had a right to be informed of 
the treasury accounts* and, after 1680, definitely to inspect them. 7 
Therefore, even when the Governor did send them down a statement 
of the public accounts, they generally (after 1680) preferred to 
examine the Receiver General's books for themselves. The most 
convenient way to do this was to appoint a committee to inspect the 
public accounts, which, after examining them, reported back to the 
House which could then consider ways and means of supply. 

This independent method of forming an estimate of the revenue 
position sometimes resulted in curious situations, as when in 1708 
the Assembly, after listening to a report of a Committee of Public 
Accounts, decided that the treasury was in quite good shape, being 
"now in cash and good debts in credit upwards of 6000", and that 
therefore new taxation was unnecessary. On hearing of this decision, 
Governor Handasyd expressed his amazement, stigmatising the 



Jamaican Financial Administration 1 13 

Committee's report as false, and declaring that he would send 
down figures to prove "that the treasury was charged with 5000 for 
which there were orders out, and not a groat to pay it with!" The 
Governor was able to prove his statement and the Assembly there- 
upon consented to raise supply ; 8 but the situation is of interest as 
showing the embarrassments that could arise from such two-fold 
accounting. The absence of any regular estimates of conjectured 
expenditure for the forthcoming year, to be laid before the House 
during times of supply, persisted right down to 1768 when, for the 
first time in Jamaican history, the regular practice was begun of 
submitting proper estimates to the Assembly prior to the raising of 
new taxation. But even then it was not the Governor or Council that 
submitted them, but the Assembly's own Committee to inspect the 
Public Accounts, which had by then become a firmly established and 
vitally important de facto branch of the financial administration. 9 

The tax bills were usually drawn up by a sub-committee of the House 
and, after being introduced, were passed three times before being 
sent up to Council 10 for similar three-fold passing, after which they 
were submitted to the Governor for his assent. Being the sole 
managers of supply the representatives had full power (after 1715) 
to devote money to any purpose they saw fit and to provide for its 
payment by the insertion of a suitable appropriation in a money bill. 
The Governor and Council were practically powerless to prevent 
such appropriations since they retained no power over a bill save 
that of complete rejection which would bring its good as well as its 
bad features to naught and gravely embarrass them for lack of funds. 
Circumstances occasionally compelled them to adopt this course, 
but not often. To acquiesce in appropriations that they actively dis- 
agreed with was very galling but could not be avoided. As the 
Jamaican Council declared in 1746, they had "already this session 
passed the Rum bill in which there was a clause for rewarding a 
militia officer with the sum of 750 who, as his Excellency informed 
the Board, behaved very ill, broke his orders and deserved rather to 
be punished than rewarded ; and must of necessity continue to pass 
every money-bill, however unreasonable some of the appropriations 
be, without amendment to avoid confusion and the ill consequences 
that might otherwise ensue". 11 

In Jamaica the oldest and most important form of tax was the 
Impost Act laying duties on strong liquors brought into the island, 
the first instance of which was the Impost Ordinance issued by 
Governor Doyley and his Council in 1661 and in later years enacted 
by the whole legislature. Another source of revenue was the licence 



114 Early West Indian Government 

fee required of all the retailers of strong liquors a tax that was first 
laid by Act of the original legislature early in 1664, but in later years 
became incorporated in the Imposts Acts, which from 1672 onwards 
were likewise widened by the inclusion of duties on imported sugar, 
tobacco, indigo, ginger and cocoa. Further regular, though minor, 
sources of revenue were the quitrents from crown grants of land and 
the proceeds from fines and escheats, all of which payments early in 
Jamaican history (1680) were by royal consent appropriated to local 
uses. In 1683 the Impost Act was passed for a period of 21 years, and 
in 1704 it was renewed for a similar period. Finally in 1728, with 
rates slightly increased, it was erected along with the quitrents, etc., 
into a permanent revenue calculated to yield 8000 or more per 
annum to meet the expenses of the regular civil or military establish- 
ment, chief among which were 1250 for maintenance of the forti- 
fications, 2500 for the Governor's salary, nearly 1000 for wages of 
officers and gunners at the forts, and the rest for salaries and fees of 
other public officials and the maintenance of government buildings. 
This permanent revenue proving quite inadequate to meet all 
charges of government, recourse had to be made to other taxes, a 
common one being a poll tax on slaves and estate animals. In the 
eighteenth century when government expenditure continued to 
mount steadily year after year, additional revenue was obtained from 
an annual Additional Duty Act (first levied about 1705) laying 
additional duties on slaves and goods imported into the island, from 
an annual tax on all strong liquors retailed in Jamaica (commonly 
known as the Rum Act and first imposed in 1735), 11 and from the 
annual Deficiency Act (levied regularly from about 1716) 13 laying a 
tax on all estate owners who failed to maintain a sufficient pro- 
portion of white servants to negroes, as required by law. 



3. Appropriation and Issue 

After the representatives late in 1664 receded from their earlier 
attempt to keep the treasury completely under their own control, 
they sought, as an alternative way of safeguarding their grants, to 
appropriate the tax proceeds only to such clearly specified uses that 
the Governor and Council's freedom of action in spending the 
money would be reduced to an absolute minimum. Out of an Impost 
calculated to yield about 2000 per annum, they appropriated 1000 
to the Governor's salary, 400 to the Lieutenant Governor, 200 to 
the Major General, 80 to the Chief Justice, 20 to each of the 



Jamaican Financial Administration 115 

Assistant Judges, 20 to the Clerk of the Assembly, 10 to the 
Assembly's Marshal, and the balance to any purpose that might 
prove necessary. 14 Although the right of the Governor and Council 
to issue these sums was not invaded, their power to misapply them 
was effectively prevented. This kind of detailed appropriation 
continued to be used until 1677 when the House, resentful of the 
Receiver General's office having been filled by letters patent, 15 tried, 
though in vain, to return to the February 1664 system of appointing 
a Collector and a Treasurer of its own, 16 and refused supplies rather 
than forego its right to do so. 

During the short but stormy administration of Lord Carlisle 
(1678-80) in which he antagonised the Assembly by seeking, though 
in vain, to persuade it into accepting for Jamaica the Poynings' 
system of control hitherto associated only with Ireland, relations 
deteriorated so rapidly that supply came completely to a standstill. 
When finally in 1679 an empty treasury compelled Carlisle to seek 
further aid, the representatives in granting it refused to entrust the 
money to the Crown's Receiver General and insisted on choosing a 
Collector of their own, Richard Wilson, whom they empowered in 
the Act itself to receive and disburse the tax proceeds. 17 Absolutely 
desperate for revenue, Carlisle had no option but to assent. 

Nevertheless the fears and apprehensions which the Poynings' 
conflict engendered, coupled with the Assembly's relief at gaining 
the victory, did make the House more wary for the future of stirring 
up needless opposition in England, and we find that the tax laws of 
the succeeding decade not only avoid attempting to by-pass the 
Receiver General but even desist from the closely detailed ap- 
propriations that had hitherto prevailed, the Impost Act of 1681 
merely appropriating the regular revenue (i.e. from impost duties, 
quitrents, fines, and escheats), 1250 to the use of fortifications and 
the balance "to the support of the government of this his Majesty's 
island and the contingent charges thereof and to no other use, intent 
or purpose whatsoever", 18 a clause that was in essence repeated in 
the 21 years' Act of 1683, the continuing Act of 1703, and finally in 
the perpetual Revenue Act of 1728. 

Thus the freedom of action of the Governor and Council may 
seem at first glance to have been well protected, until we remember 
that the impost the only "permanent" and certain revenue for 
the forty years 1680 to 1720 did not average more than 4000 a year, 
out of which 1250 was reserved for fortifications and a further 2000 
or so for the Governor's salary, leaving little enough for the many 
other salary charges, let alone anything else. 19 Clearly, therefore, 



116 Early West Indian Government 

this revenue was not sufficient to cover even the essential costs 
of the regular establishment, let alone produce a surplus for the 
Governor and Council to play with. Moreover, seeing that all 
warrants for payment out of it required the Governor's signature and 
could be issued only with the Council's consent, 20 serious mis- 
application was practically impossible. But if the Impost sufficed to 
meet no more than salaries and a few other charges of the regular 
establishment, what of the many other works and services that had 
to be performed at the public expense? What of the employment of 
sloops to watch over the coasts in time of war, the subsisting of the 
regular troops sent to the island, and the measures that had to be 
taken against the Maroons and runaway slaves from time to time? 
What of the scores of claims for damages, repairs, odd salaries and 
supplies, and the dozen-and-one other services that an island twice 
the size of Lancashire was bound to require? If the "permanent" 
revenue sufficed for none of these, how were they provided and paid 
for? 

The answer is that they had first to be approved by the Assembly 
and then defrayed out of additional revenue raised by tax Acts 
passed specially for the purpose. As the island progressed these extra 
taxes became a yearly necessity, the Acts raising them being com- 
monly called "annual" tax Acts. These customarily appropriated 
their proceeds to the work or service in hand, and then entrusted 
them to special commissioners frequently Assemblymen, and in- 
variably named in the Acts who were made responsible for all 
receipts and expenditure and from time to time accounted for the 
moneys direct to the Assembly or a sub-committee of it. 11 Indeed, so 
completely did the House by such commissioner action remove from 
the Governor and Council the control of practically all funds except 
the "permanent" revenue raised by the Liquor Impost, fines and 
quitrents, that Lord Archibald Hamilton (Governor, 1711-1716) 
complained of it to the Board of Trade, which reproved the House 
and instructed his successor, Sir Nicholas Lawes, to refrain from 
assenting to any more commissioner bills an instruction which was 
mechanically repeated to every succeeding governor down to the end 
of our period. 21 

But despite this Instruction, the Assembly had no intention of 
giving up its direct control of the "annual" funds (as all funds not 
raised by the Liquor Impost were called) if it could possibly help it, 
and with that genius for yielding the shadow but withholding the 
substance so characteristic of West Indian politicians it immediately 
hit upon another device for attaining the same end. In the "annual" 



Jamaican Financial Administration 1 17 

tax Acts of the years that followed, instead of making the proceeds 
payable to commissioners, the Assembly contrived that they be paid 
into the hands of the Receiver General not in his official capacity, but 
as its Commissioner, 23 appropriating them most carefully to their 
intended uses, and obliging him to account for them to itself alone. 24 
It dare not blazon this condition abroad too publicly, however, for 
fear of attracting the Board of Trade's notice, so for many years, to 
keep its pretensions legally alive, it was content to style the Receiver 
General by the name of "Commissioner" in one measure only the 
annual Deficiency Act. When this had gone on for several years 
without challenge, 25 the House threw off all pretence and after 1733 
in all the annual tax Acts openly designated the Receiver General 
"Commissioner" to receive and pay out the moneys raised. This 
practice went on right down to 1753, the passage of the perpetual 
Revenue Act of 1728 making no difference in any respect except that 
it increased to a certain 8000 per annum 26 the permanent revenue 
which alone the Governor and Council had unrestricted power to 
issue out for the purposes of the regular civil and military establish- 
ment. All the revenue raised from year to year by additional 
taxation and it was increasing steadily every year owing to the 
rapid development of the island remained completely in the 
Assembly's control to appropriate and to issue. 

But pride comes before a fall! In the late 'forties of the eighteenth 
century the Receiver General, Robert Graham a new holder of the 
post was an absentee represented in Jamaica by his deputy, 
Benjamin Hume. The Assembly, having confidence in Hume from 
past dealings, in the 1749 Deficiency Act presumed to vest the tax 
proceeds in him not only in his private capacity but in such a way 
as to continue him as Commissioner even if he were to lose his 
deputation from Graham. Governor Trelawny and Council both 
protested, but in vain, lack of funds compelling them to pass the 
measure. The same thing occurred for the next three years running. 
In England, however, Graham's vigorous protests at length induced 
the Board of Trade in 1753 to look into the matter, and it would have 
had the objectionable Acts annulled if they had not already 
expired. 27 However it reported against them to the Privy Council 
which instructed Trelawny's successor, Governor Knowles (1752-56) 
to refrain from passing any more such bills. 28 

When, therefore, the next Additional Duty Bill was sent up by the 
Assembly to Council in October, 1753, the latter, acting on the 
recent instruction, rejected it. The House was thrown into such a 
ferment that Knowles prorogued it awhile, but on re-assembling it 



1 1 8 Early West Indian Government 

showed no abatement of passion and proceeded to draw up and pass 
a series of seven bold resolutions for which it is justly celebrated. * 
In one of these it asserted "the inherent and undoubted right of the 
representatives of the people to raise and apply moneys for the 
services and exigencies of government, and to appoint such person 
or persons for the receiving and issuing thereof as they shall think 
proper; which right this House hath exerted and will always exert, 
in such manner as they [sic] shall judge most conducive to the 
service of His Majesty and the interest of the people". The Assembly 
proving adamant over the commissioner clause of the bill, the 
Council and Governor, rather than lose supplies passed it. But 
Knowles was a notoriously stubborn adversary as well as a born 
intriguer, and throughout the first half of 1754 he set himself to build 
up a party in Jamaica favourable to himself, for this purpose giving 
his aid to the powerful merchant faction who desired to move the 
island capital from Spanish Town to Kingston, and gaining in return 
their support for his own designs. When in the general election later 
that year the Kingston party gained a small majority of seats in the 
House, one of the fruits of victory was that Knowles secured an 
Additional Duty Act and a Rum Act" free of objectionable features, 
the proceeds being vested correctly in the Receiver General in his 
official capacity, even though the Acts still obliged him to account 
direct to the House for his receipts and payments. 

In the heat of the Kingston and Spanish Town conflict nothing 
immediate was done to redress the commissioner situation. Then 
popular elation at the success of the Spanish Town interest was 
somewhat clouded by the news of the Commons* complete rejection 
of the resolutions of 1753. With a soberness which reminds us of the 
wariness they showed seventy years before at the close of the great 
constitutional contest of 1677-80, they resolved to soft-pedal awhile. 
The loss of the commissioner clause was not as serious as might at 
first be thought. If it had been, the representatives would have moved 
heaven and earth to reverse it. But of what real account was the 
holder of the funds so long as the Assembly could rigidly control him ? 
Surely the representatives' power to control the "annual*' funds by 
appropriating them only to clearly specified objects, by authorising 
their issue only in accordance with the most strict and detailed 
terms of the tax Acts themselves, and by obliging the Receiver 
General to account direct to them as often as they demanded, gave 
them as much power over the Receiver General as was conceivably 
necessary. For thirty years they had been in the habit of vesting their 
funds in him in his private capacity: now they had been manoeuvred 



Jamaican Financial Administration 1 19 

into vesting them in him in his official capacity. Was the difference 
so vital after all? Was it worth a further upheaval of the first magni- 
tude to accomplish so little, yet risk losing so much? Apparently 
they thought not, 31 for they were content for the remainder of our 
period to entrust the "annual" funds to the Receiver General in his 
official capacity. 

The tax proceeds were, however, invariably appropriated with the 
utmost care and detail to the various uses for which they were 
intended, 82 for these appropriation clauses were the Receiver 
General's authority for making his disbursements. So far as these 
"annual" funds were concerned, there was never any question of the 
Governor and Council having any part whatever in their payment. 
They were normally issued by the Receiver General only on the 
direct authority of the House expressed by way of closely detailed 
appropriation clauses in the Acts. The public accounts relating to 
both the permanent revenue and the annual funds were closely 
scrutinised by sub-committees of the Assembly regularly appointed 
for that purpose [See section on CONTROL OF THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS], 
and it was almost as much as the Receiver General's place was worth 
for him to disobey the House. The fact that the annual funds were 
not issued by warrants from the Governor, as they ought to have 
been, was perfectly well known to the English authorities who had 
periodical qualms about the practice but nevertheless allowed it to 
continue. Finally, Archibald Campbell, appointed Governor in 1781 
towards the close of the American War of Independence, carried 
with him an Instruction authorising him to acquiesce in it. 83 

To recapitulate, the procedure adopted to meet claims on the 
Treasury after the passage of the perpetual Revenue Act of 1728 was 
briefly this. So far as the permanent revenue was concerned, moneys 
were paid out to the uses named in the Act by warrants from the 
Governor issued with the Council's consent up to a total of 8000 a 
year. 84 If they ever did abuse their trust and issued moneys in excess 
of their legal right, they invariably met with opposition from the 
House as soon as the fact became known. The House could, if it 
thought fit, refuse to "allow" the Receiver General for the payments 
thus made; witness the following resolution of the Assembly of 9th 
November, 1758, wherein the representatives declared "that if the 
Receiver General shall pay any moneys by Order in Council out of 
the revenue more than what the ... Commander-in-Chief in Council 
hath a right to do by the Revenue Law [of 1728], that he shall be 
accountable for his neglect of duty to this House, and shall pay 
the several sums he shall advance contrary to the said law out of his 



120 Early West Indian Government 

private fortune". 85 The balance of the revenue, arising as it did from 
annual taxation, was in the complete control of the Assembly and 
issued only on its authority. These annual funds increased so rapidly 
as Jamaica developed in the eighteenth century that shortly after 
1750 they amounted to about 50,000 and in the troublous war years 
of the early 'eighties amounted to well over 200,000. 36 These large 
sums were disbursed each year by the Assembly alone. Where 
claims were for salaries, contracts and other clearly ascertainable 
charges the House more or less automatically sanctioned the in- 
clusion of "uses" in the annual tax Acts to pay for them. Where, on 
the other hand, the claims were for miscellaneous and previously 
unascertainable amounts, the accounts relating to them had first to 
pass the scrutiny of the Assembly's Committee to settle the Public 
Accounts, be recommended by it for settlement, and finally 
sanctioned by the House for payment by means of the inclusion of 
appropriate "uses" in one or other of the next tax laws." 



4. The Control of the Public Accounts 

From its earliest years the Assembly had possessed the right to 
inspect the public accounts, though it would appear that in the 1670s 
this right amounted to little more than permission to scrutinise the 
returns which the Treasurer or Receiver General was obliged 
periodically to render the Governor and Council, and which were 
always available in the Council Office." In Carlisle's time, however, 
the House insisted on an unrestricted examination of the Receiver 
General's books (1679) and refused supply until the Governor gave 
in. 89 After that the House was never again hindered in its periodical 
desire to examine the public accounts, though whether it first had to 
apply for the Governor's leave to view them, depended on what a 
stickler for form or otherwise the Governor was. It became customary 
from quite early times to appoint a sub-committee to do the actual 
inspecting; this committee then reported its findings to the House 
before ways and means were ever considered. 40 On rare occasions 
even a combined committee of the Assembly and the Council per- 
formed this task, but this was distinctly exceptional, the committee 
of the House normally acting by itself. 

When after about 1692 the Assembly, to meet the extra costs im- 
posed by the war, began raising considerable sums by annual 
taxation and vesting these in commissioners of its own choosing, the 
periodic committees set up to inspect the public accounts naturally 



Jamaican Financial Administration 121 

examined the expenditure of these also, 41 and after the first few years 
this inspection was the only audit that these annual funds ever 
received. 42 From the beginning of Sir Nicholas Lawes' administration 
(1718) it became the constant practice to set up the "Committee to 
inspect the Public Accounts" at the beginning of each session; 43 this 
Committee's chief task was to examine and report to the House the 
state of the finances and make recommendations to it on revenue 
matters. 

But a second regular committee of even greater importance sprang 
up in the course of the eighteenth century. This was the body 
officially known as the "Commissioners for settling the Public 
Accounts", which had its origin in steps taken by the House early 
in that century to get in arrears of taxation. Jamaica was notorious 
for the laxity of its churchwardens and vestrymen and the artfulness 
of its tax evaders! Certainly no other West Indian colony had so bad 
a reputation for the mountain of arrears that always seemed to dog 
its treasury. From time to time, therefore, the Assembly was driven 
to try to collect these arrears, and the usual expedient was to set 
up a temporary body of Assemblymen and others as commissioners 
with power to compel payment. 44 In 1732, however, a much better 
device was hit on none other than the setting up of a standing 
commission of Assemblymen not only to collect arrears, but also to 
exercise a general oversight of the public accounts. 

The Act constituted seven named Assemblymen "or any three of 
them ... a committee during the interval of the sitting of the 
Assembly, so long as this Act shall be in force, to settle, adjust and 
prepare a state of the public accounts of the Receiver General, and 
they shall be empowered to settle and adjust the Additional Duty, 
Deficiency, and Poll Taxes once every three months and those of the 
[Permanent] Revenue once every six months and report the same to 
the next session of the Assembly". 45 This committee proved so 
satisfactory that it remained a continuous part of the financial 
machinery of the island. The members were invariably Assemblymen 
and were soon invested with wider and more effective powers not 
only to get in arrears but also to settle and adjust claims on the 
annual funds in advance of the Assembly's sanctioning their pay- 
ment. Finally, in 1774 a permanent Act was passed by which the 
entire Assembly were "appointed commissioners; and they or any 
three of them during the intervals of the sittings of the Assembly" 
were empowered "to settle and adjust the several accounts of the old 
and new revenue, additional duty, deficiencies, poll taxes, and all 
other funds and taxes whatsoever ... and also, from time to time, as 



122 Early West Indian Government 

often as they shall think proper, to look into and count over the cash 
which shall be in the Receiver General's hands". 4 * 

Between them, therefore, the sessional Committee to inspect the 
Public Accounts and the standing Committee to settle the Public 
Accounts exercised a constant supervision of the Receiver General 
and his assistants. Indeed the Assembly by 1 750 had become, through 
these committees, virtually an administrative organ : in all essence it 
was the Treasury Board of the island, and no estimate of the 
Jamaican constitution in 1783 is sound that fails to recognise this 
fact. 



5. The Receiver General 

The earliest Treasurer whose name still survives among the 
records of Jamaica was a Mr Jordan who is ordered in the Council 
records of 8th November, 1662, to bring in his accounts for audit by 
a small sub-committee of the Board. 47 He was presumably appointed 
by the Governor in 1661. With the meeting of the first Assembly in 
January, 1664, the representatives determined on a drastic alteration 
and insisted on nominating the Treasurers (two of them) themselves. 
The second Assembly, however, revoked this step and restored to the 
Governor and Council their right to appoint the tax officials, a 
practice that continued for the next thirteen years, even surviving 
for a year or two the Crown appointment of the Receiver General by 
letters patent in 1674. 48 Of the joint patentees, Thomas Martin and 
Leonard Compeare, Martin alone travelled to Jamaica where he 
landed in February, 1676. The local inhabitants, including the 
Governor and Council, not unnaturally resentful of this invasion of 
local rights, did all they could to obstruct him in the performance of 
his duties, contending that he had a right to collect no more than 
what was locally regarded as the "King's" revenue the quitrents, 
fines and escheats and continuing the treasurer and the liquor im- 
post collectors in their posts. Indeed the representatives were so 
perturbed over the new appointment that they determined to safe- 
guard the regular revenues from royal interference by striving in 1675 
to revive the early 1664 mode of themselves appointing the treasurer 
and impost collector. For a time Lord Vaughan managed to persuade 
them out of this course, but they returned to it more strongly than 
ever in 1677 and let the tax bill fall rather than forego their de- 
mands. 49 But all efforts to block Martin were in vain, for the Lords 
of Trade insisted on his admission to the full duties of his office, and 
the House, after one last burst of resistance in 1679, acquiesced. 



Jamaican Financial Administration 123 

After that the Receiver General was the only person consti- 
tutionally entitled to collect the island revenues. But the represent- 
atives were not to be wholly thwarted. While not denying the 
Receiver General's sole right to handle the regular revenue (i.e. the 
proceeds of the 'permanent' liquor impost) they refused to entrust 
to him the additional funds that had from time to time to be raised 
for special taxation for extra works and services. These they insisted 
on retaining within the hands of commissioners appointed by them- 
selves. At first this did not appear to be of much consequence for 
these occasions for special tax raising were uncommon. Accordingly 
the Receiver General does not appear to have objected. But how 
different things became when the great wars of the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries broke out! Within a year or two 
special taxation became an annual necessity and an increasing share 
of the island revenues began to be handled by commissioners 
generally Assemblymen and this went on unabated for a further 
twenty years. Finally in Lord Archibald Hamilton's time (1711-16) 
the mounting tension between Assembly and Executive over tax 
amendment, right of adjournment, the Agent and other things, 
brought this matter to a head also, and the Board of Trade instructed 
Hamilton's successor, Sir Nicholas Lawes, to insist on all revenues 
being entrusted to the Receiver General. The story of the Assembly's 
further strivings has already been told [See section on APPRO- 
PRIATION AND ISSUE] and shows that while it failed to prevent 
the "annual" revenues from falling into the Receiver's hands it yet 
managed to control their issue in ways very satisfactory to itself. 

The question of the Receiver General's relation to the House is 
worth a moment or two's notice. Until about 1675 it does not appear 
that the Assembly had any right to do more than view the Receiver 
General's accounts as they lay, audited by Council and recorded in 
the Council Office. But in 1679 the representatives presumed by 
warrant from the Speaker 60 to summon the Receiver General him- 
self before them with his books. The Receiver protested to the 
Governor (Lord Carlisle) who not only told him to ignore the 
warrant but bade him reply "both from the King and from my Lord, 
he was not obliged to show his accounts to the Assembly". 61 Upon 
the representatives refusing to proceed any further with supply until 
their desire had been granted, Carlisle somewhat grudgingly 
instructed the Receiver General to lay his accounts before them. 
Though the House thus won a considerable victory, it had yet been 
repulsed in the matter of procedure, and not for another twenty 
years did it again presume to summon the Receiver direct before 



124 Early West Indian Government 

itself. In 1701, however, by Speaker's warrant it ordered him to 
appear. He sent back an answer that he would attend, but at the same 
time complained to Governor Beeston and Council, both of whom 
expressed their resentment, the Governor declaring it a thing "never 
heard of" before. 52 Nevertheless, unlike Carlisle, he did not go to the 
length of forbidding the Receiver to attend, so the latter in due course 
did so and had his books examined. 

Beeston was shortly afterwards superseded by William Selwyn who 
proved quite a complaisant Governor, for when the House in the 
following year again ordered the Receiver to attend with his accounts, 
there is no record of Selwyn's objecting. He died within a few months 
and was succeeded by Governor Handasyd who permitted the House 
the same direct approach to the Receiver, assuring it on one occasion 
that "the accounts of all public moneys shall be always ready to be 
laid before you". The Assembly certainly took him at his word, even 
authorising the chairman of the committee set up to inspect the 
Receiver's accounts to command his attendance, M though more 
usually the House itself issued the order through its Speaker or its 
Clerk. Strangely enough. Lord Archibald Hamilton let the practice 
go on unchecked perhaps he felt that he already had enough on 
his mind contesting the claims of the House in more serious 
directions! But his successor, Sir Nicholas Lawes, took up the same 
stand as Carlisle had done, forbidding the Receiver to attend until 
the House had first addressed the Governor to give the necessary 
direction." The two following governors, the Duke of Portland 
(1721-6) and Robert Hunter (1727-34) seem to have let the matter 
slide, the Assembly reverting to direct ordering.** From the time of 
Acting-Governor John Gregory (1735-8) however, the Assembly re- 
turned to a more courteous procedure; whenever the time came 
round for a Committee to be set up to inspect the public accounts, 
the House customarily made formal application to the Governor to 
direct the Receiver General to lay his books before it. Though this 
seems to have been a matter more of courtesy than necessity, it 
persisted right down to the end of our period. It is clear, however, 
that the Receiver on less formal occasions frequently attended the 
House and its committees without any such preliminaries, which 
indeed is only to be expected when we remember what a burden of 
responsibility he had for the receipt and payment of the annual funds, 
the administering of which was virtually in the control of the 
House.* 6 



Jamaican Financial Administration 125 



6. The Surplusage Question 

The only remaining feature of interest is the question of the dis- 
posal of the surplus arising from the perpetual Revenue Act of 1728 
a bone of contention that cropped up from time to time between 
Council and Assembly. After appropriating the sum of 8000 to the 
support of the regular civil and military establishment, the Act went 
on to declare that the surplus should "be applied to the use of parties 
to be raised for the reduction of rebellious negroes or to such uses 
as the Governor, Council and Assembly ... by any law . . . shall 
think proper". Before many years were out great conflict of opinion 
arose as to the interpretation of this clause, the Council claiming 
that it guaranteed to the Governor and itself an equal voice in the 
disposal of the surplus; the representatives, on the other hand, 
contending that any bill for appropriating the surplusage, being a 
money bill, gave the Governor and Council no more power than they 
had over any other money bill, viz. that merely to pass completely or 
reject completely. They denied the Council any right to amend such a 
measure and often presumed to dispose of the "surplusage", as they 
called it, by means of a "tack" in one or other of the annual tax 
bills, a course that was prejudicial to the Board's rights. 

The matter came to a head in the session of 1769-70 when the 
Assembly presumed once again to appropriate parts of the surplusage 
by means of "tacks" in the Poll Tax and Rum Bills. The Council 
rejected both and argument grew loud and tempers frayed. The 
Council conceded that in the past it had sometimes allowed such 
"tacks" but claimed that such occasions had been merely for the 
sake of convenience and could not be "considered as vesting in the 
House an authority which the law hath not given them". The House 
in reply resolved that it was "the sole and inherent right of the people 
to raise, give, grant and appropriate all moneys and surplusage of 
money that . . . may arise by any bill ... in this House". 67 The 
Assembly proving intractable the Governor, Sir William Trelawny, 
first prorogued and then dissolved it without having succeeded in 
getting supplies. A new Assembly proved more amenable and a 
compromise was adopted that of appropriating the surplusage by 
means of a special Act passed solely for the purpose. The lion's share 
of influence thus remained in the House, for Council could not 
amend such a bill; but at least it could reject it without causing a 
collapse of the ordinary finances. This method of appropriating the 
surplusage by special Act was employed again and again and gave 



Early West Indian Government 126 

fairly general satisfaction, though from time to time minor differ- 
ences still arose. A permanent settlement of the problem was not 
achieved until 1809 when a final compromise was at length arrived at, 
the Assembly agreeing to increase to 10,000 per annum that part of 
the permanent revenue appropriable to the maintenance of the 
regular establishment (and therefore disposable by Council), on 
condition that the Board agreed that all in excess of this figure might 
be regularly used to supplement the annual funds and be freely 
appropriated by the House in the Acts that raised them. 58 



Chapter VIII 

PUBLIC WORKS AND KINDRED SERVICES 
IN JAMAICA 



1. Introduction 

In Jamaica, as in Barbados, the Governor and Council were in 
theory the correct Executive to whom all matters of administration 
should have been entrusted. Constitutionally the Assembly was 
merely a law-making body whose only administrative concern should 
have been the planning of services and the provision of finance. 
Nevertheless, in the years under review the House came to usurp the 
lion's share in the conduct of most works and services. How did 
this come about? Was the process slow or rapid, and by what steps 
was it achieved? The following pages will help to provide the answer. 

As one would expect from an island the size of Jamaica, the 
problems of administration were considerably more varied than 
those of the smaller colonies. Frequent periods of war called for 
constant attention to the fortifications and the taking of other steps 
to safeguard the island, and even when Britain was at peace the long 
years of danger from the Maroons and runaway slaves required the 
frequent despatch of armed parties to suppress them, and the 
building of barracks or stockades at various points as bases from 
which these parties might operate. Then there was the need of more 
roads and bridges, the erection and repair of public buildings, the 
encouragement of immigration and the maintenance and improve- 
ment of Kingston Harbour. Such things were properly the business 
of the Governor and Council and for the first thirty years the people 
were content to let them remain so: not until the early 1690s do we 
find the Assembly beginning to display a parallel concern and to 
assume to itself a right to share in the actual tasks of administration. 



2. Sloops to Guard the Coasts 

An early sign of this disposition on the part of the representatives 
appeared in 1693 when, during an invasion scare, Lieutenant 



128 Early West Indian Government 

Governor Beeston sought the assistance of the House in the despatch 
of several sloops to cruise about the coasts and bring warning of any 
approach by the French, a service far beyond the means of the 
ordinary revenue to supply. By way of aid the representatives raised 
over 13,000 by a poll tax and other means but, following Barbadian 
precedents, refused to entrust the money to the Lieutenant Governor 
and Council, preferring rather to vest it in commissioners of their 
own choosing consisting of four Assemblymen and two private 
citizens whom they authorised, "by the advice and consent" of the 
Lieutenant Governor, to buy or hire four sloops, fit out and victual 
them, and so prepare the way for Beeston to appoint officers and 
commanders, give them their cruising directions and send them out. 
The making of all contracts and payments, including those for 
salaries and wages, was left to the commissioners or to two of them 
specially named as treasurers. Beeston was justly indignant at the 
Assembly's presumption, to which he yielded he said "more for the 
safety of the island than your right". It is clear the commis- 
sioners, despite the clause about the Lieutenant Governor's "advice 
and consent" did not pay much attention to his authority and behaved 
very much as they pleased; so much so, that when things did not pan 
out well for the enterprise, Beeston was able to adopt an "I told you 
so!" attitude and point a finger of scorn at the commissioners for 
what he held to be defects in the arrangements they had made. 1 

The fitting out of guard sloops was so expensive a service that it 
was undertaken only in times of special urgency. Such an occasion 
again arose in 1710 when Governor Handasyd recommended the 
fitting out of two sloops. Again the Assembly acquiesced in the task, 
appropriating 5,000 for the purpose and vesting it in three 
Assemblymen to fit the vessels out. Disputes between these three 
unfortunately held the work up so much, that in 1711 the indignant 
House appointed two fresh commissioners (both Assemblymen) to 
push ahead with it. Since no copy of the authorising Act is now 
discoverable it is uncertain how far the powers of the commissioners 
extended, but it is clear from the Assembly records that they pos- 
sessed virtual independence so far as the hiring, fitting out, and pay- 
ment of wages and bills were concerned ; though there is no sug- 
gestion that they had any share in the appointment of commanders 
or in giving cruising directions.* 

As has been told in the previous chapter, the Board of Trade in 
1718 reprimanded the Assembly for these and other commissioner 
practices, and the House for a time desisted from them. Accordingly, 
when in 1720 Governor Lawes asked help in sending out a pair of 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 129 

sloops to protect the coasts from pirates and Spanish privateers, the 
representatives adopted the obviously correct procedure of ap- 
propriating a fund to the purpose and leaving the Governor, with 
the aid of the Receiver General, to order both their fitting out and 
their despatch. 3 For the next two or three years they consented to the 
hire of only one sloop but again left the control to the Governor. 4 
But with the passage of time they reverted to their earlier practice of 
appointing commissioners of their own to hire and fit out the vessel, 
hire the crew, and pay all charges ; but leaving the appointment of 
officers and commanders and the actual direction of the enterprise 
to the Governor. 5 



3. The Inspection and Management of Fortifications 

In times so filled with war's alarms as the late seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the maintenance of island fortifications was 
naturally a matter of the first importance. At first the only forts of 
consequence were the great ones at Port Royal, but as time went by 
smaller ones were erected at places as widely scattered as Port 
Morant, Kingston, Old Harbour, Carlisle Bay, Mosquito Point and 
Port Antonio. The "permanent" Revenue Acts appropriated the sum 
of 1250 to fortifications but beyond the earliest years this was quite 
insufficient and by the late seventeenth century considerable sums 
from the "annual" funds had periodically to be applied to this 
purpose. 

Because the money for fortifications was wholly from island 
sources the Assembly from very early years seems to have possessed 
the right periodically* to inspect the works that were maintained out 
of it. On such occasions it appointed a committee of its own to join 
with a committee of the Council not only to view the works but, also 
if need be, to discuss and resolve upon the steps necessary for their 
improvement. The combined committee then reported its findings to 
the parent bodies which, having debated them, brought them to the 
notice of the Governor for action. It appears that either House might 
take the initiative in moving the appointment of such a committee, 7 
the proportion of Assemblymen to Councillors on it varying, but 
generally being more than two to one. But there is no evidence in the 
seventeenth century to suggest a desire on the part of the House to 
encroach on the actual management of the fortifications; its only 
concern was for inspection to see that the forts were being kept in 
good order and that the Governor and Council were not misspending 
the public money. 



130 Early West Indian Government 

Over this inspection, however, the House soon came to adopt a 
very free and independent attitude, and to regard the setting up of the 
combined committee as a sort of automatic right in connection with 
which the Governor bore little part save acquiescence. 8 This was 
doubtless because most of the early governors gave the combined 
committees free rein to look over the forts as they pleased, inspect 
the guards, and check over the powder and stores. It is not sur- 
prising, therefore, that a governor like Lord Archibald Hamilton 
stickler for form that he was expressed strong objection, for he saw 
that the combined committee as it usually behaved was an encroach- 
ment on the Executive. Accordingly, when in 1713 the Assembly, 
adopting the usual procedure, set up a committee of thirteen to view 
the fortifications and asked Council to appoint a committee to join 
with it, the Council replied "that his Excellency having been pleased 
to lay before the Board the state of the fortifications at Port Royal 
which he had required from the proper officer; and . . . [as] his 
Excellency conceives it in all respects fully answers your intentions 
in your message on Friday last, we have therefore sent you down the 
said state for your inspection".* The representatives indignantly 
replied that "our House do not concur the said message to be 
satisfactory; and that, as they always, since the first sitting of 
Assemblies in this island, have been admitted to view the forti- 
fications, and as they with great reason conceive it to be their right, 
they insist upon the same; and do again desire that your honours will 
be pleased to appoint a committee of your Board to join with a 
committee of this House to view the forts and fortifications*'. 10 

Governor and Council thereupon relented and consented to the 
combined committee, five Councillors being chosen to represent 
them upon it. A noticeable feature of their inspection, however, was 
that Hamilton refused them access to the powder and stores or 
permission to muster the guards. Since the representatives desired a 
statement of the powder and stores they were obliged to ask the 
Governor to instruct the captain of the forts at Port Royal to lay one 
before them. 11 The Assembly greatly resented Hamilton's attitude 
and seem to have decided to let the fortifications slide rather than 
allow their right of inspection to be reduced to a mere vice-regal 
concession, for when in 1715 it proposed that a combined committee 
be set up to view the fortifications and the Council pointed out that 
it would only be "decent first to apply to his Excellency for his leave 
and directions", the House strenuously objected and let the proposal 
fall rather than concur in such an application. 11 As soon as Hamilton 
had left the island in 1716, however, the Assembly and Council under 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 131 

President Heywood (Governor pro tern.) returned to the free and 
unrestricted committee of former years. 

But the next governor, Sir Nicholas Lawes (1717-22), while not 
adopting so strict an attitude as Hamilton had done, yet considered 
that, even as a matter of courtesy, his leave should be asked before a 
combined committee should set foot inside the fortifications. When 
in 1721 the House and Council set up a combined committee to 
view the defences at Port Royal, the Governor quietly asked "how 
they would get into the fort?*' The representatives at once fell into 
debate "whether in regard the stores of powder being paid into the 
fort as part of the revenue, and the Assembly being empowered by 
the Revenue Act to inquire into the several branches thereof", the 
House was not "entitled to enquire into and view the same", and 
resolved that it was. A further queston being proposed, whether a 
message should be sent to desire leave of his Excellency to view the 
same, "carried in the negative". Nevertheless, a day or two after- 
wards they receded from this decision and consented "for the sake of 
that good correspondence which was necessary to be preserved be- 
tween them" to ask the Governor "that he would be pleased to give 
his direction to the commanding officer of the said fortifications to 
attend both committees". 13 The courtesies thus established 
although perhaps of small importance were adhered to right down 
to the end of our period, during the whole of which time combined 
Committees of inspection continued to be the customary way by 
which the Houses at regular intervals formally informed themselves 
of the state of the fortifications. 14 

But the time was steadily approaching that was to see a radical 
change in the method of actually ordering and conducting the work of 
the fortifications. The Governor and the Council, busy with their 
private affairs and their ordinary public duties, were far from being 
the most suitable persons to manage this work. Although they em- 
ployed a trained engineer to supervise the day-to-day construction 
and maintenance, things often went wrong, contractors skimped 
their work, defects went unremedied, and for want of good manage- 
ment value was seldom received for money expended. The Council 
and Assembly in 1742 pointed out to Governor Edward Trelawny 
that "the forts and fortifications . . . appear much out of repair and 
in a defenceless condition, notwithstanding great sums of money 
have been . . . expended upon them, which we apprehend is chiefly 
owing to the want of proper persons to inspect and direct the carrying 
on of the necessary works". Accordingly they suggested that the 
Governor appoint a standing Board of Commissioners to consist of 



132 Early West Indian Government 

four Councillors and seven Assemblymen (but not including the 
Governor) "to inspect the works in and about the fortifications", 
with power "to agree with workmen and labourers, and for materials 
necessary for the said service". They further asked the Governor to 
"give orders to the Commanders of the said fortifications to admit 
at all times the said commissioners ... to enter into, inspect and 
give directions for the carrying on of such works ... as shall be 
judged necessary". 1 5 The two Houses, though asking Trelawny to do 
the appointing of the Commissioners, were yet careful to specify by 
name just what Assemblymen and Councillors they recommended, 
and in reply the Governor consented to do as they desired, agreeing 
that "by this method we shall not only be assured that the works will 
be performed according to contract, but that the prices will be 
reasonable. I am liable in my station", he continued, "to be imposed 
on in both." It is equally clear that he trusted, with some justi- 
fication, that if the representatives had the lion's share in the manage- 
ment of the works they would much more cheerfully raise money for 
their upkeep. In order that the Commissioners should be able to do 
their work freely and without restriction the Governor and Council 
empowered them to draw direct on the Receiver General for what- 
ever moneys they required. 1 * 

So satisfied were all concerned with the new practice that 
Trelawny next year agreed to the Commissioners being appointed 
by an Act passed specially for the purpose. Once again the Governor 
was omitted from the Board, which was made up of four Councillors 
and thirteen Assemblymen ; the quorum to be five, of which one had 
to be a Councillor. The Act made handsome appropriations to the 
fortifications and empowered the Commissioners to draw direct on 
the Receiver General. 17 An examination of Trelawny's despatches 
reveals that he did not inform the Board of Trade of this radical 
experiment, and the extraordinary thing was that the Boards* legal 
adviser, Francis Fane, when a copy of the Act came before him for 
scrutiny, reported "No objection" to it! 18 Throughout the rest of 
Trelawny's long administration it lasted from 1738 to 1752 this 
method of managing the fortifications remained unchanged, much 
to the satisfaction of the House, which, if not always proud of the 
state of the forts, at least had the satisfaction of having the pre- 
dominant hand in their control. 

But what a shock was in store for the planters when Admiral 
Charles Knowles was appointed Trelawny's successor! Knowles as 
a naval officer had served on the West India station and knew 
Jamaica thoroughly. 19 He knew its extravagance and its inefficiency 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 1 33 

all too well, and strongly disapproved of both. One of the many 
things he objected to was the Commissioner system of managing 
the fortifications and, during his short but stormy administration, 
he insisted on taking their control into his own hands. 20 Knowles's 
successor, Lieutenant Governor Moore, however, reverted to a 
modified form of Trelawny's Board of Commissioners, the main 
difference being that Moore insisted on the Governor or Com- 
mander-in-Chief being one of its members, though without any pre- 
eminence. 21 

Needless to say this did not satisfy the able but somewhat auto- 
cratic William Henry Lyttelton when he assumed the administration 
in 1762. While not challenging the principle of managing the forti- 
fications by means of a Board of Commissioners, Lyttelton demanded 
that due weight be paid to the Governor's authority as the most 
responsible member of that Board. Accordingly the next Com- 
missioner of Fortifications Act (1763), in naming the Governor, four 
Councillors and twenty-two Assemblymen to be its members, was 
careful only to empower them (or any five of them, of which one was 
to be a Councillor) "jointly with his Excellency the Governor" to 
manage the fortifications; and ordained that money should issue 
only "by orders under the hand ... of the Governor . . . jointly with 
the said Commissioners or any five of them, of which one to be a 
Councillor". The Governor's pre-eminence of membership was thus 
safeguarded, and the fact that his signature was made an in- 
dispensable condition to the making of all payments did give him an 
important check on the actions of the Commissioners as a whole. 22 
All things considered, this was no more than reasonable, and many 
a time must have compelled the spirit of compromise to prevail, the 
Governor's signature and that of one Councillor being as necessary 
for the issue of all warrants as those of the Assembly's quota, and 
vice versa. Accordingly this continued to be the standard pattern for 
the remainder of our period, though it is clear that most governors, 
instead of making the most of their pre-eminent position on the 
Board, were content to allow the Councillors and Assemblymen the 
lion's share of decision in matters relating to the work. 

In 1768 the Act named no fewer than thirty-seven Assemblymen 
to be the House's quota on the Board; the Act of 1775 named 
twenty-eight; but finally in 1778 23 the entire House and Council 
were appointed to join the Governor in membership, and this re- 
mained the practice to the end of our period and beyond. Finally, 
from 1769 onwards the jurisdiction of the Board was enlarged to 
include the management of the Public Buildings 24 which meant 



134 Early West Indian Government 

mainly the new Assembly House, the King's House and other 
public buildings in Spanish Town, Thus in this very important 
matter of the care and extension of all fortifications and the 
principal public buildings, the whole legislature became converted 
into an administrative department in which the Governor, by 
growing custom, had little more influence and authority than, say, 
the Speaker or any other person of respect and eminence. 1 * 

What were the results of this commissioner practice? Were the 
fortifications and other works better managed than they had pre- 
viously been? Unfortunately the answer if we are to believe the 
various governors is in the negative. Both Dulling and his successor 
Archibald Campbell constantly lamented the state of the island 
fortifications which, despite the expenditure of "great sums of 
money", had "from the stupidity, ignorance and perhaps knavery of 
the engineers employed, not a single work of consequence to answer 
the immoderate expense". 14 Both these governors strongly advocated 
that the imperial government assume full responsibility (including 
expense) for the island fortifications, a course which would doubtless 
incense the Assembly and the planters as being an infringement of 
their freedom and a "superseding of their own engineer" 17 but they 
were convinced that, when they saw the results that would accrue 
from such a course, even these would agree. Failing this, Campbell 
favoured handing over control of the fortifications to a special body 
to consist of the Governor and Council and the Commanding 
Officer of His Majesty's troops, for he declared that "the political 
contests of Jamaica for some time past point out the impropriety of 
leaving the sole direction of the forts and fortifications to the 
Assembly, who avail themselves of such powers to manifest their 
disrespect and ill-will to a governor, by putting a stop to military 
works, however essential to the safety of the island". 18 If a charge 
like this was even half-true, the situation must indeed have been 
serious. Nevertheless the imperial authorities, already in despair 
over the turn colonial affairs had taken in North America, were 
totally unwilling to accept either the responsibility or the expense of 
such an arrangement, nor would the Assembly ever have consented. 
The only thing done was that the House, itself perturbed over the 
wastefulness of the efforts done upon the fortifications, resolved to 
have as much of the work as possible done by contract, as a possible 
means of avoiding extravagance. 9 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 135 

4. Parties Against Maroons and Runaway Slaves 

Another service in which the Assembly came to encroach on the 
administrative rights of the Executive was the fitting out of parties 
for the suppression of the Maroons and runaway slaves. The 
earliest Acts for this purpose now discoverable date from the end of 
the seventeenth century, and commonly show the Assembly, through 
commissioners of its own choosing, keeping the payment of such 
parties within its own control, while leaving the actual raising and 
directing of them to the Governor and Council, to whom such power 
rightfully belonged. The same general arrangements were continued 
into the early part of the succeeding century, the House devising its 
own means of provisioning and paying such parties but still en- 
trusting the direction to the rightful Executive. 30 In 1717 a permanent 
Act was passed to encourage voluntary action, the Governor or 
even the Commanding Officer of Militia in every parish being 
empowered to commission commanders to such parties as should go 
out voluntarily against rebellious negroes, and offered a substantial 
reward for every rebel taken dead or alive. 81 

But so great grew the dangers from this quarter that voluntary 
action proved quite inadequate and great organised parties had to be 
sent out against them. For some years the royal Instruction of 1718, 
forbidding any further commissioner action in the raising or spending 
of taxes, prevented the setting up of commissioners to fit out and pay 
such forces which were accordingly provisioned and paid by the Re- 
ceiver General and controlled by the Governor and Council. 3 * After a 
while, however, the House began to revert to the commissioner 
practices of former years. For instance, in framing an Act in 1730 
sending out parties from several parishes, it stipulated that in each 
parish the fitting out and provisioning be done by commissioners 
chosen by itself, a fair proportion of whom were Assemblymen. The 
Act entrusted these commissioners with the complete direction of 
each party, allowing them even to appoint the commanders, the only 
clause safeguarding the Governor's authority being that each ap- 
pointment must receive his approval. In view of the fact that these 
were only parish parties, Governor Hunter saw little to object to in 
these arrangments and gave the Act his cheerful consent. From the 
Assembly's point of view the plan was so satisfactory that the 
following year it was continued and even extended. 33 No wonder, 
therefore, that when in 1732 two men named Peters and Lee came 
forward with an offer to lead a large party out, the representatives 
felt quite free to accept it. After themselves doing most of the 



1 36 Early West Indian Government 

preparatory organising, they passed a bill to provide for it, appointed 
Peters as commander, and sent it up to the Council which also 
approved it. In due course it came before Hunter, who despite the 
fact that he had a very poor opinion of Peters, yet gave it his assent, 
mainly because the need was urgent, and the issuing of instructions 
to Peters was still left in his hands. 84 

Next year much the same thing occurred again. This time two 
fellows named Lamb and Williams offered to raise a large party and 
lead it against the rebel town near Port Antonio if only the Govern- 
ment would provide the means. The offer was made in the first 
instance to the Governor and Council who submitted it in due 
course to the Assembly which, approving the venture, straightway 
began negotiating with Lamb and Williams, made plans for a large 
expedition involving the building of one or more barracks in the 
mountains, and then drew up a bill to provide for it, in which the 
whole control was vested in commissioners most of whom were of 
their own House. So active had been the Assembly's preparations, 
so complete their plans, and so unquestioning their assumption that 
Council would as a matter of course approve the whole venture, that 
the latter were offended, and when the measure came before them 
they indignantly rejected it on the grounds that "it tended in general 
to wrest the power out of the hands of the Governor". This action 
placed the representatives in a most unpleasant fix since they had 
committed themselves so unreservedly to the expedition that they 
had already despatched several groups to Port Antonio in readiness. 
Accordingly they charged the Council with obstruction, but the 
latter replied that they were "not conscious of having obstructed the 
public affairs otherwise than in not suffering the House to assume 
the whole power of government". They had seen, they declared, 
"the House enlist men, appoint officers, direct their marches, and 
several other extravagances of that nature". 8 * The Houses being 
thus at loggerheads, public business came practically to a standstill, 
but the Council proved adamant and the representatives had finally 
to call the expedition off. Their position was quite untenable and 
two prorogations in rapid succession brought them to their senses. 
When later that same year they returned to the matter of despatching 
parties we find them adopting a more reasonable attitude. To make 
up for lost time they provided for a body of the regular troops to go 
out against the rebels, the Governor naturally having the whole 
direction of the enterprise. 86 

This, however, did not prejudice the future unduly, the House still 
being free to regulate the method of raising, financing, and fitting 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 137 

out parties so long as the direction of the venture was left to the 
correct Executive. The great pacification of the Maroons which was 
accomplished by Governor Edward Trelawny in 1738-9 greatly 
reduced the dangers and alarms from rebellious negroes, so that 
after that time the need for specially organised parties practically 
ceased, volunteer parties sent out under the terms of the permanent 
Act of 1717 (as modified in later years) being generally sufficient to 
cope with the occasional emergency as it arose, 37 and on all such 
occasions the direction of the enterprise lay with the Governor. 



5. Barrack Building 

The earliest instance of barrack building appears to have taken 
place in 1703 when Lieutenant Governor Handasyd, being apprised 
of the approach of four hundred extra regular troops for the island, 
recommended the Assembly to make plans "for their refreshment 
and subsistence". Previously the regular troops had simply been 
billeted on private townspeople, taverns and estate owners; but the 
House now decided, while billeting most of the newcomers in the 
usual way, to house about a hundred of them in or near the forts at 
Port Royal. Accordingly it appropriated a sum of money to erect a 
barracks in the vicinity of Fort Charles and appointed three com- 
missioners to supervise the building of it. For some reason the year 
ended without anything being done, so next year provision was again 
made for it and it appears to have been erected. 88 

The next time that barracks were proposed was in connection with 
the sending out of parties against the Maroons and runaway slaves, 
the barracks in this case being redoubts of sufficient size and strength 
in various parts of the island to serve as bases from which attacks 
could be launched against the rebels. Who first thought of this plan 
it is now impossible to tell, but it arose in connection with the pro- 
posals of Lamb and Williams placed before the legislature in 1733, 
when the representatives waxed so enthusiastic in their preparations 
that their zeal led them into violent conflict with the Council and 
the suspension of the whole enterprise. When, however, these 
differences were overcome the House reverted to the barracks project 
and drew up bills, subsequently agreed to by Council and assented 
to by the Governor, to provide for their construction in many key 
parts of the island. The first of these barracks was built in West- 
moreland parish near the head of the Great River, and others 
followed in rapid succession at Cave River in Clarendon, Hobby's 



138 Early West Indian Government 

and Ugly River in St. George's, Flint River in St. Mary's, near 
Nassau in St. Elizabeth's, Manchioneal Bay in Portland, and several 
other places. The result was that by 1738 the Maroon and other 
rebel villages had been effectively hemmed around with stockades, 
a thing which greatly facilitated the settlement which Governor 
Edward Trelawny made with them shortly afterwards. 

Most of these barracks were built by means of commissioner 
action, the commissioners, some of whom were Assemblymen, being 
appointed in the Acts concerned. 89 Such as were not built by com- 
missioners were built by parish action. These barrack Acts were 
unquestionably patriotic in spirit and loyal in intent, but never- 
theless did involve considerable popular usurpation of the executive 
rights of the Governor and Council. Despite occasional face-saving 
clauses about "the Governor's authority" the Acts gave full effective 
management to the commissioners, except that the Governor's right 
to issue directions to the parties sent out against the rebels was 
always respected. After the pacification of the Maroons the need for 
further barracks practically ceased and upon the parish authorities 
fell the responsibility of keeping the existing ones in repair. In later 
years if barracks in the country parishes were occasionally required 
for the quartering of regular troops, it was likewise the responsibility 
of each parish to provide them: 40 if, on the other hand, they were 
required in or about the forts or main centres, it was up to the 
Commissioners of Fortifications to supply them or else to the 
legislature by commissioner action to erect them. 41 

6. Public Buildings and Similar Undertakings 

The number of public buildings required for civil and judicial 
purposes in early Jamaica was small. A few small courthouses in the 
various precincts, a Supreme Court building in Spanish Town, a 
gaol or two, a customs office, a residence for the Governor, a place 
of meeting for the Governor and Council and another for the 
Assembly, were about all that were required until the beginning of 
the eighteenth century. The fact that the principal offices in the 
island were nearly all granted by letters patent meant that the island 
government was freed from the obligation to provide accommodation 
for them, the patentee or his deputy having to provide his own 
quarters. Up till 1685, for instance, the deputy Provost Marshal even 
provided his own gaol! For we find that the Lieutenant Governor 
on 25th February that year recommended the Council to build a 
prison upon part of the King's land at Port Royal, "there having 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 1 39 

been hitherto none in this island . . . [save] that . . . belonging to the 
late patentee for the Marshal's place, which would now be converted 
to other uses whereby the island would be wholly desitute of a place 
of security to keep prisoners in". 42 Until after 1730 there is no 
evidence of the Assembly ever encroaching on the Governor and 
CounciFs right to build, furnish and maintain public buildings, 
except in the very natural particular that the representatives from the 
earliest times seem to have erected and maintained out of public 
funds their own Assembly House. 43 It is true that the Assembly was 
occasionally consulted about the building and repair of public 
buildings, as when Governor Handasyd in 1710 recommended to it 
the repairing of the gaol in Spanish Town, or when Governor Lawes 
in 1719 tried though in vain to persuade it into erecting a public 
building there to house the several public offices ; but it always seems 
to have left the direction of such works to the Governor and Council. 
In 1731, however, Governor Hunter recommended the building of 
a new gaol in Spanish Town and the House voted a reasonable sum 
for the purpose. While it did not presume to appoint commissioners 
of its own to do the work, it did take a very practical interest in the 
way it was carried out, even to the length of having a plan submitted 
to itself as well as to Council. Nevertheless the Governor and Council 
retained the major responsibility for overseeing the work which was 
done by contract. 44 Yet that same year the legislature, having agreed 
to the making of improvements at the mineral springs at the Bath, 
appropriated money to the work and appointed two Councillors 
and several Assemblymen as commissioners to survey the site and 
erect a large building on it. 45 In the same way some years later when 
the legislature took in hand the erection of a great new Assembly 
House in Spanish Town (to serve as a meeting place for both Council 
and Assembly) the work was entrusted to a body of commissioners 
consisting of three Councillors and ten Assemblymen, with full 
authority to design, lay out, and construct the building. An initial 
grant of 6000 was made for it and the commissioners given an 
independent right to draw on it. 46 If a commissioner were to resign or 
die, power was given his fellow commissioners to select another out 
of the same House to take his place. The scheme grew somewhat as 
time went on, accommodation for the chief public offices being also 
provided and substantial additional grants being made. Thus these 
Commissioners for the Public Buildings became for a long time an 
active and responsible public body, being revived and strengthened 
in 1759 47 in order to erect the building of the new "King's House" 
(or Governor's residence) then about to begin. 



140 Early West Indian Government 

The commissioner principle for the management of public 
buildings being so thoroughly inaugurated, it is not surprising that 
it became the general practice from then on. When the division of the 
island into three counties required the erection at treasury expense 
of gaols at Kingston and Savanna la Mar to serve the needs of the 
new courts there, the justices at each place were appointed com- 
missioners for the work. 48 In 1759, too, at the same time as the 
erection of the new King's House was being undertaken, the legis- 
lature decided to buy a country estate or "pen" for the use of the 
Governor, and three commissioners the senior Councillor, the 
Chief Justice, and the Speaker of the Assembly were appointed to 
purchase a suitable property. 49 In 1773, when similar but smaller 
provision was made for a residence for the naval commander-in- 
chief on the Jamaica station, the commissioners consisted entirely of 
Assemblymen. Three years later when a hospital was contemplated 
commissioners consisting of the Assemblymen and churchwardens 
for Kingston, Port Royal and St. Catherine were empowered to rent 
or buy a suitable building for the purpose in Kingston. The success 
of the hospital then encouraged the legislature to think about the 
erection of a public workhouse at Kingston, with the result that in 
the following year ( 1 777) an almost identical body of commissioners 
was set up to build one.* 

In 1769 a notable step was taken when the Assembly moved to 
combine the functions of the Commissioners of the Public Buildings 
with those of the Commissioners of Forts and Fortifications, and 
Governor and Council agreeing, the combined body became known 
as the "Commissioners of Forts, Fortifications and Public 
Buildings". At the time the Board consisted of the Governor, seven 
Councillors and eighteen Assemblymen, but it steadily grew in 
numbers until from 1778 onwards it comprised the entire legis- 
lature. 61 Thus in the realm of public buildings as well as in that of 
fortifications the legislature, by one means or another, by 1783 had 
come to usurp complete executive jurisdiction, reducing the 
Governor's authority to negligible proportions, and making the 
local inhabitants practically masters in their own house. 

7. Highways, Bridges and Kingston Harbour 

The making and repair of roads and bridges was normally 
the responsibility of the parish authorities, but occasionally the 
construction of trunk roads and expensive bridges required legislative 
sanction and even treasury grants. When the road from Clarendon 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 141 

to St. Elizabeth's over One Eye Savanna was proposed, a special 
Act (1705) was passed setting up a body of commissioners partly 
Assemblymen and partly J.P.s and vestrymen to direct the efforts 
of surveyors and work parties in laying it down. Some years later 
when a road from the Cave in the parish of Westmoreland over the 
mountains to Montego Bay was suggested, the same method was 
employed ; and again in the making of the road from Pepper Plan- 
tation in St. Elizabeth's over May Day Hills to St. lago Savannah 
in the parish of Clarendon. 51 

After 1750, however, the legislature, following English models, did 
a good deal of its road making and repair by means of turnpike 
trusts, each set up by Act of Assembly. The trustees were invariably 
named in the Act and usually consisted of selected Councillors, 
Assemblymen, and other leading planters interested in the part 
concerned. Under the stimulus of turnpike action the road system 
benefited considerably, one or two new roads being built to link up 
existing thoroughfares, and several of the older highways being 
greatly improved. 68 The legislature often assisted with treasury 
grants and by the middle sixties public expenditure on roads had 
become so heavy that the Assembly in 1768 set up a committee of its 
own members to inquire into all road expenditure and this proved so 
useful that it became a regular sessional committee. In 1771 the 
House ordered "that all motions made for money to be laid out on 
roads . . . shall be referred to the [Road] Committee . . . that they may 
examine into the necessity of granting such money". It is clear that 
in a number of cases grants were wastefully spent, for in 1776 the 
Committee recommended to the Assembly that in every future road 
project "one of the commissioners [entrusted with the grant] shall be 
a member of this House, who may be accountable for any abuses 
committed". 54 Once again, therefore, the Assembly is seen arrogating 
to itself a definitely executive task, viz. keeping a watchful eye on all 
road works carried out at the public expense, and deciding what new 
proposals should, or should not be supported. Indeed, so meticulous 
did this scrutiny become that we find the Assembly on 19th Decem- 
ber, 1781, actually resolving "that no money shall in future be 
granted by the House for any roads without a diagram of the said 
roads being laid before the House." 55 The Assembly was thus be- 
coming something of a Highways Board as well as a public works 
authority and Treasury Board ! 

So far as bridges were concerned, the building of country bridges 
(where built at all) was the responsibility of the parish authorities, 
but bridges over the Rio Cobre, being so near the chief towns, were 



142 Early West Indian Government 

of such importance to the island as a whole that their erection and 
upkeep might justifiably call for special provision. In an Act passed 
in 1724 for building "one or more bridges over the Rio Cobre" at the 
Bog Walk, a body of commissioners consisting of eleven Assembly- 
men and several private citizens was set up to build suitable bridges 
over the river at places where it crossed and recrossed the "River 
road" from St. Thomas to St. Catherine, with power to tax the 
people of these two parishes, impress negroes, and take all other 
steps necessary. 66 Just over forty years later considerable agitation 
arose to build a new bridge over the Cobre to carry the Spanish 
Town-Kingston Road. Those advocating the step were optimistic 
enough to believe that the 5000 odd required to build the bridge 
would be forthcoming by public subscription if only suitable appeal 
were made. Therefore the first Act (1767) to sanction it merely set up 
a body of eleven Assemblymen and several other people as com- 
missioners to conduct the appeal and get on with the job. Not un- 
naturally, however, this scheme fell flat for lack of response, so a 
further Act (1774) reconstituted it on a turnpike basis, this time with 
two bodies of commissioners, one (mainly of Assemblymen) to go 
ahead with the bridge, and the other (wholly Assemblymen) to build 
a new stretch of road for part of the way from Kingston; the 
combined commissioners being made trustees for the entire thorough- 
fare (road and bridge) from Spanish Town to Kingston, with power 
to raise funds not only by public appeals but also by a road toll. 
Still the project hung fire for lack of funds, so the following year a 
third Act was passed, incorporating the whole body of com- 
missioners "a body politic" and giving them power to borrow 
money on the security of the toll from the Treasury, if all else 
failed. At long last progress was possible and the work began. It 
took a fairly long time and cost considerably more than was first 
expected, but at last it was completed. Thus the care of the most 
important bridge and thoroughfare in the island was vested in 
commissioners, a good proportion of whom were Assemblymen. 67 
So far as Kingston Harbour is concerned the following are the 
main facts. Until the disastrous earthquake of 1692 and the great 
fire of January, 1703, Port Royal was the chief port in the island, but 
from the time of the fire it rapidly declined, giving place to King- 
ston 68 as the chief port of entry. The wharves at Port Royal and the 
first wharves at Kingston were undoubtedly built on the Governor 
and Council's authority, probably with naval help. But as the 
eighteenth century wore on, the Assembly began to take a strong 
interest in harbour affairs. In 1744 when increased traffic required a 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 143 

more systematic regulation of the harbour, and the appointment of 
a water-bailiff or harbour master, the legislature passed an Act 
appointing a new scale of harbour dues, and setting up a Harbour 
Trust to make regulations for the control of all vessels using the 
harbour and to appoint a water-bailiff to see that these were carried 
out, his salary to be met out of the dues. The original trustees con- 
sisted of a councillor, three Assemblymen (the then members for 
Kingston) and five private citizens. 59 The Trust did not give lasting 
satisfaction, however, and sixteen years later it was replaced by a 
Board of Commissioners consisting of seven Assemblymen and six 
private citizens who were empowered to frame harbour regulations 
and generally direct the water-bailiff in his duties. Strangely enough 
the Act provided that the latter was thenceforward to be appointed 
by the Governor. Nevertheless the hold of the Assembly upon the 
Harbour Board continued to increase until in 1769 its membership 
consisted of the Speaker of the House, no fewer than ten other named 
Assemblymen and only three private citizens. But this proved a most 
unwise tendency, for both Speaker and Assemblymen were far too 
busily engaged on their normal duties to be able to spare time for 
harbour affairs. Consequently in 1 775 a drastic alteration was made. 
The Assembly withdrew from all participation and vested the 
control of the Harbour in the Justices and Vestry of the parish of 
Kingston.' 

8. Assisted Immigration 

Jamaica, with its large area yet meagre population, was the only 
British West Indian colony in the eighteenth century which needed 
to encourage white immigration. Its European population in 1693 
after nearly forty years of English occupation was less than 8,000 
and its negro population only 9,500. The negroes owing to the slave 
trade were increasing rapidly, the whites hardly at all. In view of the 
rapid increase in the negro population the legislature felt that it must 
do all in its power to attract white settlers. Accordingly in 1693 it 
passed the first of what were to become a whole series of laws to 
encourage immigration. This, a five years' Act, raised a fund out of 
which to pay the passage money of all such immigrants as could be 
attracted from the British Isles and North America, and set up a 
body of commissioners (two Councillors and five Assemblymen) to 
advertise this overseas. These commissioners were to choose one of 
themselves to be treasurer who was responsible for receiving and 
spending the money as the commissioners directed. 81 



144 Early West Indian Government 

Similar provision was made by an Act of 1716 which placed a fund 
in the hands of certain commissioners (five Councillors, nine 
Assemblymen and one other) half of which was to be used to pay the 
passages of immigrants and the other half to be laid out in the pur- 
chase of cheap lands to be granted by the commissioners free to the 
new settlers at the rate of thirty acres per person in each family, "the 
said grant to be void and the land returned to the commissioners" 
if the land was not taken up and settled within two years. This Act 
was disallowed in England in 1717, in part because objection was 
taken to the commissioner machinery as an infringment of the 
prerogative. 62 

But despite the imperial frown, commissioner action, though 
modified, continued still to be employed. Less than four years later 
in a drive to increase settlement in the north-east part of the island 
the legislature set up a small body of commissioners (one Councillor 
and two Assemblymen) to negotiate the purchase of cheap and un- 
settled land in Portland and district in order that the Governor might 
be enabled to make free grants to immigrant families at the same 
rate as before. The following year the compulsory purchase of no 
less than 30,000 acres of derelict land in the same neighbourhood 
was sanctioned, and later a body of commissioners was set up to 
"direct surveyors, ... lay out . . . and allot" parcels of land to all 
newcomers desiring them. 68 In 1726 a more generous scale of grants 
was decided on, each new settler being made eligible for a grant of up 
to 500 acres in proportion to the number of white men and negroes 
he was prepared to settle on it, 64 and he was given up to five years to 
fulfil his contract. Ten years later a further 15,000 acres near 
Manchioneal Harbour and a similar area at or near Norman's 
Valley were devoted to the settling of immigrants, each man to 
receive 50 acres for himself, 50 for his wife, 20 for each child and 10 
for each slave; and still further steps were taken to complete the 
closer settling of Portland. Commissioners were still the chosen 
machinery for the allocation of grants and they were fairly in- 
dependent of the Governor and Council's authority.* 5 

The net result of all this free land settlement was, however, dis- 
appointing. In 1741 there were still only 10,000 66 white people in the 
island. The way in which the condition for free land grants had been 
relaxed in 1726 to allow of grants not only in proportion to white 
people settled on the land, but also in proportion to the numbers of 
negroes introduced, undoubtedly stimulated settlement, but it was 
mainly settlement of the characteristic plantation kind three or 
four white persons working an estate with up to ten times that 



Public Works and Kindred Services in Jamaica 145 

number of slaves. It was becoming clear that Jamaica would never 
be a white man's country. The climate, for one thing, was unsuitable, 
but the economic factor was the crucial one the fact that no 
white worker could compete with slave labour. The only white 
person who could with confidence take up land was a man with 
capital enough to employ slaves. Without doubt several score of 
poor families did settle; and a good many by enterprise and thrift 
gradually managed to buy sufficient slaves to work their holdings in 
the plantation way. But a good number found the task impossible, 
the Acts themselves admitting that grants were often "thrown up" or 
else just allowed to lie neglected for lack of means to develop them. 
Whereas the white population in nearly fifty years (1693-1741) 
increased by only two or three thousand, the negro population had 
multiplied more than ten-fold, there being 100,000 negroes in 
Jamaica by 1741. 

Nevertheless the legislature was not dismayed, and made a 
valiant effort in the middle of the century to redeem the situation. 
The measure of its earnestness is to be seen in the generosity of the 
scheme it devised. By An Act for the better . . . encouragement of 
white families to become settlers (1749) it set aside what was con- 
sidered the large sum of 6,000 a year to advertise in Britain and 
North America for immigrants, pay their passage money over, 
lodge them for a time on arrival, settle each family free on a twenty 
acre freehold with cottage and one slave, and exempt them from all 
public and parochial taxes for the space of seven years. Any trades- 
man emigrating to Jamaica was guaranteed a free passage plus a 
bounty of 10 on his arrival. Furthermore, since the legislature 
hoped that a good many immigrant families would take up residence 
on or about the existing estates and so strengthen the proportion of 
whites to negroes there, it offered a premium of 145 to every 
estate owner who would take such a family, provide it with a twenty 
acre freehold, a cottage and a slave, and also the sum of 20 to make 
a start with. To administer the scheme the Act set up a Board of 
Commissioners consisting of the entire legislature, i.e. the Governor 
and Council and the whole Assembly. It would be pleasant to be 
able to report that the scheme met with the success that it deserved, 
but it was not so. As drawn up in 1749 it was to remain in operation 
for fourteen years, but the results considering the expense were 
so disappointing that it was discontinued after only ten, a repealing 
Act in 1758 providing that the operation of the original Act should 
cease from and after 1st November, 1759. 67 From then on the 
legislature seemed too discouraged to try any further full-scale 



146 Early West Indian Government 

schemes of assisted immigration, the only encouragements after that 
being the bounties and rewards that might have been claimable by 
ship's masters for the bringing over of white people, under an old and 
well-nigh obsolete Act of 1703. 68 

This account of land settlement and immigration policy is of 
some interest not only for its own sake but also for the way it shows 
how, in any scheme of consequence to be met out of the public 
purse, the legislature tended to usurp the part of the Executive in 
carrying it out. 



Chapter IX 

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE 
LEEWARD ISLANDS 



1. Introduction 

During the late seventeenth century the administration of the 
finances throughout all the Leeward Islands was remarkable for its 
extreme unorthodoxy. The local methods of raising money and 
spending it were characteristically their own, born of their needs, and 
suited entirely to their own convenience. One universally noticeable 
feature which fills the student with surprise is the manner in which 
the island legislators tended to incur expenditure before they raised 
the revenue with which to meet it. This is not so unnatural as may at 
first appear. Within every island most works and services were 
ordered upon the public credit, and only when the resultant accounts 
grew too voluminous to be any longer neglected, did the legislature 
bestir itself to raise fresh taxes out of which to pay them. 

But before any work could be undertaken at the public expense in 
any of the islands in the late seventeenth century, the matter had to 
meet with the joint approval of both Houses. It was open to 
either body to initiate such a proposal, the Assembly as well as the 
Council being accorded an unquestioned right to propose any service 
requiring an appropriation from the public funds. 1 Most schemes, 
however, originated with Council, who made a practice of sub- 
mitting simple proposals to the Assembly, suggesting that such and 
such a work be undertaken at the public expense. Proposed by the 
President and Council of St. Christopher to the Assembly, "that 
care ... be taken for the speedy fitting of his Majesty's fort at 
Cleverley's Hill". Proposed by the Council of Nevis to the Assembly, 
"that care be taken to strengthen the prison which the marshal 
complains will not hold his prisoners". 2 The Assembly having agreed 
to the work, the Council would be informed and the matter could 
be carried into early effect. In connection with the suggested repair 
of the Nevis prison, for example, the lower House simply agreed 
that "it be forthwith repaired at the country's charge". It should be 
noted that in no island did the Council ever submit estimates of the 



148 Early West Indian Government 

conjectured cost of any scheme which it might propose. If the 
representatives wished to ascertain this they could do so among 
themselves, but as a rule they were content simply to authorise the 
work, with the cheerful intention of meeting all reasonable charges 
which might come of it. 

Only under special circumstances were the Governor and Council 
permitted to incur expenditure without the approval of the lower 
House. In Montserrat for example, as late as 1727 the Lieutenant 
Governor and Council of their own authority, at a time when the 
Assembly was not in session, ordered the Treasurer to put the island 
prison into good repair. So, too, in times of martial law the early 
Governors and Councils enjoyed a freer spending power, although 
insufficient evidence remains to show how great this freedom really 
was. 8 

But such exceptions in no way mar the general rule. By the close of 
the seventeenth century it had become clearly established that no 
expenditure incurred by one House without the approval of the other 
could be met from the public treasury, but would remain instead as a 
private charge upon the body responsible for its authorisation. In 
1697 a certain Captain Perry was commissioned by the Nevis Council 
to carry a shipload of French prisoners back to Guadaloupe. Having 
performed this service he submitted his account to the legislature for 
payment. When the Council sent it down for the examination of the 
Assembly the latter at once resolved "that the charge of thirty 
pounds . . . brought against the country by Captain Perry for 
sending to Guadaloupe the French prisoners of war ... be not 
allowed the said Perry, being done only by order of the Council 
without an Assembly*'. 4 In a similar fashion, when Governor 
Parke, in 1709, with the Council's approval, gave orders that two 
sloops be taken up for the service of the island of Antigua, and later 
submitted to the Assembly the accounts relating to the hire and 
maintenance of these two vessels, the House definitely refused to 
meet the charge, on the grounds that the service had been under- 
taken without its consent.* 

So strong had this principle become by the opening of the eight- 
eenth century, that legislative sanction was acquired for it under the 
terms of several of the local tax Acts, chief among which was the 
Antiguan Poll Tax Act of 24th June, 1711, which ordained that all 
its proceeds were "to be applied to the public use of the island by 
order of the Governor, Council and Assembly . . . and not other- 
wise". 6 It is no less significant that none of the tax Acts passed prior 
to the year 171 1 7 ever contained specific mention of the uses to 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 149 

which their proceeds were to be put. Such appropriation clauses 
were entirely unnecessary, since the prevailing system of joint 
authorisation was itself a sufficient safeguard against any serious 
misapplication of the public funds. 



2. Preparing for Supply 

As we have already seen, the accounts which related to all properly 
sanctioned undertakings were allowed to accumulate 8 until their 
volume grew so large as to demand speedy settlement. Only when 
this stage was reached did the legislature raise fresh revenue 
sufficient to extinguish them, and perhaps leave a small surplus in 
the treasury with which to meet the charges of the immediate 
future. 9 All such "public accounts" were examined, adjusted, and 
passed for payment by the Assembly as well as the Council of each 
island. In Antigua the manner of doing this differed in detail though 
not in essence from that which prevailed in the sister islands. 

In the latter that is, St. Christopher, Nevis and Montserrat 
the accounts were first examined by a small joint committee of the 
legislature, which had the authority to judge the reasonableness of 
each claim, with power to reduce it or even reject it altogether if it 
thought fit. This committee then reported to both Houses the 
respective amounts which it found to be justly owing upon each 
account. The sum total of such accounts represented a complete 
estimate of the existing indebtedness. The committee's report thus 
served a double purpose. It indicated first the sum which should be 
allowed each creditor in respect of his claim, and second, the mini- 
mum revenue which would have to be raised in order to wipe off the 
existing debt. It was generally approved by each House without 
amendment, and the way thus prepared both for raising the new 
revenue and for paying the expectant creditors. 10 Sometimes an 
account of a specially urgent nature might receive immediate 
attention from the legislature, without having to await the periodical 
settlement. But such a claim had, like the rest, to pass the scrutiny of 
each House before it could be paid. 

In Antigua the public accounts were not subjected to quite the 
same delay as they were in the other islands. As each claim or batch 
of claims arrived, it was adjusted first in one House and then in the 
other, either body having power to diminish it or even reject it 
altogether if it appeared unreasonable. In the case of all satisfactory 
accounts, orders were issued immediately to authorise their payment 



150 Early West Indian Government 

from the public treasury. But the issue of such an order was no 
guarantee of immediate settlement; the recipients being forced to 
retain their warrants until such time as a fresh tax would be passed 
to provide for their satisfaction. When this volume of public 
creditors became too great to be longer ignored, the legislature 
generally did one of two things. Either it appointed a joint committee 
of public accounts to bring in an estimate of the total debt, or else 
it simply commanded the Treasurer to lay before it "an abstract of 
the country's debts". 11 In either case it provided itself with the 
appropriate material upon which to base fresh taxation. 



3. Procedure in Tax Legislation 

In the raising of new taxes the island Councils retained their right 
of participation for a much longer period than the House of Lords 
did in England. Right down to the second decade of the eighteenth 
century it was the constant practice of all islands to prepare tax bills 
in a joint committee of both Houses, though it was customary to 
read them first in the Assembly. Towards the close of Governor 
Hamilton's administration, however, the planters in both St 
Christopher and Antigua evinced a growing disposition to give up 
the practice of joint preparation. The Poll Tax Act of 1718 is the last 
in St Christopher known to have been so prepared, while an 
Antiguan Act of February 1719, drawn up solely in the Assembly, 
marks the beginning of a permanent change in the tax procedure of 
that colony. 1 * In Nevis the change followed soon afterwards. In 
1724 the Assembly ventured to prepare a new levy bill in a committee 
composed entirely of its own members. The measure having passed 
the House, was sent to the Council for approval. The latter at once 
protested against the innovation, demanding a return to the practice 
of past years. A dispute arising, both sides submitted their case to 
Governor Hart, who gave his opinion in favour of the Assembly. He 
informed the Councillors that they were in the wrong, because 
according to English precedent, the popular House possessed the 
sole power of originating taxation. 1 * On the other hand, the Council 
of Montserrat continued to enjoy for a much longer period its right 
to join with the Assembly in the preparation of money bills, the last 
Act to be so prepared being the Poll Tax of 1745. Thenceforward in 
that island also, every new tax was prepared by the Assembly alone, 
and only after having passed that House was it sent up for the 
Council's approval. 14 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 151 

In all islands except Montserrat the right of Councils to tax 
amendment did not long survive the repudiation of their claim to 
assist in its preparation. The Nevis Assembly, soon after its victory 
in 1724, assumed to itself the sole management of all money bills, 
allowing the Council a right of amendment only in matters of purely 
formal concern. No attempted alteration of the tax rates or other 
important sections of a bill was ever tolerated. The fashion soon 
spread to other parts. In 1728 the Antiguan House, resolving to 
model itself upon the practices of the House of Commons, denied to 
the Council any further amendment, a determination to which they 
adhered tenaciously throughout the remainder of the century. The 
Assembly of St. Christopher began to strain soon afterwards for the 
same exclusive power, with the result that by 1739 the local Council 
acknowledged its inability any longer to amend. 15 The Montserrat 
Council, on the other hand, continued to enjoy its amending power 
right down to the very close of our period of review, a Liquor Excise 
Act of 1772 being successfully amended without the slightest protest 
from the Assembly. 1 * 

It is important to notice that the local Assemblies from earliest 
times down to the close of the eighteenth century raised fresh 
revenues and continued old ones simply as a matter of course, with- 
out any previous request from the Executive. This marked a further 
particular in which island procedure differed radically from that of 
the Imperial Parliament. In England the management of finance was 
traditionally the concern of the Crown, and all proposals for fresh 
revenue emanated from the government of the day. The Commons 
merely used their discretion in yielding what was asked of them when 
it was asked of them. In the islands, on the other hand, the main- 
tenance of the public credit was thought to be as much the concern 
of the Assembly as it was that of the Executive. If public indebted- 
ness demanded a fresh tax, or the expiry of an existing law required 
the passage of a continuing Act, it seldom needed a reminder from 
the Governor and Council to effect the remedy. Instead the separate 
Assemblies, quite frequently of their own accord, took the initial 
steps to cope with the emergency. 17 

Such a custom occasionally produced most unexpected con- 
sequences. Cases are on record where an Assembly in deciding that 
the time was ripe for the raising of a fresh tax, thereby worked in 
direct opposition to the wishes of the Governor and Council. Some- 
times too, the Board, in debating the tax rates suggested by the 
lower House, considered these excessive, and so proposed a re- 
duction. For the government of the day to be found thus diminishing 



152 Early West Indian Government 

the amount of proffered taxation would certainly have sounded 
fanciful to an Englishman of the period ! A Montserrat Assembly in 
1718, after taking into consideration the urgent wants of the local 
clergy whose salaries dependent upon the island treasury had 
long been unpaid, proposed to the Council that a levy be speedily 
raised to repair their circumstances. The Board, on the score of 
island poverty, flatly refused to concur in such a step, whereupon 
the House, baulked in its good intentions, condemned the attitude 
of the other as "a great shame and a reflection upon the inhabitants 
of this . . . colony". 18 

At the close of the seventeenth century the Antiguan Assembly, 
entirely without any previous request from the Council, came for- 
ward with a suggestion that a fresh Poll Tax be raised, and called 
upon the Board "to concur with us in an order to the Treasurer to 
bring in an abstract of the country's debts, against such day as may 
be thought convenient, that we may be the better enabled to raise 
the said tax as usual and with the least burden to the inhabitants". 
The Board being agreeable, the Treasurer received his instructions 
accordingly. At their next meeting the representatives proceeded to 
examine the figures which he laid before them. Among themselves 
they determined the amount of revenue to be raised, and fixed the 
rate of the tax per head. This done, they reported their decisions for 
the confirmation of the Council, in order that a joint committee 
might be set up to prepare the necessary bill. After having perused 
the suggestions, the Board resolved that the proposed rates were too 
burdensome and would require reduction. This being intimated to 
the Assembly, they after further discussion agreed to the alteration. 
Only then was the joint committee set up and the bill prepared in 
accordance with their final desires. 10 Over thirty years later a 
similar situation arose in Montserrat, the Council seeking to reduce 
the rates of taxation which the Assembly had proposed. Upon this 
occasion however, the House refused to depart from its decisions, 
thereby forcing the Board to acquiesce in the higher rates in order to 
save the measure from falling to the ground. 10 

At no time during the seventeenth or eighteenth century did a 
Governor and Council 11 ever submit to an Assembly any estimates 
of the anticipated charges of the coming year. Every new tax was 
intended primarily to extinguish the volume of existing debts, rather 
than provide funds for the future, though some of the island As- 
semblies made more systematic provison for future needs than did 
others. In both St. Christopher and Montserrat, for example, the 
committees of public accounts towards the end of the eighteenth 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 153 

century made a practice, previous to the introduction of every new 
tax, of reporting not only the existing burden of debt, but also an 
estimate of the more fixed and ascertainable charges which would be 
sure to require settlement within the ensuing twelve months: 
Antigua, too, seems from quite early times to have made partial 
provision for future commitments. The Nevis House, on the other 
hand, seems to have been the most improvident in this respect, each 
new tax being passed almost exclusively for the purpose of ex- 
tinguishing the debts already in existence. 22 



4. Inspection of Accounts and Issue of Public Money, down to 1711 

Having now examined the main features which surrounded the 
raising of the revenue, let us focus our attention upon the question 
of expenditure and the handling of accounts. We have already seen 
how the Assemblies, either directly or by means of their re- 
presentation upon committees of public accounts, enjoyed with 
Council a co-equal share in the passing of all claims prior to payment. 
This popular participation in a function which should more properly 
have been reserved to the rightful Executive, was directly opposed to 
the wishes of the Crown. Onwards from 1686 the Instructions given 
to each governor commanded that all public moneys should be paid 
from out the Treasurer's hands only upon warrants signed by the 
Governor or Lieutenant Governor of each island, and issued with 
the consent of the Council. The Assembly was to be permitted a right 
merely "to view the accounts of money or value of money disposed 
of by virtue of the laws" made by it. 28 It was the obvious intention 
of the Crown that the representatives should possess the right to 
appropriate the revenues to such uses as they desired; that each 
Governor and Council should possess a free power to devote these 
revenues to the purposes so allowed; and that each Assembly should 
have a right to review the vouchers arising from such expenditure 
in order to see that its wishes concerning the application of the 
money had been strictly respected. 

The royal wishes were however almost completely disregarded. It 
is to be feared that many of the early governors, preferring the 
retention of peace to a quarrel on behalf of the prerogative, openly 
connived at a continuance of joint adjustment. 24 Indeed it was not 
until 1718 that the Assembly's right to share in the adjustment of 
public accounts was first challenged. In that year, however, the 
Council of St. Christopher under the leadership of Lieutenant 



154 Early West Indian Government 

General Mathew sought to take independent cognizance of the 
accounts in the manner which the royal Instruction intended. The 
local House at once complained of the innovation to Governor 
Hamilton, who, himself blind to the incompatibility which existed 
between the prevailing usage and the spirit of his Instructions, gave 
his judgment in favour of the Assembly, and enjoined the Council 
to return to the custom of the past. 25 

The right of Assemblies to join in the adjustment of accounts was 
in itself a most important one, but it was rendered doubly formidable 
by the fact that they enjoyed a similar right to share in the actual 
issue of all money from the public treasury. They possessed therefore 
the means of ensuring that no money was ever paid to a public 
creditor in excess of that which they had agreed to allow him. By an 
early Tax Act of 1668 the Antiguan Assembly had secured legal 
sanction for its claim that the counter-signature of one of its 
members in practice the Speaker should be essential to the 
validity of every treasury warrant. By 1682 we know that the same 
usage, with Stapleton's approval, was in existence in Nevis, although 
soon afterwards the same governor twice refused a similar demand 
put forward on behalf of the Speaker of St Christopher. 16 The fact 
that he was quite agreeable to the existence of the practice in the 
two former islands, indicates that his rejection of the plea from St. 
Christopher was based upon considerations of policy rather than 
principle. How much longer the Assembly of that island had to wait 
before it was allowed this privilege is a matter of pure conjecture. 
It probably won it before the close of the seventeenth century, for 
we know it was actively enjoying it early in the eighteenth. By a 1704 
Act for the Treasurer's receiving and paying the Public Stock it was 
ordained that all orders on the Treasurer, in order to be valid, must 
be "signed by the Chief Governor or the Lieutenant Governor, 
two of the Council, with the Speaker and two more of the As- 
sembly". 27 The early eighteenth century records of Montserrat 
reveal the fact that there, too, the countersignature of Assembly 
members was necessary to the validity of any warrant for the pay- 
ment of money from the Treasurer's hands. 18 

Such a popular jurisdiction over the issue of public money was 
also in manifest opposition to the royal Instructions. Nevertheless it 
continued unabated year after year until by an unfortunate mischance 
it became revealed to the Board of Trade. Towards the close of 1710 
a fierce controversy arose in St. Christopher over the right of the 
Assembly to control not only taxation but the Treasurer as well. Its 
bitterness attracted the attention of the Board of Trade in England, 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 1 55 

who began an immediate examination of the points at issue. Only 
as a result of this did their attention become drawn to the objection- 
able nature of the Treasury Act of 1704, which was in consequence 
promptly disallowed early in 171 1. 29 



5. Inspection of Accounts and Issue of Public Money, after 1711 

The joint issue of public money, though abolished in St. 
Christopher, continued unaltered in the three sister islands until 
1718, when Governor Hamilton, after receiving orders from the 
Board of Trade to pay more strict obedience to his Instructions, was 
compelled to oppose any further retention of the custom in the 
remaining portions of his government. 

(i) ANTIGUA, 1718-83. 

Calling the Antiguan representatives before him Hamilton ex- 
plained to them the full import of the Instructions he had just re- 
ceived. After pointing out that he had no option but to obey, he 
explained that he would no longer be able to acquiesce in their 
Speaker's countersignature upon treasury warrants. At the same 
time he expressed his complete willingness to continue allowing them 
their old-established authority in the adjustment of all accounts.The 
House in vain strove to induce him to waive obedience to his new 
orders until a final appeal might be made to the Board of Trade. He 
refused, and straightway forbade the Speaker's countersignature to 
any further warrants. But while he so rigidly insisted upon an 
immediate compliance with his new commands, he did not thereby 
refuse the House the appeal which it desired to make to the imperial 
authorities. Indeed, he readily agreed to the passage of a new 
Excise Act, framed in such a manner as to make mention of the 
Assembly's claim. This was despatched to England under a suspend- 
ing clause, and came in due course before the Board of Trade. There 
it served admirably the purpose for which it was designed. It pro- 
voked the Board to make a final ruling upon the whole question of 
Assembly participation in the issue of public money. The Board 
determined to oppose it at all costs, and the Act was promptly 
disallowed, thereby spelling what seemed final defeat to the popular 
claims. 

But in the meantime the House had thought of a compromise, by 
which they designed to yield literal obedience to the royal Instruction, 
but to defeat its real intent. For the future all accounts should be 



156 Early West Indian Government 

submitted as before to the Assembly as well as the Council for ad- 
justment. The former, having determined how much should be 
allowed upon each one, was thereupon to despatch a formal address 
to the latter containing an intimation of this amount. This done, an 
order was to issue from the Governor or Lieutenant Governor to the 
Treasurer authorising payment of the sum in question. The 
representatives thus preserved for themselves all the advantages of 
the original system while they paid a seeming deference to the new. 
They were still to share in the adjustment, though the resultant 
accounts were to be signed in a manner in strict literal accord with 
the royal commands. This scheme was embodied in a fresh Tax Bill 
which, having passed both Houses, secured Hamilton's assent, and 
came into immediate operation in the opening months of 1719 a 
copy of it being sent home for the royal approval. 30 It was never 
disallowed, 31 with the result that subsequent measures followed 
almost identically the same form, thereby establishing permanently 
the procedure which it began. The Assembly, especially after it 
repudiated in 1728 the Council's right of tax amendment, became the 
sole manager of all supply. It enjoyed with Council a joint decision 
concerning all works and services which were undertaken at the 
public expense; it joined with the Board in the adjustment of all the 
relevant accounts; and its "address" certifying the amount to be 
allowed on each claim, was an indispensable condition to the making 
of all payments. To all effective purposes therefore it still participated 
in the right of issue. 

Only once in future years was the propriety of this system ever 
challenged. In 1751 Acting-Governor Fleming, fully alive to the 
completeness with which the Council's discretionary power over 
finance had been eclipsed, and resentful of the utter powerlessness 
which had resulted, sought by the rejection of a pending tax bill to 
compel the House to forego its long-established jurisdiction over the 
public accounts. He strove by doing so to restore to the Council a 
free spending power subject only to the appropriation conditions of 
each Tax Act, and was warmly supported by the Board of Trade in 
his endeavours. Deadlock ensued, the representatives preferring 
rather to bankrupt their treasury than raise new revenue at such cost 
to their privileges. For two years this continued, neither side being 
willing to capitulate. Finally in 1753 a new governor arrived, in the 
person of George Thomas, formerly Deputy Governor of Penn- 
sylvania. Before despatching Thomas to the Leeward Islands the 
Board of Trade had pointed out to him the time-honoured Instruction 
which defined the procedure to be followed in issuing all public 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 1 57 

moneys, and enjoined him "to use his utmost endeavours to induce 
the Assembly to comply with it". 32 He promised faithfully to do so, 
but on his arrival found himself totally unable to resist the public 
clamour. A bankrupt treasury had brought all business to a stand- 
still, yet not a penny would the Assembly yield until its claims were 
recognised. In desperation the Governor was forced to surrender 
to purchase supplies at the expense of his own independence and 
that of his lieutenants. The Board of Trade, upon hearing of his 
action, expressed their sorrow that the exigencies of his position had 
made such a step necessary. They hoped that there would still be 
time on some future occasion to reopen the matter and compel the 
Assembly to surrender their ill-gotten gains. But that time was never 
again to arise. Thomas indeed would have been the very last man to 
risk popular hostility for so forlorn a cause. The system of joint 
adjustment had, in fact, been too long established to be so easily 
overturned. It continued for the future in exactly the same manner as 
it had existed in the past, the House retaining that co-equality with 
the Council which has already been described. 

(ii) ST. CHRISTOPHER, 1711-83. 

The island that suffered most from the changes of the early 
eighteenth century was St. Christopher. The disallowance of its 
Treasury Act of 1704 had dealt a severe blow to the representatives, 
but they consoled themselves that, though they had lost their right 
to share in the issue of public money, they still retained their right 
to join in the adjustment of the public accounts before payment. But 
in 1718 the Council sought to debar them from even that function. 
They protested at once to Governor Hamilton who, blind to the in- 
compatibility that existed between the prevailing custom and the spirit 
of the royal Instructions, gave his verdict in favour of the Assembly 
and directed the Council to continue the practice of joint adjustment. 

Unfortunately for the representatives, however, the relief which 
Hamilton so cheerfully gave them was destined to be of short 
duration. At the close of 1721 a new Governor, John Hart, arrived 
within the islands. The new appointee had already gained consider- 
able experience in colonial administration from his previous 
governorship of Maryland. Early in the new year he became involved 
in a bitter dispute with his Antiguan Council over a matter connected 
with his salary, and as a result left that island in anger and established 
his seat of government temporarily in St. Christopher. The new 
Governor had quite clear views regarding the powers which ought 
rightfully to belong to each Assembly, in contrast to those which 



158 Early West Indian Government 

should fall properly to the discretion of the local Executives. He was 
prepared to allow to the popular houses all the privileges enjoyed 
by the Commons in England, but was equally determined to resist 
their claims to anything more. Both he and his immediate successor, 
Lord Londonderry, remind us very much in this respect of Sir 
Richard Dutton, the erstwhile Governor of Barbados. 

During his residence in St Christopher, Hart succeeded in 
persuading the local Assembly to abandon the privileges which it had 
previously enjoyed in excess of those possessed by the English 
House. Though the sessional papers of the period are curiously 
silent upon the actual discussions and arguments which accompanied 
the change, it is clear that from an early stage in his administration 
the Assembly surrendered its previous right to share in the adjust- 
ment of public accounts." The only safeguard it retained against 
misapplication of the public funds lay in its right to appropriate 
each tax to its various uses, and to examine into the subsequent 
records of how the moneys had been spent. 14 The Council now 
possessed a legally free hand to spend money to all purposes which 
had been sanctioned by the tax Acts, to adjust the resultant accounts, 
and to issue money in payment. The financial administration was 
thus brought to the very level which the imperial authorities had 
always desired. 

The joint committee of public accounts, being deprived of its 
former ability to adjust and report upon the unsettled claims of 
public creditors, now lost all significance and dwindled into rapid 
obsolescence. The legislature continued its old habit of incurring 
expenditure considerably in excess of revenue provisions, upon the 
authority of joint resolution alone, and here again it was the Council 
and not the committee which possessed the power of adjusting the 
resultant accounts. Because of this practice of spending in advance 
of supply, there was always in existence a more or less large body of 
debts for which no revenue provision had up to the time been made. 
These, having been adjusted by the Council, always constituted the 
first charge upon every new tax, and had always to be taken into 
consideration before this was raised. The representatives, contem- 
plating fresh supply, would pray the Governor "to direct that all the 
public accounts . . . may be laid before this House" for examination, 
that they might inform themselves of the existing indebtedness. It 
also became customary for the Governor and Council to provide the 
House with an estimate of the anticipated charges of the ensuing 
year, in order that the forthcoming tax might raise a sufficient 
surplus to meet these as well. 85 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 1 59 

The freedom thus acquired by the Council during this decade was 
probably abused, many accounts being passed quite readily for pay- 
ment which in the earlier days of joint committee jurisdiction would 
have been gravely questioned and perhaps reduced. The Board was 
doubtless less critical in its examination of the accounts than a joint 
committee would have been. The Assembly naturally looked with 
some longing, therefore, upon the great heap of claims which, at the 
introduction of every new tax, were known to be awaiting settle- 
ment and still unpaid. If only they could regain their old jurisdiction 
over these, what a saving could be effected for the public treasury! 

At last in 1733 the first step was taken towards this end. Just be- 
fore the introduction of the Poll Tax Bill of that year the House 
pressed for, and gained, the appointment of a small joint committee 
to adjust all accounts which were awaiting satisfaction. The measure 
subsequently passed made provision for the payment only of those 
claims which this committee had allowed. 36 In the following year the 
Assembly went yet a step further, by presuming to set up a committee 
solely of its own members to examine the accounts. The Council at 
once opposed the innovation, thereby creating such a deadlock that 
all tax legislation became completely suspended, the Assembly ex- 
piring before any agreement could be reached. The dispute dragged 
on for a further four years, the House dropping its claim to sole 
adjustment, but persisting in its demand for a share in that function. 
The Council on the other hand, now fully alive to its danger, denied 
the representatives any jurisdiction at all in the matter. However, in 
1738 and again 1739, a stubborn refusal on the part of the latter to 
raise any further revenue until their claims were recognised, forced 
the Board grudgingly to capitulate, it agreeing to a joint committee 
of adjustment after the fashion of 1733. 87 Eighteen months later the 
Assembly, wishing to renew supplies, moved once again for the 
establishment of a joint committee to adjust the public accounts. The 
Council, now under the vigorous leadership of Lieutenant General 
Gilbert Fleming, at once opposed any such step. The whole matter 
blazed up anew, complete deadlock ensuing for a period of over 
twelve months. The Board, though quite willing to send down the 
most detailed statements of the existing debts, yet steadfastly refused 
to allow the representatives any right to adjust the actual claims. At 
length the House, placing the financial well-being of the island before 
its own privileges, temporarily surrendered by consenting to raise a 
fresh tax upon the Council's terms. 88 

Despite this temporary set-back the representatives were deter- 
mined to leave no stone unturned to gain the victory. In 1744 the 



160 Early West Indian Government 

exigencies of the French War compelled Governor Mathew to ask 
unusually heavy supplies from them, and in order to get them to 
grant these, he was forced to compromise over the question of the 
accounts. It was agreed that \hcfixed charges of the administration 
should lie wholly within the Council's control in other words, the 
accounts that related to the permanent military and civil establish- 
ments were still to be adjusted and paid at the sole discretion of the 
Board but all accounts relating to the more variable items of 
expenditure were to be subject to adjustment by the Assembly as 
well as the Council, and paid only by mutual consent. 89 Such a step 
was the beginning of the end : it was impossible for long to continue 
the division thus attempted, and before many months had elapsed, 
it was completely abandoned in favour of joint adjustment of all 
accounts be their nature or field of origin what it may. 40 

In 1750 Governor Mathew went home on furlough, leaving 
Lieutenant General Fleming in command during his absence. 
Fleming had always been resentful of Mathew's capitulation to the 
popular clamour and he at once engaged in a final attempt to restore 
the effective powers of each Council over finance. His attitude had 
not changed one jot throughout the preceding decade he still 
regarded any popular jurisdiction in the adjustment of accounts as 
an unconstitutional and unwarrantable encroachment upon the 
prerogative. In Antigua, in St. Christopher, in Nevis, and in 
Montscrrat he set himself to oppose any continuance of the practice. 

The Assembly of St. Christopher in December, 1750, passed a 
Tax Bill in which it strove to acquire legislative sanction for its newly 
won rights. The measure passed the Council but Fleming refused it 
his assent. At once the old antagonism was revived. The House 
resolutely refused any further supplies until its rights in the matter 
were indisputably recognised. The Lieutenant General was equally 
stubborn, and was fortified in his resolution by the enthusiastic 
support he received from the Board of Trade. The struggle continued 
for four years without a penny of fresh revenue being raised. But 
the arrival of Governor Thomas brought success to the popular 
advocates in St. Christopher in the same way as it did to those in 
Antigua. A fresh Act passed early in 1754 received the newcomer's 
reluctant assent. The legislature now adopted a device very similar 
to that practised in Antigua since 1719. It was resolved that all 
moneys raised by each new tax were "to remain in the hands of the 
Treasurer . . . until such time as orders shall issue to him for the pay- 
ment thereof by the Commander in Chief of the island for the time 
being, with the approbation of the Council and Assembly". 41 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 161 

It is noticeable that the representatives had begun the quarrel by 
claiming a right to adjust only the accounts which were outstanding 
and unpassed at the commencement of fresh tax legislation: they 
gained as a result of the dispute the far greater privilege of judging 
the merits of all accounts. In actual practice the mode of adjustment 
followed in St. Christopher was much the same as that followed in 
Antigua. The House, having received from the Council a batch of 
accounts requiring settlement, customarily submitted them to a 
small standing committee of itself which had been set up at the 
beginning of each session. This body reported its conclusions to the 
House which, if it confirmed them, simply addressed a com- 
munication to the Council stating that "this House has examined the 
public accounts sent down from your Board, and find the following 
sums to be due" 42 then followed a list of the amounts which had 
been the outcome of its decision. 

From 1754 onwards the legislature ceased to appropriate the tax 
proceeds by means of special clauses in the Act itself. 48 Under the 
changed financial procedure detailed appropriation terms were no 
longer necessary. Since a return had been made to the pre-1720 
method of passing accounts, a similar reversion was possible to the 
correspondingly early custom of authorising each separate work or 
service by a simple joint resolution of both Houses. Henceforth in 
St. Christopher, as in Antigua, every undertaking had to receive the 
approval of each House before it could be undertaken at the public 
expense: the accounts derived from it had to be adjusted by both 
Houses, and the certificate of the Assembly testifying to its approval 
became an indispensable condition to the issue of all money in pay- 
ment. 

(iii) NEVIS, 1711-83. 

The changing fortunes of St. Christopher and Antigua in the early 
eighteenth century were not without their effects upon the financial 
procedure of their two sister islands, Nevis and Montserrat 
especially upon that of the former. The royal disallowance of the 
St. Christopher Treasury Act caused almost as much unrest in her 
nearest neighbour as it did in St. Christopher itself. Although it is 
probable that the Nevis Speaker's countersignature of treasury 
warrants was not thereby affected, it is clear that the legislature of 
that island, fearing an extension of the royal prohibition to itself, 
took steps in advance to safeguard the application of its revenues. 
The annual Poll Tax Act for 1711, for the very first time in Nevis 
history, contained detailed clauses by which every portion of the 



Early West Indian Government 

revenue was distinctly allotted to some particular use. 44 Finally, as a 
result of the Antiguan dispute of 1718, the right of the Nevis 
Assembly to join with Council in the issue of public money was also 
denied. In November, 1718, Governor Hamilton issued to his Nevis 
subordinates explicit directions enjoining them to give a strict 
obedience to the royal Instruction on the point. 45 

The fact that the legislature had now begun to append specific 
appropriation terms to its tax measures gave the Executive a legal 
power to spend money freely upon the purposes indicated. This, if 
strictly carried out, would have excluded the joint committee of 
public accounts from practically all useful jurisdiction. But in 
actual fact the usefulness of the committee was not so much impaired 
as might first have been expected. This was mainly because the 
Assembly, in raising each new tax, made only incomplete provision 
for the future charges that would arise during the coming year. In 
consequence the legislature as in St. Christopher had still to resort to 
joint resolution as a means of authorising the conduct of the many 
works and services for which the Tax Act had made no provision. 
Since there was no fund in existence for their payment, the accounts 
which related to these additional items of expenditure had perforce 
to await settlement until such time as the legislature chose to raise 
further revenue for their payment. Whenever a new tax was under 
contemplation it was customary to appoint a joint committee to 
examine and adjust this volume of accumulated claims, and report 
them to both Houses. 44 The sums allowed by the committee having 
been confirmed by each House, the way was clear for the introduction 
of the new bill. It is clear therefore that the Assembly by virtue of 
its representation upon the committee of public accounts and its 
later power to confirm or reject that body's returns still continued 
to share in the right of adjustment. Moreover, on account of its 
control over taxation, the House was placed in the further position of 
being able to ensure that provision was made in the new tax for the 
payment of no accounts save those which it had itself approved. 47 

The right of the representatives to share in the adjustment of out- 
standing accounts was not denied them till the year 1751. In that 
year, however, Acting-Governor Fleming who was already at grips 
with the Assemblies of St. Christopher and Antigua over the same 
issue took occasion to refuse his assent to a Nevis tax bill because 
it included a clause by which the representatives designed to secure 
legislative sanction for their long-established custom. He pointed out 
the constitutional error of their ways and demanded that the 
objectionable passages be deleted. This they readily consented to 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 163 

do. 48 But their action was a mere pretence, for they had no intention 
of yielding up so old and valued a privilege. They kept up the 
practice in secret until the arrival of Governor Thomas allowed them 
openly to bring forward their claim in order to secure for it the 
latter's hesitant consent. 

Henceforward a significant alteration was made in the form of 
passing all new money bills. The appropriation of specific sums to 
specific purposes was entirely discontinued. In its place they adopted 
the practice which had lately become established in Antigua and 
St. Christopher. They ordained that the entire revenue derived from 
each new tax should be retained within the Treasurer's hands, until 
paid out in accordance with warrants signed by the Commander-in- 
Chief of the island, and issued only with the approval of the As- 
sembly as well as the Council. In actual practice the joint approval of 
both branches of the legislature now became necessary for the 
authorisation of every public work or service, however small. The 
accounts relating to these, after having been adjusted by a joint 
committee, were confirmed for payment by the Assembly, who there- 
upon despatched to the Council a certificate of the amount to be 
allowed in respect of each claim. Upon receipt of this "address", 
The Lieutenant Governor was empowered to issue his warrant 
authorising the payment of such a sum from out the Treasurer's 
hands. 4 * 

(iv) MONTSERRAT, 1711-83. 

The only remaining island to be considered is M ontserrat. There 
we find that the financial procedure remained almost unchanged for 
the whole period of our review. The methods already described as 
belonging to the late seventeenth century, remained in almost con- 
stant operation throughout the whole of the eighteenth. The 
happenings which took place in the larger islands left no mark upon 
the practices which prevailed in this smaller and more isolated one. 
Probably it was its very isolation which preserved it so free from 
change. 

The practices of the late seventeenth century were so well suited 
to their circumstances that the Montserrat planters, unlike their 
neighbours, never even experimented with other forms. Governors 
gave them so little attention that their methods remained almost a 
closed book to the world outside. Interference from without was 
almost unknown. They were thus able to pursue the even tenor of 
their ways, free from the changes of political fortune from which 
their neighbours suffered. Throughout the whole of the century the 



164 Early West Indian Government 

public works and services continued to be authorised by mere joint 
resolutions of both Houses. The accounts resulting from these 
continued likewise to be jointly adjusted, either separately in each 
House, or as was more common periodically by joint committee 
subject to the confirmation of each House. 50 

For a long time the Assembly was content to allow its jurisdiction 
in this respect to rest solely upon the foundation of past usage, but 
in 1727 it ventured to place it upon a more secure footing. The Poll 
Tax Act of that year made specific mention of joint adjustment "by 
the Governor, Council and Assembly", thereby giving a definite 
legal sanction to the practice. The same device was employed again 
in the Tax Act of 1739 which devoted a portion of its proceeds to 
"the payment of ... the public debts that have been settled by the 
Council and Assembly, or by a committee appointed by them". 51 
Indeed it was not until the acting-governorship of Gilbert Fleming 
that the Assembly's privilege was ever challenged, but the efforts 
which he made to restore the prestige of the Councils within the 
neighbouring islands were extended even to this one. He refused his 
assent to a Montserrat tax bill because of the way in which it sought 
to legalise the jurisdiction of the Assembly over accounts. By 
pointing out the manner in which it infringed the prerogative, he 
persuaded the legislature to delete all the offending passages. 52 But 
though these planters, like those of Nevis, formally acquiesced in his 
demand they nevertheless resolved to continue the practice in 
secret. To refrain from making objectionable mention of it was one 
thing: to forswear its exercise was quite another! Upon the arrival 
of Governor Thomas, they again inserted their claim within a tax 
bill sent up for his approval. Again objection was made to it, and 
again they deferred to the Governor's wishes by refraining from 
making legislative mention of their practice, though they continued 
to employ it just the same. 53 Not until the mid-seventies did they 
take any further trouble to demand legal sanction for it. By then, 
of course, it had already been conceded in all the other islands, and 
the Montserrat Assembly was allowed it without further delay. 54 

The public accounts having been adjusted in the manner described, 
orders for payment out of the treasury called "adjustments"- 
were issued under the authority of the Council and the Assembly 
combined. Unlike the Assemblies of all the other islands, the 
Montserrat House managed throughout the entire eighteenth 
century 55 to preserve its right to join with the Council in making 
these actual payments. Despite the fact that Governor Hamilton 
twice 56 directed the Council's attention to the irregularity of the 



Financial Administration in the Leeward Islands 165 

practice, the latter seem successfully to have disregarded his behests. 
Governors gave so little attention to the island that the Council 
were given every opportunity of evading their duty. Early in the 
century it would seem that each "adjustment" had to bear the 
signatures of all the Assemblymen present in the House when it was 
issued. Later, however, the countersignature of the Speaker was 
held sufficient to attest the Assembly's approval of the order. In the 
strictest sense, therefore, the participation of the Montserrat House 
in the payment of all public moneys was more direct than that 
enjoyed by any of the neighbouring Assemblies. But, practically 
speaking, they stood all upon the same effective basis the certified 
approval of each House being an indispensable condition to the issue 
of all money in all islands. 



6. Conclusion 

Only one thing remains now to be remarked. It followed as a 
corollary that each Assembly, if given a share in the adjustment of 
all public accounts, must also be given a right to join in the making 
of the contracts from which they sprang. How otherwise could they 
judge equitably the claims of the contractors concerned? Lieutenant 
General Fleming, when opposing the claims of the St. Christopher 
Assembly in 1741, clearly foresaw this inevitable result." Your 
House is assuming ... a power", he said, "of dictating who shall and 
who shall not be paid, a province you are incapable of executing 
with justice . . . till you have arrived at the power of employing and 
agreeing with the persons for the several services from whence their 
demands will arise that is, without seizing the entire admini- 
stration." 57 The degree to which Fleming was right in his analysis 
will best be indicated in the following chapter. 



Chapter X 
PUBLIC WORKS IN THE LEEWARD ISLANDS 



1. Introduction 

During the early years of the Restoration each Leeward Island 
Assembly held its sittings with the Council, 1 thereby constituting 
a joint body for the discussion of current problems. As the Councils 
made no division of their business into legislative and executive 
sections, it followed that the representatives were sometimes present 
when matters of an essentially executive nature were under consider- 
ation, and were permitted to vote along with the Councillors them- 
selves in the making of administrative decisions. Orders and directions 
were then issued under the joint authority of both Houses. 1 In after 
years, when each House had commenced to meet separately, the 
same temper continued, matters of executive interest being regarded 
as the close concern of the Assembly as well as the Council. The 
conspicuous absence of all traditional usages and dignities from the 
relationships which prevailed between the two, made it possible for 
them to co-operate very closely in the solution of their difficulties. 

The representatives, intimately interested in the financing of all 
public undertaings, felt no less closely interested in the efficiency 
with which these were carried out. We have already remarked upon 
the way in which they were able to initiate proposals for ad- 
ministrative works, and were taken into the Council's close con- 
fidence in the planning of all new enterprises. A great deal of the 
superintendence given to public undertakings in such small islands, 
being necessarily dependent upon the honorary services of public 
spirited persons, was apt to make heavy inroads upon their time. 
When therefore the representatives evinced a willingness to under- 
take a share of these obligations, the Council were nothing loth to 
allow it to them, as in so doing they relieved themselves of a portion 
of their burden. 

Both Board members and Assemblymen were planters living close 
together within narrow shores, intimately interested in the problems 
of each other, and of the community as a whole. Any explanation 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 167 

of their institutional relationships must be found more in the intimacy 
of that social condition than in any theoretical deductions from 
contemporary English usages; it must be found in a study of things 
as they were, rather than of things as constitutional lawyers would 
have them be. Comparatively early in the history of every island the 
representatives came to be allowed an occasional share in the conduct 
of administrative concerns. A certain service needing to be undertaken, 
it became not uncommon for a few of the Assembly to be joined 
with a few from the Council, in order to examine in detail the 
requirements of the occasion, to estimate the probable cost, to 
suggest a plan of action and perhaps even to manage and control the 
actual performance of the task. It is extremely probable that as early 
as 1673 a joint committee of the Montserrat legislature was given 
power to contract for, and supervise the construction of, the local 
court-house and gaol. Three years later the legislature of St. 
Christopher, being in urgent need of timber for making carriages for 
the guns, determined to send some sawyers to cut wood in the 
neighbouring island of Tortola. A joint committee comprising the 
Governor, one Councillor and three Assemblymen was appointed to 
draw up an agreement with the sawyers, and to hire a vessel suitable 
for their voyage. In early Antigua the same joint committee device 
was not unknown; while in Nevis, as early as 1693, a committee 
comprising two from each House was set up to purchase some land 
for the building of a stockade, which was required for the pro- 
tection of women and children in time of danger. This body was also 
empowered to hire overseers to supervise a negro labour gang which 
it was intended to employ upon the work, and was to report its pro- 
ceedings at the next meeting of the legislature. 3 

This popular participation in the conduct of occasional ad- 
ministrative tasks was quite a spontaneous thing, born of the mutual 
good-will prevailing between the Council and Assembly, and not the 
result of any financial influence which the latter was able to wield. 
Indeed there is no evidence that the early Assemblies ever made use 
of their financial powers to extort administrative privileges of this 
nature. But if financial influence played no part in the origin of the 
system, it did play an important part in its perpetuation. It is surely 
no coincidence that the eighteenth century which witnessed an 
increase in the Assembly's control over the finances, witnessed a 
corresponding increase in their encroachment within the field of public 
works. The joint committees of the late seventeenth century were 
neithersonumerousnorso independent of the Governor and Council as 
were those of a century later. Each Governor was still allowed to retain 



168 Early West Indian Government 

his correct executive prerogatives, and even where a joint committee 
of management was interposed between him and the work in hand, 
it was still looked upon as a body subordinate to him, and subject to 
his directions. 4 But as the succeeding century advanced, the 
frequency of joint committee enterprise increased, and with it the 
degree of independence which came to be allowed such bodies. In 
matters like the repair of fortifications, the hiring of sloops, the 
construction and repair of public buildings, the fitting out of ex- 
peditions against the French, or the performance of any other 
service at the public expense, the joint committee became regarded 
as the most satisfactory medium of control. 



2. Fortifications and Other Means of Defence 

The management of fortifications should never have been with- 
drawn from the control of the Governors, of whose prerogatives it 
formed a most essential part. Nevertheless, the records of the 
eighteenth century bear witness to a continuous encroachment upon 
that field. In Nevis in August, 1705, the Assembly, after having had 
its attention drawn to the disrepair of the forts, moved for the ap- 
pointment of a joint committee "to make an agreement with the 
ablest masons of this island" for the conduct of repairs. This body 
later reported to both Houses that it had engaged seven masons at 
7/6 per day to begin work on 3rd September following. 5 Eighteen 
months later the defences within the neighbouring island of St. 
Christopher were found to be in need of urgent improvement. The 
local legislature agreed that a quarter part of all the negroes upon the 
island be conscripted immediately for a fortnight's work upon them. 
This labour force was placed under the discretionary control of a 
joint committee, to be "employed upon the most urgent occasions 
during that time". 8 Only a little while afterwards, the Antiguan 
legislature, in turning its attention to questions of defence, agreed 
that the security of the island demanded the erection of a new plat- 
form for the guns at Cripplegate. A joint committee composed of 
two members from each House was set up at the Assembly's 
suggestion to agree with a contractor to build it. The appointment of 
such a body at once took from the Governor and Council any 
authority which they, of their own right, might have otherwise 
possessed in the matter. The Assembly members of the committee 
proved extremely neglectful in their attendance; no contract was 
made, and the work seemed destined to be indefinitely delayed. 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 169 

Governor Parke in desperation attempted to order its erection upon 
his own authority, but could find no contractors willing to under- 
take it upon such terms. At last three months after the matter had 
been first suggested the Council addressed a further note to the 
Assembly reminding them of their neglect, and recommending 
either that the old committee speed up its business or that a fresh 
body be appointed in its stead. 7 We are not told what course they 
adopted, nor is it essential to the significance of our story that we 
should know. 

As the eighteenth century advanced fortifications activity began 
to grow more and more independent of the Governor's control. In 
Montserrat a committee, drawn from the Council, the Assembly and 
the Field Officers, was created in 1735 to build a new magazine and 
repair the existing defences. This body was given complete authority 
to hire tradesmen, to conscript a certain body of slaves for the heavy 
work, to press horses and carts into the service, and generally to 
conduct the whole enterprise. The Act which set on foot the whole of 
this machinery showed a conspicuous disregard for the consti- 
tutional right which the Governor and Council ought to have pos- 
sessed to control such a scheme. In Nevis at the same time similar 
methods were in operation. There we find a joint committee estab- 
lished by mutual agreement between the two Houses in 1735 to 
select a site for a new stockade. This body having reported its choice 
of Saddle Hill, a further joint committee was set up to borrow a sum 
of 500 for the purchase and survey of the land. It being intended to 
employ a band of slaves upon the work, the same committee was 
empowered to engage overseers, and to superintend the progress of 
construction. 8 Four years later the President and Council recom- 
mended to the Assembly that Saddle Hill be re-fortified. At first the 
latter refused to agree, but a new House which was convened soon 
afterwards exhibited a more compliant temper. Upon the motion of 
this body, a joint committee was appointed to meet with contractors 
in order to prepare an estimate of the cost which would attach to the 
undertaking. Its report having been approved, the legislature set up a 
further committee to conscript a body of negroes and to engage 
overseers. Soon afterwards a third committee was established "to 
give proper directions" to the overseers for the conduct of the work. 
This system of management continued spasmodically upon Saddle 
Hill for another six years ; new committees being set up or old ones 
revived whenever fresh alterations needed to be made. 9 

A situation which arose in 1742 in connection with the work upon 
Saddle Hill, well illustrates the degree to which joint committee 

r2 



170 Early West Indian Government 

management, coupled with the popular control of finance, increased 
the Assembly's control over the forts. On 25th March of that year 
the lower House, desiring that work upon the Hill be temporarily 
suspended, requested Council's concurrence that the "President 
would be pleased immediately to issue out an order that all work . . . 
do from henceforth cease". The Board however refused, and 
attempted to carry on the work alone, in manifest opposition to the 
House, whose members doubtless withdrew at once from the com- 
mittee of management. When the people at large came to hear of the 
dispute they gave their immediate support to the Assembly, by 
refusing to send any further negroes to the task. The lack of 
labourers brought the work quickly to a standstill. Moreover, when 
a few weeks later it became necessary to pay the various accounts 
which had accrued to the undertaking, the representatives stead- 
fastly refused to consent to the payment of any claim which related to 
work done after the date upon which they had requested operations 
to cease. 10 

In St. Christopher for twenty years after the arrival of Governor 
John Hart (1721), joint committee control of fortifications, though 
not completely forsaken, became nevertheless seriously curtailed. 11 
It appears that the change, due in the first instance to Hart's in- 
sistence, was afterwards prolonged by the efficient zeal of William 
Mathew formerly Lieutenant General of the group who began in 
1733 his long governorship. 1 * Finding local procedure to be so free 
from the objectionable features prevalent in the neighbouring 
islands, Mathew strove to keep it so. For some years he succeeded 
and kept within his own hands the complete management of 
defensive works. Early in 1740, however, the representatives in 
passing an Act for continuing the work of the fortifications, reverted 
to joint committee control by dividing the island into two divisions, 
within each of which they set up a body of commissioners for the 
superintendence of the defences. To each committee was entrusted 
the duty of building guard houses, with power to direct where and 
how these should be erected, to hire workmen, and "to purchase 
such materials" as it should think necessary. Mathew, though he 
passed it, viewed the Act with displeasure. When later he discovered 
that the legislature was persisting in this form of management, he 
openly protested against it as an invasion of his authority. "His 
Majesty", he wrote, "had reserved to myself as chief Governor with 
the advice of Council the fortifying any part of my government, yet 
nevertheless I have hitherto delegated that power by passing bills 
that empower the commanding officer on the island in my absence to 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 171 

execute what his Majesty requires of myself only. This I find has not 
answered my intentions for the good of the island, but has been much 
abused . . . Therefore I desire you recommend from me to the 
Council that for the future all laws made . . . for fortifying the island 
are to be executed by my own directions only with the advice of his 
Majesty's Council, or I shall not assent to them." 18 

But despite his protests he was compelled to acquiesce in the 
system, for the Assembly would provide for the defence upon no 
other terms. On 25th February, 1742, a further Fortifications Act 
was passed to prolong the existence of the commissioners, who were 
empowered not only "to direct" the location and manner of building 
each guard house, but also to manage the whole work of construction 
"in what manner they think convenient". 14 The Governor was furious, 
but the exigencies of the moment forced him to consent to it. That 
he was fully awake to the flagrant irregularity of the whole pre- 
ceeding is clearly shown from a letter which he addressed to Lieu- 
tenant General Fleming, to whom he remarked, "I always was 
willing to satisfy the Assemblies how monies given by them were 
disposed of, and have invited several of them to view the works with 
me, but I never made engineers of them. I have warned you long 
since 'tis not his Majesty's intentions, nor did I ever hear of a 
committee of the House of Commons directing the fortifications of 
the Tower or Portsmouth or any other. You sacrifice the King's 
authority daily." 16 

Finally, in the island of Antigua the Assembly had begun to en- 
croach upon the Executive so much, that in 1734 a very compre- 
hensive scheme for repairing the fortifications upon Monks' Hill 
was carried into effect by two committees drawn solely from the 
lower House. 18 But such a procedure, though significant, was never- 
theless distinctly unusual, and later years witnessed a return to the 
older and more satisfactory system of joint control. An Act passed 
early in 1740 "for enlarging the fortifications of James Fort and 
building a new magazine within the same" left the complete direction 
of the whole work to a joint committee; while in the following year 
a similar procedure was employed for the erection of some new 
barracks within the island. 17 

By the mid-century, therefore, the principle of joint control over 
fortifications had become firmly established in all the islands. Future 
years served only to consolidate the practice. Early in the second 
half of the century it became habitual in the three largest islands 18 to 
make constant provision at the opening of every new session for 
the appointment of one or more standing joint committees of 



172 Early West Indian Government 

fortifications, each of which was made responsible for the efficient 
maintenance of some specified portion of the local defences. Each was 
required to examine periodically the needs of the fortifications en- 
trusted to its care, and to report these to the legislature. The latter 
having agreed to the necessity of making improvements, the com- 
mittees were generally charged with the duty of effecting them. These 
bodies, executive as well as advisory in character, were considered 
to be regularly constitutional. Each came to be regarded as the 
authority properly responsible for the efficient maintenance of its 
own "department" that of fortifications and defence. All re- 
quisitions sent in by fort captains for fresh supplies of stores had to 
pass through its hands. It alone could sanction expenditure upon 
works subject to its care, the Assemblies refusing to allow payment 
for charges irregularly incurred without such sanction. The 
Governors authority was reduced to a mere power of recom- 
mendation and advice, which the committees could accept or reject, 
as they felt disposed. 1 * 

The tenacity with which the Assemblies of this late period clung 
to their privileges in this matter is well illustrated by a situation which 
arose in Antigua early in 1782. Report having just arrived of the 
French capture of St. Christopher, the Council and Assembly were 
speedily convened in order that steps might be taken towards 
strengthening their own defences. The Assembly, besides suggesting 
that martial law be proclaimed, recommended that a joint com- 
mittee be set up "to act with*' the President, with full power to 
make all contracts conducive to the defence of the island. The 
Council, however, looked with disfavour upon this scheme. They 
considered that in a time of such stress the House ought to forego 
its traditional privilege, and adopt a more summary method of 
procedure. The Councillors hoped that they themselves would be 
allowed complete discretionary jurisdiction to organise the island as 
they pleased. They whole-heartedly concurred in the need for 
martial law, and reminded the Assembly that such a proclamation 
would suspend the ordinary legislative processes, upon which all 
members of the lower House would be expected to repair to their 
posts within the militia. The representatives at once dissented from 
this view. "The doctrine of an absolute and necessary cessation to 
all legislative authority at all times during the existence of martial 
law," they retorted, "this Assembly does not assent to ... If there- 
fore, your Board continues to think that martial law must divest the 
legislative bodies of all authority, we do unanimously dissent from 
the proposal of enforcing it.** Since the proclamation of martial law 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 173 

depended upon the consent of the Assembly, 20 which in turn was 
made conditional upon the retention of joint committee control, the 
Council to procure the former was forced to acquiesce in the latter. 
A body of commissioners comprising four Councillors and seven 
Assemblymen was established to join with the President in fortifying 
the island against expected attack. The President with two Councillors 
and four Assemblymen constituted a quorum sufficient "for carrying 
any measures into execution". The officer commanding the regulars 
upon the island was to be consulted in any matter upon which his 
advice might prove useful, but final judgment lay always with the 
committee. Only in the event of an actual invasion was the latter to 
cease its operations, thereby permitting the Governor and Council 
to assume summary control. 21 

The joint control which prevailed in connection with fortifications 
was likewise applied to other fields of military endeavour, such as 
foreign expeditions, conducted at the public expense. As early as 
1692 the Antiguan legislature, in planning an expedition against the 
French in the neighbouring islands, set up a joint committee to take 
up all the necessary provisions. It is clear that this body was given a 
certain measure of discretionary freedom in its acts, because it was 
allowed to issue orders direct upon the Treasurer for the payment of 
those from whom supplies had been obtained. After Utrecht, no 
further expeditions of importance were despatched until the outbreak 
of the Seven Years' War. In 1759, however, and again in 1762, 
contingents of negroes were sent from the islands to assist in the 
reduction of the neighbouring French colonies. The records of the 
forces sent against Martinique in the latter year show clearly the 
degree to which joint committees assumed control of their enlistment 
and despatch. Although details varied from island to island, the 
general procedure was the same. Within each island a committee 
recruited the slaves compulsorily from the planters, hired the 
necessary sloops, and sent them forth. The committees acted quite 
independently of the Lieutenant Governors and Councils. The Act 
of St. Christopher which governed the conduct of operations within 
that island was particularly explicit in granting such freedom. The 
local commissioners were empowered "to pursue all measures . . . 
for raising the said . . . slaves and sending them away" as they should 
"think fit". They were to borrow money sufficient to meet their 
immediate ends, and were "to take all such steps" as they should 
"think necessary for the better transporting of said slaves to ... 
Martinique . . . without using any formality whatsoever". 22 



1 74 Early West Indian Government 



3. Public Buildings 

In the conduct of public works, too, the Assembly came to be 
allowed a degree of participation fully as great as that allowed it in 
connection with the fortifications. The late seventeenth century, as 
we have seen, provided many precedents for joint committee 
management in many fields of public enterprise. The Assemblies of 
the succeeding age were not slow to take advantage of these, with the 
result that the records of the eighteenth century contain numerous 
instances of committee control of a most varied character. It will 
suffice if we sample a few of these, in order to show the different 
fields into which joint control extended itself. 

Early in 1708 the Nevis legislature desired to make some alterations 
to a building which in former days had done duty for a gaol. The 
House recommended that a joint committee should be appointed 
"to agree with carpenters and masons to fit out a room of the former 
prison house**. After some demur the Council consented to this 
plan, which was apparently carried into effect.** Some years later 
the Antiguan Assembly, considering how inconvenient it was that 
its sittings should be held "in taverns and public houses**, moved for 
the creation of a joint committee "to consider of means and receive 
proposals** for building a Sessions House. The Council agreed to 
this, and appointed two of its members to join in the committee. 14 
In the absence of further evidence it is impossible to say whether or 
not this matter was ever proceeded with; but if it was, it is almost 
certain that the joint committee was entrusted with its management. 
In the early thirties the Montserrat authorities, anxious for the 
erection of a church in the parish of St. Anthony, passed an Act 
to provide for the work. By the terms of this measure the actual 
construction was left to the management of a small committee 
chosen from the two Houses. 1 * 

Assembly participation in the conduct of public works had become 
quite marked, therefore, even before the outbreak of the financial 
controversies of the mid-century. But as a result of the popular 
victories upon that occasion, the influence of the representatives in 
executive matters within every island grew gradually more and more 
preponderant. It became essential not only that they be consulted 
upon all matters requiring expenditure, but also that they be given 
a share in the actual ordering and management of the works them- 
selves, that they might be able to judge equitably of the accounts 
which would later come before them for examination. The joint 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 175 

committee at once offered itself as a convenient device for securing 
the end desired, and became employed more extensively than ever 
before. In fact, the variety of circumstances in which joint control 
came to be practised during the latter half of the century quite 
defies enumeration only a few of the more noteworthy being of 
sufficient interest to merit description. 

In 1747 the Antiguan Assembly, desiring to have a new court- 
house built in the market place at St. Johns, proposed to the Council 
that a joint committee be appointed to prepare plans for the new 
structure. In due course this body returned its report, which met 
with the approval of both Houses. As a result it was given further 
instructions to hire labourers, purchase materials, and "contract 
with undertakers" for the erection of the building. 88 

In St. Christopher only a month or two later, the attention of the 
legislature was drawn to the need for choosing a new gaol. The 
Council suggested to the Assembly that a joint committee be set up 
"to agree for a proper place in the town of Basseterre". This course 
was adopted, the committee reporting only a week afterwards that a 
house belonging to a certain Mr John Douglas could be hired at a 
rental of 50 a year. The Houses having approved this suggestion, 
empowered their committee "to rent the said house . . . and also to 
agree with workmen for making iron bars and windows ... for the 
greater security of the place". 27 About the same time the represent- 
atives began to feel the need for a new meeting place in Basseterre. 
Accordingly they moved for the appointment of a joint committee 
to purchase some existing premises which were thought to be suit- 
able for conversion into public buildings. Apparently this expedient 
proved inadequate, for in 1750 we find the business of a new Sessions 
House again engaging their attention. Plans were now made for the 
erection of a totally new building. A joint committee was established 
to prepare specifications for the approval of both Houses; after 
which it received directions to superintend the actual work of con- 
struction. 18 

Not very long afterwards the Montserrat Assembly had similar 
need to occupy itself with the question of its public buildings. Here, 
however, it was the repair of the old ones rather than the erection of 
the new, that demanded attention. After some discussion the House 
appointed a committee of four of its own members to join some of 
the Council, "to inspect all public buildings and contract for all 
necessaries for the carrying on and repairing such". 29 In due course 
the necessary repairs were by this means effected. Much the same 
sort of task presented itself to the Antiguan legislature in 1765, when 



176 Early West Indian Government 

it became necessary to erect a new office for the local Registrar of 
Deeds. The Assembly adopted a scheme, similar in all respects to 
that already noted in St. Christopher. A joint committee was set up 
to purchase land, and prepare plans for the new building, and when 
these had been approved, the same committee was empowered to 
contract with workmen for its erection. 80 



4. Water Works 

Schemes for the supply of fresh water to the towns, being generally 
undertaken at the public expense, provided further opportunities for 
joint control. In 1772 the Nevis authorities, wishing to provide a 
constant water supply for Charlestown, appointed a joint com- 
mittee "to inspect into the . . . springs" near by, and to make a report 
to both Houses upon the practicability of tapping them. This body 
reported favourably upon the proposal. Thereupon the legislature, 
having first agreed to purchase the site of the springs, set up a fresh 
committee to prepare a bill to cover all details, and to carry "into 
execution" the whole affair. It was further decided "that their 
agreements and contracts with workmen and others shall be final" 
in other words, the terms of such agreements were not to be subject 
to any Assembly amendment, or even review. This joint committee 
was continued from session to session, with the result that consider- 
able progress was made in the laying of pipes between the springs 
and the town. After four years of effort, however, it became evident 
that the scheme was destined to failure; the works having merely 
choked up the springs to no purpose. The previous owner of the 
site petitioned to have his land restored to him, and expressed his 
willingness to refund the purchase price. The Houses, fully sensible 
of the futility of further persistence, glady adopted this course, and 
ordered the island Treasurer to take up all the pipes, in order that 
they might be put up for public sale. 81 In Montserrat, a similar 
proposal for supplying the towns of Plymouth and Kinsale with 
water from Bass's Springs came under discussion at the close of 1774. 
By common consent a joint committee was set up to report upon 
the practicability and cost of the scheme. This report proving quite 
favourable, a joint body was subsequently chosen "to consider proper 
ways and means for carrying the same into execution". Whether or 
or not the matter was ever brought to a successful conclusion it now 
seems impossible to discover; nor is it essential to our story. 81 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 111 

5. Conclusion 

It is clear, therefore, that by the eighties of the eighteenth century 
the agency of the joint committee had become almost universally 
employed in the management of all undertakings which required 
more than a negligible expenditure of public money. 33 The practice 
was only moderately efficient, but it was in complete accord with 
the prevailing political temper, and in harmony with the existing 
system of administering the finances. It is also clear that the As- 
sembly, by virtue of its financial power, had obtained by the latter 
half of the century a preponderating influence in the direction of such 
committees. The Nevis representatives were particularly insistent 
upon their authority in this respect. "This House" so runs their 
claim, "are of opinion that we have power to control the proceedings 
of all committees, unless they are made conclusive and final by a 
special joint resolution entered into by both Houses for that 
purpose." 84 Similarly the representatives of St. Christopher in 1778 
refused to a joint committee "full power to make necessary and 
essential repairs" to the fortifications, on the ground that the grant 
of such final authority to a mere committee would constitute too 
great a surrender of their own powers. "This House cannot in duty 
to their constituents," they asserted, "concur in delegating so 
material and extensive a power to a committee, as to enable such 
committee to make necessary and essential repairs without the 
consideration of this House to the propriety and necessity thereof." 35 

Further indication of the leading place which the Assembly had 
come to occupy in matters of direct administrative concern is found 
in the fact that they themselves sometimes took initial cognizance of 
an existing public need, by setting up a committee of their own to 
enquire into and report upon it. Having decided, moreover, that a 
certain work or service really demanded attention, the House itself 
was nothing loth to make the initial arrangements for carrying it out, 
even before the Council's consent had been obtained. In the island 
of Montserrat this popular disregard for the correct executive 
authority appears quite early. In 1745 the Assembly informed the 
Council that it had "agreed to allow Michael White Esq. one pound 
eight shillings per day, to direct the laying out of the trenches, 
batteries, etc. in [the island] passes", and desired the Board's ap- 
proval for the act. 36 A year later the same House contracted with a 
certain John Dyett to build a shed to the guard house at Old Road, 
upon the understanding that he would be paid for it in accordance 
with its estimated value when completed. Only when the shed had 



178 Early West Indian Government 

been finished did the representatives inform the Council of what they 
had done, and request the appointment of a joint committee of one 
from each House "to join two persons nominated by the said Dyett 
to appraise" the building. The Council raised no objection to this 
course. The appraisers met, valued the shed, and reported their 
decision to both Houses, whereupon an order was issued to Dyett in pay- 
ment of his services. Such informal procedure continued occasionally 
to be adopted in Montserrat right down to the close of our period. 37 

But that every Council was not prepared to submit to such popular 
presumption, and had ample power to combat it, is readily il- 
lustrated from a situation which arose in St. Christopher in July, 
1785. There the Assembly, having recognised an urgent need for 
repairing the barracks upon Brimstone Hill, had proceeded to set up 
a committee of its own members to arrange for the performance of 
the work. This body, acting solely upon its own authority, called 
upon contractors to submit their estimates for making the repairs. 
The Councillors learned nothing about the matter, until they 
happened to spy within the local newspaper the advertisement calling 
for these figures. In considerable astonishment they despatched an 
immediate note to the Assembly, pointing out the grave risk which 
it ran of having its proceedings completely disavowed. We "think 
it right to remind you", cautioned the Council, "that the concur- 
rence of this Board may possibly and indeed has heretofore been 
deemed absolutely necessary in passing all accounts incurred in the 
execution of such works". The threat produced immediate effect. 
The representatives lamely protested that it had never been their 
intention to ignore the Council's authority. They had adopted the 
course they did, only because the Council had not been in session 
when the decision to carry out repairs had been taken. They had 
always intended, they said, to obtain the Board's approval upon the 
first possible occasion. The Councillors, however, were not to be so 
easily appeased. For over three weeks they refused to have any more 
dealings with the Assembly in the matter, thereby causing the com- 
plete suspension of the work. When at length they did give permission 
for its continuance, it was only upon condition some of their number 
were added to the committee of management, thereby constituting 
it a body of joint control. 38 

Although this tendency on the part of Assemblies to usurp the 
whole of public works administration is of great significance, we 
must be careful not to give it undue stress. Such activity was 
relatively uncommon. It was the exception rather than the rule, and 
does not mar our general conclusion that it was the joint committee 



Public Works in the Leeward Islands 179 

which had become the real executive instrument in the conduct of all 
services undertaken at the public expense. Such a committee almost 
invariably contained more Assemblymen than Councillors, thereby 
giving the former a preponderant influence over its decisions. It could 
be set up upon the motion of either House at any time when a work 
of consequence required it. Moreover, since it was generally given 
an independent power to draw direct upon the Treasurer for its 
expenses, it enjoyed full authority over the work entrusted to its 
care, subject only to such directions as the legislature as a whole 
agreed to give it. 

The attitude of the imperial authorities to this development of 
joint committee administration was the same with regard to the 
Leeward Islands as it was to Barbados. The system met with no 
opposition from the Board of Trade. Acts establishing joint commit- 
tees, instead of being rejected, were allowed to "lie by". The Board's 
legal advisers, dreaming perhaps that the committees were always 
meant to enjoy a jurisdiction subordinate to the Governor and 
Council, repeatedly failed to raise objections to them. 

An Antiguan Act passed early in 1734 provided for the creation of 
two committees composed entirely of Assemblymen, for work upon 
Monk's Hill ; the first to repair the cisterns, and the second to repair 
the platforms for the guns. To these committees was entrusted the 
sole execution of the work, with power to draw direct upon the 
Treasurer for payment of all their expenses. Yet when this measure, 
after having reached the Board of Trade, was sent down for the 
inspection of its legal adviser Francis Fane, he replied that he could 
find "no objection" to it, with the result that it was allowed to enjoy 
its full effect. 39 If no objection could be found in so radical a 
measure, it is hardly likely that subsequent Acts establishing only 
joint committees would be excepted against. An Act passed some 
years later "for . . . building a new magazine . . . within James Fort" 
stipulated that directions for the erection of this building were to be 
given either by the Governor, Council and Assembly, or by "a 
committee of the same". Fane reported this too, as free from ob- 
jection. 40 Later measures of this type also failed to meet with op- 
position, there being no recorded instance of an Act being disallowed 
on account of legal opposition to the principle of joint control in 
public undertakings. From this fact we must infer that the growth of 
the system was not really opposed to the wishes of the imperial 
authorities, who were content that the prerogative in approved 
localities should be gradually relaxed, and the popular elements 
permitted freer play. 



Chapter XI 

APPOINTMENT IN BARBADOS AND THE 
LEEWARD ISLANDS 

1. Introduction 

The commission granted to every West Indian Governor gave 
him the right to appoint all officers civil, judicial, or military 
within his province. In practice, however, this theoretical authority 
was modified in two very important particulars. First, a Governor's 
right to make local appointments did not prevent his master, the 
King, from doing the same. The authority which appointed the 
greater assuredly possessed the power, if it wished, to appoint the 
lesser also. Secondly, in Barbados and the Leeward Islands there 
were some officials the special nature of whose duties was held 
sufficient to give the Assemblies a right to share in their selection. 
These officers comprised the Assemblies* own clerks and marshals, 
the island agents, Treasurers, and sometimes though this was not 
a uniform rule some others of the treasury staff. The present 
chapter deals with these three agencies of appointment. In it we shall 
attempt to discover the extent to which successive Governors and 
Councils came to have their appointing power restricted in ac- 
cordance with the encroachments of the Crown on the one hand and 
the Assembly on the other. 



2. External Appointments to Major Offices 

(i) DIRECT CROWN APPOINTMENTS. 

All island authorities deeply resented the manner in which their 
English superiors interfered in the making of local appointments. It 
was felt that the gift of places was one of the most powerful weapons 
a Governor possessed, both for keeping his subordinates duly 
obedient to himself and for rewarding those who might deserve well 
of his administration. The arrival of a stranger, therefore, armed 
with a commission from the Lord Proprietor, the Crown, or some 
government department, authorising his entry into an office which 
had previously lain within the Governor's gift, was sufficient to 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 181 

excite the bitterest passions of the local inhabitants. As often as not 
some existing official had to be turned out to make room for the 
newcomer, who, though enjoined by his patent to yield obedience to 
the Governor's authority, nevertheless enjoyed a position of com- 
parative independence so long as he retained sufficient influence at 
Whitehall to counter the complaints which the Governor might 
make against him. 

External interference in Barbadian and Leeward Island appoint- 
ments dated from quite early times. Charles II, whose name is most 
commonly associated with the beginnings of the patent office system 
within the colonies, in reality only enlarged and extended a system 
which had been created for him by his predecessors. He had pre- 
cedents dating from proprietary times to justify him in his acts. The 
Second Earl of Carlisle in 1640 had disposed of the office of Secretary 
of Barbados by commission direct from himself. 1 So too, during the 
Commonwealth, the posts of Secretary and of Provost Marshal in 
Barbados had been disposed of by patent from Cromwell. This had 
provoked bitter though unavailing protests from the planters who 
throughout the period of the civil wars had become accustomed to 
choosing all their own officials, 2 and resented the Protector's action 
as a piece of tyranny. They hoped that with the return of the Stuarts 
all such interference with their internal offices would cease. 

Charles, however, had quite other plans. Early in the first year of 
his return, he took occasion to grant both the Secretaryship and the 
Provost Marshalship 8 of Barbados to persons of his own selection. 
In vain the Barbadians protested the Governor's right to choose 
these officials; their remonstrances passed unheeded, and from 1672 
onwards all governors were forbidden to meddle with any places 
which had been granted by virtue of patents from the Crown. 4 In 
1676 the posts of Naval Officer and Clerk of the Market in Barbados 
were both erected into patentable places, much to the indignation of 
Governor Atkins, who complained bitterly against this growing 
encroachment upon his jurisdiction. Secretary Coventry in reply, 
stated the imperial attitude in the matter with unmistakable blunt- 
ness. The King had legal power to make direct grants of all the 
island offices if he so desired. "Your Assembly will be very much 
mistaken," he wrote, "if they think they can erect any office with 
power to take fees of the King's subjects, and by their power exclude 
the King from disposing of it." 6 Accordingly the post of Attorney 
General in Barbados not long afterwards became a Crown appoint- 
ment, and in the second half of the eighteenth century the Solicitor 
General's place followed suit. 6 



182 Early West Indian Government 

The same patent office process extended itself also to the Leeward 
Islands though upon a less extensive scale, for there the majority of 
administrative offices were of too trifling a value ever to be attractive. 
Nevertheless in 1677 the King granted the combined offices of 
Secretary and Provost Marshal in the Leeward Islands to one 
Captain Garrett Cotter in trust for his kinsman Sir James Cotter, 
the Deputy Governor of Montscrrat. Both Sir William Stapleton and 
his successor Sir Nathaniel Johnson deeply resented this step, which 
took from them the chief offices of worth within their gift. 7 For a 
considerable time after that no further Crown encroachments took 
place, but in the middle of the eighteenth century the offices of 
Attorney General and Solicitor General 8 of the Leeward Islands 
became direct Crown appointments, and so did the Chief Justice's 
place within each of those islands.* These Chief Justiceships, on 
account of their fees, were of considerable value, and it was probably 
this circumstance that first induced Chief Justices in the Leeward 
Islands to crave direct royal confirmation for the posts which they 
had already received at the Governor's hands. Such confirmation 
safeguarded them from arbitrary removal and so made their tenure 
of office more secure. The Crown, nothing loth to increase the scope 
of its own patronage, readily granted the desired favour. Having 
once encroached, it was not slow to usurp complete jurisdiction 
over all such places. For the future, though sometimes it filled them 
in accordance with a governor's recommendation, it no less 
frequently took the unrestricted liberty of filling them with whom- 
soever it pleased. 

(ii) DEPARTMENTAL APPOINTIIENTS. 

A similar reduction of vice-regal authority accompanied the 
growth of imperial customs administration within the islands. The 
commissions granted to the Willoughby brothers empowered them 
to establish ports and custom-houses and to appoint fit officers to 
fill these places. 10 The collection of the 4J per cent, duty in Barbados 
and the Leeward Islands, from its inception down to the year 1670, 
was completely entrusted to the management of these brothers, who 
must therefore have exercised the right of appointment so given 
them. But for the next fourteen years the duty was let out to farm, by 
which means the responsibility for its collection ceased to reside in 
the Governor, and became vested instead within the hands of local 
collectors appointed by the farmers themselves. Finally at the close 
of 1684 this system was abandoned, and its collection thenceforward 
devolved upon the Commissioners of Customs in England, who 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 1 83 

appointed local officials of their own. 11 In effect therefore, yet a 
further portion of the Governor's field of appointment was with- 
drawn from his control. 12 In much the same way, a Governor's right 
to appoint the local judges of the Vice-Admiralty Court was with- 
drawn early in the eighteenth century when it became customary for 
these to be appointed direct by the Commissioners of the Admiralty 
in England; and the island Postmasters from the very first were ap- 
pointed by the English Postmaster-General. 

Thus between direct Crown appointment on the one hand, and 
departmental appointment on the other, the most attractive posts in 
the island administration came to be withdrawn often quite early 
from the Governor's gift. 



3. External Appointment to Minor Posts 

Unfortunately, the system of external appointment to island 
offices was not confined to major posts. These having been absorbed, 
it only remained for many of the lesser clerkships, marshalships, and 
registrarships to follow suit. The eighteenth century bore constant 
witness to this process. 

The right of the Crown to take to itself the disposition of these 
lesser offices did not always proceed unopposed. In 1667 the 
Barbadian legislature passed an Act 13 giving the Chief Justices of the 
Common Pleas full power to appoint the clerks and marshals to be 
employed within their courts. In passing this measure the legislature 
destroyed the previously existing right of the Secretary and the 
Provost Marshal to appoint their own deputies to these places, and 
owing to the turmoil of the times the new procedure passed without 
serious 14 challenge until the opening years of the eighteenth century. 
In 1707, however, one George Gordon was appointed Provost 
Marshal of Barbados. When he arrived to take up his place his 
notice was drawn to the fact that, prior to 1667, the appointment of 
the clerks and marshals of the courts had resided in the possessors of 
his office. He readily saw that by securing the disallowance of the 
Act of 1667, he could regain this power. His determination to adopt 
this course was strengthened by the fact that there was a growing 
tendency within the island to repudiate his authority in other fields. 
The Judge of the Court of Vice-Admiralty had of recent years 
assumed to himself a right to reject the Provost's deputy, and appoint 
a marshal of his own for his court. A law of 1708, which permanently 
established a committee of public accounts, had similarly ordained 



184 Early West Indian Government 

that the committee have power to choose its own marshal. Gordon 
determined therefore to lay his complaints before the Crown itself, 
in order to stamp out these growing encroachments upon his 
authority. He secured the assistance of Alexander Skene, who was 
Secretary at the time. Together they drew up their bill of complaints, 
making it appear that it was as much their concern for the authority 
of letters patent as for their own profit which motivated their 
protests. Both the Board of Trade and the Privy Council lent them a 
sympathetic ear. Despite its forty years of operation the Act of 1667 
was disallowed, the Governor being instructed to admit the patentees 
to the full privileges of their offices, as enjoyed by their predecessors, 
and to take care that no further laws be passed infringing their 
rights. 15 

While the Provost Marshal was thus airing his wrongs, Secretary 
Skene was busy prosecuting some complaints upon his own account. 
The post of private secretary to the Governor had in the seventeenth 
century lain within the appointment of the island Secretary. This 
circumstance had caused much dissatisfaction among the governors, 
James Kendall in particular having complained loudly against the 
fact that he could not choose his own servant instead of having to 
put up with whomsoever the Secretary pleased to allow him. 16 Upon 
Skene's arrival within the island in 1700 the then Governor, Ralph 
Grey, took matters completely into his own hands by appointing a 
private secretary of his own, selecting Edmund Bedingfield, Skene's 
immediate predecessor, for the position. In order to provide him 
with suitable rewards, Grey ordered that all the clerical work 
attaching to the Governor's jurisdiction as Ordinary within the 
island should be transferred from the official Secretary to the private 
appointee. The Secretary was thereby robbed of the probate and 
testamentary business which hitherto had been his most profitable 
source of emolument. 

Skene petitioned the Crown for redress. Grey was called upon to 
explain the authority upon which he had acted. He replied that as he 
held the office of Ordinary, he surely possessed the right to appoint 
his own clerk for the transaction of that business. In this attitude he 
was supported by the local Council who, with more force than truth, 
asserted that all former governors had enjoyed the power of ap- 
pointing their own private secretaries. Skene, on the other hand, had 
the whole weight of past usage to support his claims, and could 
clearly show not only that his predecessors had appointed deputies 
to serve as private secretaries, but also that they had freely enjoyed 
the fruits of all testamentary business. The Board of Trade and the 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 185 

Privy Council both adopted the view that, whatever the theoretical 
rights of the Governor's position might be, it was the Secretary and 
not he who in the past had appointed the private secretary, and so 
ordained that the Secretary be continued in that privilege. Skene in 
1702 was granted a fresh commission which cleared the matter of all 
uncertainty by including the disputed place within the scope of his 
office. 17 For a few years he enjoyed the fruits of his victory un- 
disturbed. In 1708, however, a new Governor, Mitford Crowe, re- 
verted to a course similar to that attempted by Grey. He, too, chose 
his own private secretary, and robbed the principal Secretary of a 
portion of his duties in order to provide emoluments for the new 
appointee. Skene was again forced to appeal to the Crown, with the 
result that Crowe received strict injunctions to restore him the full 
fruits of his office. The Governor's stubborn refusal to comply with 
that command undoubtedly contributed to his recall in the following 
year, 18 after which Skene was left unmolested. 

Mitford Crowe also made a last determined stand upon the 
question of the Naval Officer's appointment, which was a long- 
standing grievance. By the terms of the Navigation Act of 1663 the 
appointment of this officer was vested in the Commander-in-Chief. 
Atkins had been the first to protest when the post was made a 
paten table one, and Kendall in 1691 had again protested. "The 
Governors", he had argued, were by the Act "made responsible for 
the execution of the said offices : 'twere but rightly reasonable [there- 
fore] that they should have the disposal of them to such as they 
[could] confide in." 19 Finally in 1707 Crowe, acting upon the as- 
sumption that the place lay rightfully within his patronage, forced 
Samuel Cox, the existing patentee, to pay a rent of 300 a year for it. 
The latter at once appealed to the Board of Trade, which speedily 
reproved the Governor for his arbitrary dealings and compelled him 
to restore Cox to the free enjoyment of his office. 20 

In the Leeward Islands this opposition to the system of external 
appointments to minor positions was not so pronounced, though we 
do know that the governors viewed its extension with dislike. The 
only serious challenge ever directed against it however was issued 
early in the governorship of John Hart (1721-27). Previous to this 
time the Governors of the Leeward Islands had enjoyed the right of 
appointing certain of the clerks and registrars within their ad- 
ministration. 21 Hart sought to extend his sphere of appointment by 
presuming to fill several additional offices which had previously lain 
within the gift of the island Secretary. Wavel Smith, the existing 
holder of that office, 22 was the very last person to submit to such 



186 Early West Indian Government 

treatment: he at once challenged the Governor's action. In the 
initial stages it was the Governor who triumphed. He refused to 
allow the Secretary's deputies to officiate in any of the disputed 
offices until Smith had accepted vice-regal commissions for them. 
Doubtless Hart reaped some profit from the grant of these, but his 
triumph proved very short-lived. Smith hastened to make his 
petition to the King, before whom he was able to argue that the 
Governor's willingness to compromise by the issue of commissions 
was in effect a confession of his bad title to them. Making the very 
most of his opportunities he laid claim to a wide margin of offices, 
even including some which had hitherto lain within the Governor's 
disposition. The Board of Trade found in the Secretary's favour and 
recommended that he be "continued in possession of the offices" he 
claimed. 23 

The success of external appointees in all such controversies was 
almost wearisome in its uniformity. It was useless for a Governor to 
struggle against Crown appointments. By the mid-century a wide 
variety of posts had come to be filled by Crown appointment; indeed 
almost every office of substance had become filled in this way. 



4. Assembly Encroachments 

The encroachments made upon the Governor's authority from the 
direction of the Assembly were by no means so uniformly successful. 
The Crown, as supreme Executive, did possess a legitimate right to 
appoint to island offices. The Assembly on the other hand, as a 
subordinate legislature, had no right at all to enter into the ex- 
ecutive sphere. The Governors generally realised this; though some- 
times only imperfectly. Consequently we find that the struggles be- 
tween them and their Assemblies over matters of appointment were 
both frequent and bitter. The Governors had legal right upon their 
side, but the Assemblies very often possessed a compelling influence 
which was more than sufficient to gain their ends. 

(i) THE ASSEMBLIES' SERVANTS. 

It is only to be expected that one of the first ways in which island 
Assemblies departed from English precedent was in the appoint- 
ment of their own servants. From earliest times of which record now 
exists, we find that their clerks and marshals where there were any 
were appointed solely by the private election of the members. The 
right of the Barbadian House to elect its own Clerk and Marshal was 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 1 87 

at no time ever challenged, with the result that it continued unabated 
throughout the whole period of our review. 24 In the Leeward 
Islands, on the other hand, this right of popular selection lasted only 
until the governorship of John Hart (1721-27) who compelled the 
Houses to revert to something like the English custom in the matter, 
whereby such appointments were left to the Crown. Although the 
Assemblies at his behest gave up their privilege, they must have done 
so only with the greatest reluctance, for on two earlier occasions the 
same subject had given rise to most bitter conflict. 

Early in 1710, when Governor Parke had called a session of the 
General Legislature to meet in the island of St. Christopher, the 
representatives refused to proceed to business unless they were 
allowed to appoint their own clerk. They insisted that the choice of 
their own servants had "been the constant practice, use, and custom 
of General and several Assemblies from the first settlement of these 
islands". 25 Parke's rigid insistence upon his legal right to the ap- 
pointment led to a complete deadlock, and later to the actual dis- 
solution of the House before an atom of business had been trans- 
acted. Then, too, it was the same Governor's insistence upon a 
similar right in connection with the Antiguan Assembly that pro- 
voked the quarrel which led ultimately to his death. 26 It is clear that 
Parke's immediate successors, instead of reviving the dispute, 
adopted the line of least resistance by acquiescing quietly in the 
Assembly's claim. 17 

Hart, however, returned to the charge, though not so bluntly as 
Parke had done. Whereas the latter had insisted on a right to 
appoint whomsoever he pleased, Hart was willing to concede the 
Assemblies an informal power of recommendation. Early in 1722, 
for instance, a new Assembly which met in Nevis, proceeded at its 
first meeting to select a clerk. Having chosen one Solomon Israel for 
the post, it asked Hart to admit him to be sworn. The Governor 
refused on the grounds that such a procedure would constitute an 
infringement of the prerogative. The representatives in vain pro- 
tested the ancientness of their right to free appointment. Hart proved 
adamant. The power of commissioning the Assembly's clerk be- 
longed to him. He was willing to compromise to the extent of al- 
lowing them to recommend the person whom they would prefer to be 
employed, but no further would he budge. They could take it or 
leave it. The House thereupon bowed to his will and "recom- 
mended . . . Mr Israel, of whom his Excellency approved, and admit- 
ted him to be sworn accordingly". 28 The Antiguans were similarly 
persuaded to adopt this procedure, the House being permitted 



188 Early West Indian Government 

merely to recommend its own clerk and messenger, both of whom 
were thereupon approved by the Governor and granted their 
commissions. 29 Before long the same practice was extended to 
other islands. 

But having thus vindicated their right, the Governors were not 
always careful to use it so tenderly. Although they maintained the 
general rule of allowing the representatives to recommend, they did 
not always confirm the first person the latter put forward. In 1742, 
for instance, the Antiguan House recommended a young man, 
John Gallway, for their messenger. Governor Mathew rejected him, 
asking the Assembly to make choice of another. Mathew stated 
that he considered the post more suitable for an elderly, partially 
disabled man, and that it would be an act of charity to grant it to 
such a person. The House thereupon acceded to his wish by recom- 
mending a man of whom he could readily approve. 30 A few years 
later Mathew went even further: in 1748 he appointed Peter Tyson 
to be Clerk to the Assembly of St. Christopher almost in direct 
opposition to the wishes of that body which was perfectly well 
satisfied with the existing Clerk, Craister Greathead. Nevertheless 
Tyson was admitted to the office.* 1 

By 1783, however, the Assemblies were all again tending to dis- 
regard the Governor's authority. Once more they are found claiming 
the essential choice of all their sevants, leaving to the Governor a 
mere formal right of confirmation. In part the Governors had 
themselves to blame for this, for they had of late become far too 
prone to disregard the Assembly's rights of recommendation. In 
1780, for instance, Governor Burt, having had reason to complain 
of the slovenliness of Aretas Akers, the existing clerk of the St. 
Christopher Assembly, decided straightway to dismiss him, and 
issued a fresh commission to one George Berkeley for the place. The 
representatives were deeply incensed at this repudiation of what they 
had grown to regard as their rightful privilege of initial recom- 
mendation. Being, moreover, quite satisfied with Akers they refused 
to admit Berkeley to the office. The Governor vigorously asserted 
his discretionary right to appoint whomsoever he pleased, but the 
House remained undeterred. Soon afterwards Burt died, leaving the 
administration in the hands of Anthony Johnson, President of St. 
Christopher. The latter took no steps to enforce Berkeley's admis- 
sion. Instead, Akers continued in office until March, 1781, when he 
resigned purely of his own accord. The representatives thereupon 
chose James Ward to succeed him. Only then did they signify their 
choice to the Commander-in-Chief in Council for his confirmation, 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 1 89 

with a request that he admit Ward to take his oaths of office before 
that Board. 32 It is significant that there is no mention of any com- 
mission in connection with Ward's appointment. It would appear 
that the Assemblies were fast succeeding in their efforts, and that the 
need for the vice-regal commission was becoming a thing of the past. 
Already in 1775 the Montserrat Assembly, smaller, more isolated, 
and less well known than its neighbours, had successfully presumed 
to choose a fresh clerk without securing the Governor's confirmation 
of him. 33 So, too, in Antigua, by the eighties the commission seems 
to have become unnecessary. Hurt's successor, Thomas Shirley, 
seems in this respect to have been most neglectful of his rights. 
During his governorship it was deemed sufficient that an Assembly's 
nominations be merely approved by him, after which its Clerk and 
Messenger (sometimes known by this time as Sergeant-at-Arms) 
were permitted to take their oaths and commence their duties with- 
out any further formality. 34 

(ii) ISLAND AGENTS. 

In the appointment of agents to manage the affairs of the colonists 
in England, it is only to be expected that the Assemblies should have 
desired some influence, and it is clear that the Councils never denied 
their right to this. Disputes which arose upon this matter related 
only to the proportionate influence which each House should enjoy. 
From the earliest years when agents had first been chosen the 
representatives had been given a prominent share in their selection. 
In Barbados the first agent ever appointed was chosen (1671) solely 
by the Assembly, which, though it did not insist upon this exclusive 
privilege in future years, came nevertheless to exercise an almost 
invariable right to nominate the agents, whom the Governor and 
Council were expected passively to confirm. The latter, however, 
were not long content to play so mechanical a part and strove hard 
for a right themselves to nominate, and to reject, if necessary, the 
Assembly's nomination. This struggle which commenced in 1694 
continued intermittently until 1709, when the Crown at the insti- 
gation of the Board of Trade, interfered upon the Council's behalf. 
In disallowing an unfavourable Agency Act passed early in that 
year, the Queen stipulated that for the future the appointment of 
agents should always be "by the joint consent of the Governor, 
Council and Assembly" in other words that the Council should 
enjoy a power of nomination or rejection just as freely as did the 
Assembly itself. 35 



190 Early West Indian Government 

For some years the matter remained on that footing, the agents 
being appointed by successive Acts in the passing of which the 
concurrence of three branches of the legislature was necessary. In 
the troublous decade 1723-1732, however, the whole controversy 
was revived, the lower House claiming the exclusive right of 
selection. But in the latter year they receded from their demands, 
thereby allowing a return to joint appointment by legislative Act, 
which system prevailed unbroken for the remainder of our period. 
It should be noted, however, that these Acts always originated in the 
Assembly, so that, with the passage of years, the right of that House 
to nominate the agent became a virtual reality. The representatives 
thus gained by the force of usage what they had failed to secure by 
more direct means. 

In the Leeward Islands the Assemblies were less aggressive, and 
were content to allow the Councils an equal right both to nominate 
and to reject. Never at any time did an Assembly attempt to exclude 
its local Lieutenant Governor and Council from participation in the 
agent's selection. In 1733 one Richard Coope was nominated by the 
Council of St. Christopher for appointment to that position. The 
bill appointing him was read first in the Council before being sent 
down for the approval of the lower House, which upon this occasion 
confirmed the choice.* 6 Indeed the selection of agents in each of the 
Leeward Islands was generally a matter for arrangement between 
the branches of its legislature. It generally took the form of a 
legislative Act over which each House possessed the right of amend- 
ment or rejection. Numerous instances arc on record where the 
Houses, in disagreeing over the choice, allowed the appointment to 
fall to the ground. 87 In the absence of clear-cut proof we cannot 
assert that the Leeward Assemblies possessed the sole right of 
selection, but it is clear that during the latter half of the eighteenth 
century the nomination as a general rule did rest entirely with them, 
the names being submitted only afterwards for the Council's ap- 
proval. 

The appointment of the Antiguan agent was conducted along 
lines sufficiently different from the rest to call for special notice. In 
that island a permanent Act was passed in 1698 to regulate the 
manner of his selection. This measure ordained that "the 
Commander-in-Chief, Governor, or President for the time being 
[should] once every year . . . nominate some fit person by and with 
the consent of the Council and Assembly of this island to be their 
agent". 38 For over seventy years the real intent of this Act was 
evaded, the Assembly and Council themselves continuing to nominate 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 191 

the agents, whose names were then submitted to the Governor 
for his confirmation. Thus the intended procedure was in effect 
completely reversed. At the close of 1772, however, Governor Ralph 
Payne compelled the islanders to return to the correct practice. He 
insisted upon his right to make the initial recommendation and limited 
the Council and Assembly to their right only to approve. 39 But 
with his removal from the government, the planters reverted to their 
previous custom. While not denying to each new governor his right 
of nomination, they completely stultified such a privilege by pre- 
suming themselves to recommend to him the persons whose ap- 
pointment they desired. Thus in 1782 the Assembly addressed the 
Council in the following terms. "We think . . . that the agency ap- 
pointment should be at this time filled up, and as Alexander 
Willock and John Burton Esqrs. both now residing in ... London, 
are very desirous of undertaking the public service jointly, we ... 
wish to recommend them to the favour and good opinion of his 
Excellency ... and of your Board, praying that his Excellency in 
pursuance of an Act passed in ... 1698 . . . would please to nominate 
these gentlemen as joint agents of this island ; and that your Board 
in consequence of such nomination would grant your assent, to 
which the concurrence of this House will readily be added." The 
Council being quite favourable to the appointment, Governor 
Shirley acceded to their combined request, by nominating Willock 
and Burton to the vacant office. 40 This was speedily drawn into a 
precedent, thereby giving to the Antiguan House the substantial 
privilege already possessed by the neighbouring Assemblies, of being 
able freely to nominate the person whose appointment was desired. 

(iii) TREASURERS. 

When we come to the appointment of local treasurers we enter 
upon more debatable ground. The claim of the Assembly to partici- 
pate though quite understandable was nevertheless not so ex- 
cusable. The right to select this officer lay quite legally within the 
power of the Governor and Council, as the regularly constituted 
Executive within each island. These generally realised that the ap- 
pointment was a matter of vital importance to themselves, for the 
authority which appointed the Treasurer assuredly kept within its 
grasp a very powerful lever over the conduct of the public finances. 
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that disputes on this head were 
by all parties considered of the very utmost importance, and gener- 
all provoked extreme bitterness. In all islands during the early years 
each local Treasurer was chosen by the joint concurrence of all 



192 Early West Indian Government 

branches of the legislature. There is no evidence that he was ever 
appointed during the seventeenth century by the Governor's com- 
mission. 41 

In Barbados as early as the Commonwealth, we have definite 
record that the Treasurer was chosen by joint agreement between 
"the Governor, Council and Assembly". 42 It may be that during the 
period of Francis Lord Willoughby's second governorship (1663-66) 
this practice was abandoned, but, if it were, it was certainly restored 
by his immediate successors. We have clear proof that by the year 
1670 the selection was again made by agreement between the 
Governor, Council and Assembly, and was finalised by the in- 
clusion of the appointee's name within the clauses of the Liquor 
Excise Act.** The lower House enjoyed the right to nominate him, 
and to submit his name to the Governor and Council for their 
approval. 44 This procedure was followed year after year, until the 
House, by amassing a weight of precedent in its favour, assumed to 
itself the sole right of nomination, while the Governor and Council 
by constant confirmation tended to destroy their right to reject. 

A preliminary clash in the matter occurred at the close of 1690, 
when the Assembly in preparing for a new Excise Bill, resolved to 
displace the existing Treasurer and to nominate a successor in his 
stead. The displaced official, happening to belong to the Council, 
naturally gained the support of his colleagues in protest: they were 
angry that the House should have presumed upon so drastic a 
course without consulting their wishes in the matter. They declared 
that they had always previously been consulted in the selection of the 
Treasurer, and desired that they might continue so for the future. 
The representatives, on the other hand, retorted that his nomination 
had always been their exclusive privilege, and denied that the 
Council had any right to interfere. Governor Kendall, fully sympa- 
thising with the Board, prorogued the House for three weeks, in an 
effort to make it relinquish its claims. In this, however, he was un- 
successful. The House instead forced him to capitulate, and 
continued for a further twenty years to put forward the initial 
nomination, which the Governor and Council continued auto- 
matically to confirm. 46 

But early in 1710 the whole question was revived. The Council 
for reasons of its own opposed the appointment of a certain Richard 
Downes whom the Assembly had recommended. This time the 
matter was fought to a finish. Taxation was completely suspended, 
the representatives refusing to raise a penny until they were allowed 
the selection of their own Treasurer. The dispute was speedily 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 193 

referred to the Board of Trade, who in turn consulted both the 
Attorney and the Solicitor -General upon it. The strong body of 
precedent in favour of the Assembly's demand, together with the 
grave dangers to which the semi-bankrupt island was subjected at so 
critical a time, induced the Board to recommend an acquiescence in 
the popular claims. By an Order-in-Council of 26th September, 1710, 
the right of the Council to reject the Assembly's nominee was 
abolished, and thenceforth the selection of the Treasurer lay com- 
pletely with the lower House. 46 

In the Leeward Islands during the early period when each As- 
sembly was accustomed to meet along with the Council, the 
selection of tax collectors and treasurers was always a matter for 
their joint agreement. 47 When at different intervals during the last 
thirty years of the seventeenth century, the Assemblies began to 
hold their sittings apart from the Councils, the same joint system was 
continued, the initial recommendation coming to reside custom- 
arily in the popular House. 48 This continued the general rule until 
the governorship of Walter Hamilton, who took up office early 
in 1716. Recognising the manner in which island practice differed 
from English usage, this man took immediate steps to recover what 
he concluded to be his rightful jurisdiction. The sessional records of 
the period are scanty of detail, and do not adequately indicate with 
what feelings the planters viewed his demands, but it is clear that the 
Assemblies proved far less aggressive than their Barbadian counter- 
part had done, with the result that Hamilton was finally able to 
impose his will upon them. His success doubtless owed much to the 
tact which he exercised in pressing his purpose, especially his 
willingness to continue in office ail their existing officials, whose 
positions he regularised by the issue of commissions from himself. 49 

But it was the thin end of the wedge. Once having vindicated their 
right, the Governors were not slow to make full use of it. John Hart, 
who succeeded Hamilton, was just the stamp of man to insist upon 
his full prerogatives, and preserve all that his predecessor had gained. 
Upon discovering that the existing Treasurer of St. Christopher had 
been dilatory in accounting for his receipts, Hart summarily dis- 
missed him and, after brief consultation with the Council, appointed 
a successor. 60 The same Governor, having received advice that the 
existing Antiguan Treasurer wished to resign, straightway conferred 
with the local Council over the selection of a new one. In vain did the 
Assembly seek to revive its right of initial recommendation. Hart 
flatly refused to part with his rights, and the House was forced to 
capitulate. 51 From that time onwards the appointment of the 



194 Early West Indian Government 

Treasurer within all the Leeward Islands remained in undisputed 
possession of the Governor-in-Chief, who with the consent of the 
relevant Council, disposed of the office by commission under his own 
hand and seal. 

(iv) EXCISE OFFICERS. 

Besides the appointment of the Treasurers, the Assemblies some- 
tunes concerned themselves in the selection of any other officials 
whose duties had to do with the collection of taxes, In every one of 
the islands import duties were levied for revenue purposes upon all 
incoming wines and strong liquors, while all vessels were compelled 
in addition to pay certain tolls of gunpowder for use in the local 
fortifications. In all islands save Antigua the collection of the liquor 
duties was entrusted to the local Treasurers, and even there the 
exception as we shall see later was more formal than real. The 
gunpowder, on the other hand, was everywhere collected by an 
officer specially appointed for the purpose, who was in addition 
generally made custodian of the local military stores and arms. 

In Barbados, although the collection of the liquor impost devolved 
upon the Treasurer, there was always a subordinate Comptroller 
employed to assist him. The selection of the latter caused some dis- 
pute in 1675, when the Assembly presumed for the first time to 
nominate him in just the same way as it did the Treasurer. The Cou i 
desiring to secure the appointment of one of their own number, 
John Hallett, to the post, demanded that the House waive its 
nomination. This the representatives refused to do. The continuance 
of the quarrel threatened to imperil the financial well-being of the 
colony; should no fresh Act speedily be passed the old measure 
would expire and the tax fall to the ground. To prevent this the 
Assembly consented to the passage of a temporary measure by 
which the existing duties were continued for a further three months. 
At the end of this time they again came forward with a nomination 
for the Comptroller's office. Astute politicians that they were, they 
now sought to recommend none other than John Hallett, the very 
man for whom the Council had so lately been contending. It appears 
almost certain the the ruse was successful and that the Board, intent 
more upon the victory of the person than of the principle, acquiesced 
in the choice. In the absence of definite proof we cannot be certain 
of this point, but it is quite clear that by 1677 the House had freely 
won the right of nomination which points to the probability of its 
victory two years earlier. 62 After the successful repudiation in 1710 
of the Council's right to reject the Assembly's nomination for the 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 195 

Treasurership, it became equally unconstitutional for it to reject 
their nominee for the Comptroller's office. The House therefore 
retained its privilege throughout the whole of the ensuing century. 

In Antigua by the terms of a permanent Liquor Excise Act passed 
in 1697 the collector of the duty was to be "chosen and appointed by 
the Governor-in-Chief ... or Deputy-Governor . . . and the Council 
and Assembly". 53 The position was, however, generally attached to 
the Treasurership, so that in nominating a person for the one, the 
Assembly in effect filled the other. When in the eighteenth century 
they lost the power of sharing in the Treasurer's appointment, it 
became necessary either to separate the two offices, or else for the 
House to grant the collector's office to the same person whom the 
Governor chose for Treasurer. The latter course was the one 
generally adopted. Each Governor, after choosing the Treasurer, 
submitted his name to the Council and Assembly in order that they 
might, if they saw fit, annex the collectorship to the major office. 54 



(v) POWDER OFFICERS. 

The powder officers, whose duties included the custody of the 
island military stores, were variously appointed. Neither in St. 
Christopher nor in Nevis does it appear that the Assembly ever 
seriously encroached upon the Governor's right to fill this office with 
a person of his own choosing. In Barbados and Montserrat, on the 
other hand, local laws 65 passed early in their history not only 
allowed the Assemblies to share in the selection, but gave them the 
sole right of nominating candidates annually for the position. The 
Governors and Councils of these two islands were left the bare 
privilege of approving the Assembly's choice, In the remaining 
island of Antigua the method of selecting the powder officer suffered 
a change almost parallel with that of the Treasurer himself. At the 
close of the seventeenth century he was chosen by arrangement be- 
tween the Governor, the Council, and the Assembly, the last named 
quite frequently, though not invariably, exercising the right of 
initial recommendation. 5 * The Powder Acts of the period also lent 
legislative sanction to the custom. In 1718 the Antiguan legislature 
sent to Governor Hamilton a bill which aimed at a continuation of 
this practice. The Governor, while recognising that the measure 
impaired the prerogative, nevertheless gave it his assent, pending 
an appeal to the Board of Trade for a ruling upon its validity. In 
writing to the last named he pointed out the ancientness of the 
existing custom and craved advice. 57 It does not appear, however, 



196 Early West Indian Government 

that the Board ever returned an answer, and the Governor was 
forced to take the decision into his own hands. This he did by re- 
fusing to permit any further infringement of his rightful powers, 58 
and thenceforward the House lost all share in the collector's ap- 
pointment. 

(vi) LESSER POSTS. 

In addition to the officers already described, the Assemblies at 
different times won a share in the appointment of many lesser 
officials. They were motivated sometimes by the fact that a post was 
of such public importance, it was desirable they should exercise some 
check upon the persons appointed; and sometimes by the fact that 
the salary of the official was a direct charge upon the public funds. 
By an Act of 1736 the Barbadian legislature ordained that the 
Assembly should annually nominate for the approval of the 
Governor and Council a gauger of casks for each of the main ports 
of the island. Two years later similar provision was made for the 
appointment of an Inspector of Health. 69 So, too, in 1774, the same 
legislature having decided that the appointment of an Inspector of 
Weights and Measures would be desirable, passed a law whereby the 
Assembly were allowed to nominate candidates for this post also. 60 
Finally in 1779, in appointing a Harbour Master for the port at 
Bridgetown, the Barbadians actually named the official in the Act 
which created his appointment, thereby giving to the lower House 
the virtual right of nomination.* 1 . 

The Antiguans in 1698 passed a law which allowed the Assembly 
a share in choosing the local Registrar of Deeds. 62 Only four years 
later the same people, in providing for the establishment of com- 
missioners of the public ponds, ordained that the Governor-in- 
Chief or in his absence the Lieutenant Governor "with the advice 
and consent of the Council and Assembly" should appoint "five 
knowing men as commissioners ... for the precinct of Falmouth, and 
the like number ... for the precinct of St. Johns". These men were 
entrusted with a general supervision of the ponds, with power to 
summon small negro levies to clean and repair them whenever 
necessary. In actual practice the literal intent of the Act from the 
very first was completely ignored, the commissioners gradually 
coming to be nominated in part by the Assembly from their own 
members, and in part by the Council from among theirs. 63 

In St. Christopher in June, 1727, a law was passed for the establish- 
ment of a Registry of deeds and conveyances. The Act stipulated 
that the Registrar was to be appointed by the Governor-in-Chief, 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 197 

with the consent of the Council and Assembly. But its literal in- 
tention was not always strictly followed, for sometimes in the event 
of a vacancy, the Governor, who did not reside in the island, felt 
at a loss whom to appoint and was glad to avail himself of the 
legislature's recommendation. This was in grave danger of being 
drawn into a precedent until Governor Mathew asserted his right 
to retain control of the nomination, and merely to submit it to the 
local Council and Assembly for their approval. After his death, 
however, his successors, less careful of their rights, allowed the 
Houses once more to usurp the right of nomination. Sometimes it 
was the Assembly which put forward the initial recommendation 
and sometimes it was the Council. The other House having concurred 
in it, the name of the selected candidate was sent on to the Governor 
for his confirmation and formal appointment. Onwards from the 
middle of the century this became in fact the customary method of 
filling the office." 

But the decisive personal gains made by Governors Hamilton and 
Hart in the domain of local appointment brought to a standstill the 
tradition of popular appointment which had been so prominent a 
feature in the public life of the Leeward Islands before their time. 
Where early Acts such as the above had already given permanent 
sanction to the joint appointment of certain officials, the Assemblies 
naturally let them continue, but as a general rule they made no fresh 
attempts to encroach upon the rightful authority of their Governors. 
It is in this that the difference between the Leeward Assemblies and 
that of Barbados is most clearly marked. The latter, as has been 
shown, continued actively throughout the eighteenth century to 
press upon the executive field of appointment, but not so its neigh- 
bours in the lesser islands. Occasionally, of course, a Leeward 
Assembly might assume again the forbidden power, as did the 
Montserrat House in 1740, when, with the Council's approval, it 
appointed Charles Pilson to take charge of the small arms belonging 
to the public. This position was worth but a trifling wage, and the 
Assembly ever afterwards assumed the sole right to dispose of it to 
whomsoever they deemed capable of undertaking it. 85 Such minor 
instances cannot, however, be regarded as serious exceptions to the 
general Leeward Island rule. 

5. The Position in 1783 

From what has been described, we can readily see what com- 
plication of authority had grown up in Barbados and the Leeward 



198 Early West Indian Government 

Islands by the close of the eighteenth century. The Crown, the 
Governor and Council, and the Assembly all aspired to some share 
of appointing power. The diversity of appointment which resulted 
from this was perplexing in the extreme. By 1780 there were in each 
island three main groups of officials a civil service, a legal and 
judicial establishment, and a military department. 

The civil service itself comprised three divisions. The first con- 
sisted of officials concerned with the collection of imperial revenue. 
Some of these, like the Naval Officer or the Receiver-General of the 
Casual Revenue, were patent officers. Others, comprising a small 
army of searchers, waiters, and collectors, were employed direct by 
the Commissioners of Customs in England, and worked under the 
supervision of a Surveyor-General of Customs chosen by the same 
authority. Still others, like the local Postmasters, were servants of 
the English Postmaster-General. The second was made up of the 
officials belonging to the local treasury the Treasurer, the Powder 
Officer, and their assistants who busied themselves with the 
collection of all taxes and dues levied for local purposes. In Barbados, 
as we have seen, most of these were chosen exclusively by the lower 
House ; whereas in the Leeward group by far the greater number were 
still appointed by the Governor in conjunction with each Council. 
The third section was of a very miscellaneous sort, consisting of the 
numerous clerks, registrars, inspectors, and marshals engaged in the 
general public service. Some of these, being patent officers or their 
deputies, took fees as their sole reward ; while others, found chiefly 
in Barbados, enjoyed regular salaries from the local treasury. These 
latter included the Inspector of Weights and Measures, the Inspector 
of Health, and the Harbour Master, all of whom were chosen almost 
exclusively by the popular House. 

The judicial and legal establishment included the judges of the 
various courts, the Attorney and Solicitor-Generals, and the medley 
of clerks, marshals, registrars, and examiners who were employed 
within the courts. In each island there were courts of General and 
Petty Sessions for the trial of criminal causes, as well as Courts of 
King's Bench and Common Pleas for the determination of civil 
actions. The former were presided over by the local Chief Justices and 
J.P.s, while suits in the latter were heard before a Chief Judge and 
a body of assistants. Moreover in Barbados, Antigua, and St. 
Christopher, there were Courts of Vice- Ad mi rally for the hearing of 
maritime causes; while in Barbados there was in addition a specially 
constituted Court of Exchequer, with its Chief Baron and its Puisne 
Barons." 



Appointment in Barbados and Leeward Islands 199 

We have seen how the appointment of all judges and J.P.s in 
Barbados (except the Vice-Admiralty judges) remained still within 
the competence of the Governor and Council; whereas the Leeward 
Islands Governor and his Councils could make final appointments of 
only the lesser judges and J.P.s, the Chief Justiceships there being 
within the gift of the Crown. The Attorney and Solicitor-Generals 
in both governments were likewise chosen by the Crown, and all 
Vice- Admiralty judges were appointed from England also; while 
of the battery of clerks, marshals and others, most were either patent 
officers or their deputies. 67 

In the military sphere, however, the Governor's freedom of ap- 
pointment remained intact throughout the full period of our review. 
The Assemblies never seem to have attempted so gross an infringe- 
ment of the prerogative as to have drawn to themselves a power of 
appointing to military places. In their Militia Acts they often set 
formal restrictions to the Governor's discretion as for instance, 
setting minimum property qualifications to be possessed by every 
aspirant to commissioned rank, or specifying the times and places 
of exercise but further than that they never presumed to go. The 
Governor's right to select his own officers for all commands within 
each local militia remained unthreatened from any source. 

The military establishment generally consisted of several com- 
panies of foot-soldiers and one or more troops of Horse. Posts of 
command within these, though numerous enough, were not only 
valueless, but even burdensome to all who held them. Consequently 
they excited neither the greed of place hunters nor the jealousy of the 
local Assemblies, who regulated the whole militia establishment by 
law, and many of whose members, being prominent planters, held 
military commands of the highest authority. 

To sum up, it is impossible to gauge with mathematical precision 
the losses suffered by the vice-regal authority between the years 1660 
and 1783, but it is possible to draw certain broad conclusions about 
them. The system of patent appointment robbed all Governors of the 
chief places within their gift. The Assembly of Barbados took from 
the local commander practically all the posts dependent upon the 
local treasury for their reward. Only in the Leeward Islands was the 
Governor's appointive authority left comparatively free from popular 
encroachment; and there, as if to balance the account, the Crown 
had taken to itself an unusual share of patronage relating to the 
higher judicial offices. In forming any estimate of the constitutional 
position of a Caribbean Governor at the close of the eighteenth 
century, each of these circumstances must be taken into account. 



Chapter XII 
APPOINTMENT IN JAMAICA 



1. Introduction 

The story of Jamaican appointments follows much the same lines 
as that of the sister islands. The royal commission to every Jamaican 
governor gave him the right to appoint all officers, civil, judicial, and 
military; but in practice this authority was invaded from the same 
three quarters as it was elsewhere. Firstly, the King by letters patent 
under the great seal took to himself the appointment of all the more 
lucrative posts; secondly, two or three English administrative de- 
partments made appointments to a small number of island positions, 
and thirdly, the Assembly in certain cases encroached upon the field, 
though not to quite the same extent as the Barbadian Assembly 
managed to do. 



2. External Appointment by Letters Patent 

It must be remembered that Jamaica at the time of the Stuart 
Restoration was a new colony, unprotected by existing usages, 
virtually empty, and lying wide open to exploitation. No wonder, 
therefore, that office seekers, disappointed perhaps in securing 
preferment in England, sought Jamaican offices as acceptable substi- 
tutes. The few really profitable posts soon went. As early as January, 
1661, the important office of island Secretary was granted by letters 
patent to Richard Povey for life, and the equally important Provost 
Marshalship to [Sir] Thomas Lynch for life. Next month John 
Mann was similarly made Surveyor-General of all lands in Jamaica 
for life. 1 

There was then a lull for a few years because none of the other 
offices was worth the trouble and expense of soliciting a royal grant, 
but as soon as these began to become even moderately profitable, 
the tendency to seek royal appointment reappears, and several more 
places, previously in the Governor's gift, were usurped by letters 



Appointment in Jamaica 201 

patent. In 1672 the Chief Clerkship of the Supreme Court became a 
patentable place, being followed in rapid succession by the office of 
the Registrar of the Court of Chancery (plus Clerk of the Patents), 
the Clerkship of the Court of Common Pleas at Port Royal, and the 
office of the Clerk of the Crown and the Peace. 2 The Receiver- 
General's place, previously in the Governor's gift, was filled by 
letters patent for the first time in 1674 and remained a patent office 
ever afterwards. Similarly the Auditor-GeneraFs place became 
permanently patentable in 1680, the Naval Officer's in 1681, and the 
Attorney-Generalship about 1693. 3 Well might Sir Thomas Lynch 
remark, even as early as 1683, that "the very meanest office in this 
island is patented and for lives, too in England". 4 

The governors resented the patent office system as an encroach- 
ment on their rights and a diminution of their authority, for the 
patentees, behave as they might, were well-nigh irremovable, their 
appointments being on practically the same plane as the Governor's 
own. Moreover, since the Secretary, in addition to being Clerk of 
the Council and of the whole administration was also ex officio 
secretary to the Governor, it was almost impossible for a governor 
to employ a private secretary unless he was willing to pay him out 
of his own pocket or resort to some subterfuge for his emolument, 
the Secretary naturally being unwilling to surrender to the new- 
comer any of the prerogatives or profits of his office. Despite this, 
the Duke of Albemarle, during his short but high-handed ad- 
ministration (1687-88) insisted "on account of his great dignity" on 
having no fewer than three clerks of the Council, the deputy 
Secretary and two others of his own choosing. Undoubtedly he 
would have met with opposition from the patentee in England if he 
had not died so soon. His successor, President Watson, lost no time 
in dismissing the two extras 5 and so restored the deputy Secretary to 
his full rights. Not long afterwards Lord Inchiquin (1690-92) also 
employed a private secretary for whose remuneration he assigned all 
that profitable part of the Secretary's duties that related to wills and 
probates. The deputy Secretary, Edward Broughton, at once ap- 
pealed both to his principal and the English authorities; but history 
repeated itself, Inchiquin died ! and the private secretary resigned of 
his own accord. It was well that he did, for within two months a 
royal order arrived directing that Broughton be restored to his full 
privileges. 6 It was a considerable time before governors found a way 
out of the difficulty, and then it was only by a ruse. With the con- 
nivance of the Council they set up an office known as the "Messenger 
for the Carriage of the Public Despatches" with a salary of 500 per 

o2 



202 Early West Indian Government 

annum payable from the public treasury; which office was custo- 
marily bestowed upon the Governor's private secretary, so providing 
him with suitable emolument. 7 Perhaps it was the success of this 
ruse that emboldened the Council in 1757, dissatisfied as it was with 
the services of the deputy Secretary, to try the experiment of choosing 
a clerk of its own. But the deputy at once appealed to England, and 
the Council was instructed to restore him to his customary duties 
without delay. Thus we see how the patent office system irked not 
only the Governor but the Council as well. 8 

The people, for their part, hated the system for the corruption and 
inefficiency that it bred. Since the offices were almost invariably 
exercisable by deputy, the patentees of all but the smallest generally 
resided in England and either farmed or rented the places to 
deputies. 9 Occasionally even the deputy remained in England and 
acted on the spot through a deputy deputy! No wonder that Lieu- 
tenant Governor Beeston in 1697 felt "bound in duty" to complain 
to the Board of Trade how great a prejudice it was to the island "that 
the patentees who have all the great offices live in England and send 
over anyone to officiate who are strangers to the place, to the people, 
and the offices they come to manage, and when they fail to pay their 
rents or chance to die, other strangers are put in their room, by 
which means the Treasury and the Secretary's Office of Records, and 
all others are illy and unduly managed, and men's interests are there- 
by in danger and their estates precarious". 10 The Jamaican Agents 
also complained loudly in the same strain. 

The Board of Trade, only freshly established and zealous in the 
performance of its duties, lent a sympathetic ear and early in 1699 
prevailed on the Privy Council to order that all patent officers be 
obliged "by their patents or otherwise" to reside in their various 
territories "and execute their respective offices in their own persons 
unless in case of sickness or other incapacity". 11 The Jamaican 
Legislature, in ignorance of what was pending at Whitehall, itself 
passed an Act "to oblige patentees of offices to reside in this island", 
but the English authorities disallowed it on the grounds that it was 
an infringement of the prerogative and, in any case, merely sought to 
do what the Order-in-Council had already done. Unfortunately, the 
Order-in-Council proved completely ineffective, partly because of 
an uncertainty as to whether it applied to existing, or only to future 
patents. The whole weight of patentee influence was ranged against 
it, with the result that the obscurity was never properly cleared up 
and it was allowed rapidly to become a dead letter, 12 much to 
colonial disgust. Even Jamaican attempts to prevent pluralism by 



Appointment in Jamaica 203 

forbidding any one person to hold "two or more offices of profit" 
failed to escape disallowance in England, where the patentee interest 
proved ever unconquerable. 13 

3. External Appointment by Government Departments 

Patentable places were not the only Jamaican positions outside the 
Governor's gift. There was, in addition, a handful of posts within 
the disposal of English government departments. Most important of 
these were the several Jamaican offices of the imperial customs, such 
as those of the local comptroller and collector who were both ap- 
pointed by the English Commissioners of Customs. 14 Then there was 
the local Postmaster appointed by the English Postmaster-General. 15 
Finally there came the Judge, the Advocate-General, and the 
Registrar of the Court of Vice- Admiralty which had jurisdiction over 
all prizes brought into Jamaican waters by n